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Abstract 
This research explores the determinants of risk behaviour when an organisation 
operates outside its normal operational domain. Organisations are being forced 
outside their normal operational domains with ever-increasing frequency. 
Through studying a banking acquisition, an area which has not been studied 
before, the research identifies the risks faced by the organisation, the apparent 
irrational management of the risks, and the reasons for this behaviour. 
The research applies multiple research methods, which include the review of 
company documentation, interviews with key managers and external experts, a 
modified Delphi technique, case studies and statistical analysis. Through these 
methods, the risks faced by the organisation are identified and evaluated in terms 
of probability, impact, and degree of mitigation. Four risks are investigated in 
detail, and based on these, six propositions are put forward, four of which are 
support by statistical tests. 
The research shows that where the organisation had a successful outcome history 
in managing a given risk, or could manage the risk using normal management 
controls, the risk tended to be managed disproportionately well compared to its 
significance. Where those conditions do not apply the management of the risk 
tends to be proportionately lacking. There is also evidence to suggest that the 
existence of industry-specific regulation in relation to a risk results in the risk 
being better mitigated. 
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Organisations wishing to improve their risk response in unfamiliar operational 
domains should therefore consider day-to-day controls as one route to 
improvement. Also, where possible, they should try to create a history of 
successful outcomes in dealing with the risk types they are likely to face in 
unfamiliar problem domains. Regulatory bodies need to consider the impact that 
their regulations will have in order to help organisations exhibit better behaviours 
in unfamiliar problem domains. 
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PART A: SYNOPTIC DOCUMENT 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LINKING 
DOCUMENT 
This chapter introduces the research, its background, purpose, and structure, and links 
the three research projects. 
1 Introduction 
The terms "merger", "acquisition" and "takeover" refer to various forms of 
transforming the control of an organisation from one set of owners to another, and 
collectively, they are referred to as merger and acquisition (M&A) activity (Sudarsanam, 
1995: 1). This activity involves the combining of two or more corporate entities, or 
parts of entities, to form a new or enlarged single entity. 
Undertaking a merger or acquisition places most organisations outside their normal, 
and therefore "familiar", operational domain. The process of changing the legal 
ownership of the company (Change of Control) places operational constraints upon all 
organisations, and in the case of investment banks which trade equities, commodities, 
debt and similar financial instruments on their own behalf and on the behalf of their 
clients, there are additional constraints which are unique to the financial services 
industry. This research examines how one large investment bank acquired another 
investment bank. By examining this acquisition, the determinants of risk behaviour, 
and the behaviour itself, are determined. The focus is primarily on the risk 
identification and behaviour during the acquisition's Change of Control (CoC). 
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1.1 The target organisation 
This research examines what was, at that time, the largest acquisition in financial 
history. While the research focuses on both the acquiring and acquired bank, it refers, 
on occasion, to an earlier acquisition made by the acquired bank. It is necessary to 
keep the identity of the target organisation and the other two banks confidential. 
There are four primary reasons for concealing the identity of firms involved. Firstly, 
there is the possibility that some details might compromise the acquiring bank's 
competitive position. Secondly, at this senior level the banking industry is a close-knit 
business community, and the individual participants stipulated that anonymity be 
maintained. Thirdly, there is the possibility that any unfavourable findings could 
embarrass the target organisation and might impact upon its standing, reputation and 
possibly market valuation. Fourthly, by assuring confidentiality, I have been given, 
with the exception of personnel data, almost unrestricted access to the acquisition 
documentation, and this would not have been forthcoming otherwise. 
The research refers directly to three banks; Banks A, B and C. The first, Bank A, is the 
investment-banking arm of a major UK bank. Its parent is a successful retail and 
commercial bank. It created Bank A as part of its diversification into other financial 
products. 
Bank A had a turbulent trading history and incurred substantial losses. In the late 
1990s its parent wished to divest it. An American bank, Bank B, acquired it. 
Bank B is a long-established US investment bank, ranked amongst the ten largest in the 
US. It made a number of successful acquisitions during the 1980s and 1990s and 
acquired Bank A in the second half of the 1990s. 
Page 3 
Bank C is a large European bank. It had grown through acquisition and organic 
growth; becoming the leading retail bank in its home country as well as other 
European countries. In addition, its investment banking operations are sizeable in the 
UK, Europe and Asia. It acquired Bank B in the late 1990s creating a global 
investment bank. 
Bank C is the target organisation of this research. All of the participants have been 
involved in Bank C's acquisition of Bank B. Many have also been involved in Bank B's 
acquisition of Bank A. 
1.2 The business issue 
In introducing the business issue, this section will examine how merger and acquisition 
activity among banks and similar financial organisations is different from M&A activity 
in general. This section will show that. 
e There is a growing trend toward increased M&A activity (Mergerstat 2003b), 
both in terms of transactions (number of M&A deals being attempted) and size 
(monetary value of organisations being combined) 
" M&A activity is expensive to undertake; the merger under study cost over 
US$11 billion [D0008C] 
" M&A activity is failure-intensive (more not to achieve its stated aims than 
achieve them) (Meeks, 1977) 
" When M&As fail, they are very expensive in terms of shareholder value and 
may threaten the existence of the organisation. A recent example of this is the 
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post- merger losses of US$97 billion at AOL Time Warner (Thal Larsen, 
2003: 1); and 
" Banking and finance M&As are subject to special regulatory reporting 
requirements which require close co-operation between the acquirer and the 
acquired, which is normally prohibited and is normally not essential and is 
prior to the CoC. 
Naturally, with such high probability of loss combined with such high potential impact, 
risk management is very important in these circumstances. This has been given greater 
importance in recent years by a number of key stakeholders, such as financial 
regulators, looking to improve financial reliability, governance and reporting law 
enforcers who suspect that malpractice (such as fraud) may have taken place, and 
industry leaders and the public, who are concerned with the level of ethics exhibited by 
corporations. The importance of these issues has risen as a result of a number of high- 
profile corporate failures and reporting scandals such as those involving Enron/Arthur 
Andersen and \VorldCom (Larkin and Casscles, 2003). 
Even with the high level of this risk and ensuing public attention, mergers remain a key 
part of many corporations' intended and emergent strategies, and show no signs of 
abating (Mergerstat, 2003a). This has certainly been the case with the target 
organisation. Bank C attempted three major acquisitions during the 1990s. The target 
organisation's success with these acquisitions was mixed. One was considered a 
success (Barber, 2000), while another was generally considered a failure (Harris, 1999; 
Hart, 1998), a perception worsened by its subsequent involvement in a US$200 million 
fraud trial (Eaglesham, 2002). The third major acquisition failed prior to the change of 
Page 5 
control (Aalund, 1999; Rhoads and Portanger, 2000a; Rhoads et al., 2000) resulting in 
the resignation of one director (Harris et al., 2000) and playing a major role in the 
undermining and the subsequent resignation of the chairman (Rhoads and Portanger, 
2000b; \Valker, 2000). 
1.2.1 Growth in merger activity 
During the 1990s the investment banking sector, like other sectors, saw a considerable 
amount of M&A activity. The target organisation was not alone in following an 
acquisition strategy. Some of the more significant acquisitions and mergers of that 
period were the merger of Saloman Brothers and Travellers Group to form Salomon 
Smith Barney (The Economist, 1997; Horowitz et al., 1997), which in turn were 
acquired by Citi Bank a year later (Siconolfi, 1998) to form Citi Group, and the 
acquisition of JP Morgan by Chase Manhattan (Silverman and Thal Larsen, 2000) to 
form JP Morgan Chase. In Europe too, this trend was common; Bankers Trust 
acquired Nat\Vest Markets (Wall Street journal, 1997), the enlarged Bankers Trust was 
itself acquired by Deutsche Bank a year later (Breuer and Neumann, 1999), Deutsche 
Bank having completed an earlier acquisition of Morgan Grenfell in 1989 (Pensions & 
Investments, 1990). 
Banks have not been alone in this "merger wave" (Sudarsanam, 1995). The level of 
merger activity globally is generally increasing (BBC Online, 2000b; Williams, 2000; 
The Banker, 1999a; Mergerstat, 2003b). This is clear from the data presented in Table 
1- Global merger activity (1980-2003). Since 2001 the level of activity has decreased, 
but this should be seen as the passing of yet another "crest" of a rising merger "wave" 
(Sudarsanam, 1995), a phenomenon that has been observed several times in the past. 
While figures for 2003 are not yet available, indications are that we have now passed a 
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trough in this particular wave. During the first six months of 2003 there was a drop of 
just over 6% in terms of both volume and transaction levels (Thomson Financial, 
2003b). In contrast, the third quarter showed a 14% increase in activity (Thomson 
Financial, 2003a) and the fourth quarter has seen a series of very large mergers and 
acquisitions being announced, prompting the Financial Times to wonder whether 
"[the] Big merger animals" and "Merger mania" was back (Financial Times, 2003). In 
one day alone (October 26t, 2003) the BAT/Phillip Morris merger was announced, 
along with four others worth over US$70 billion (Morgan, 2003). This type of 
behaviour has been observed previously, and there are periods when companies "get 
high" on M&A activity (Sudarsanam, 1995: 1). 
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Year Number of 
Deals 
Value (US$ 
billion) 
Average 
Transaction 
(US$ million) 
1980 1,889 44.3 23.5 
1981 2,395 82.6 34.5 
1982 2,346 53.8 22.9 
1983 2,533 73.1 28.9 
1984 2,543 122.2 48.1 
1985 3,001 179.8 59.9 
1986 3,336 173.1 51.9 
1987 2,032 163.7 80.6 
1988 2,258 246.9 109.3 
1989 2,366 221.1 93.4 
1990 2,074 108.2 52.2 
1991 1,877 71.9 38.3 
1992 2,574 96.7 37.6 
1993 2,663 176.4 66.2 
1994 2,997 226.7 75.6 
1995 3,510 356.0 101.4 
1996 5,862 469.1 80.0 
1997 7,848 674.8 86.0 
1998 8,047 1283.4 159.5 
1999 9,628 1387.4 144.1 
2000 11,123 1268.6 114.1 
2001 8,545 683.0 79.9 
2002 7,411 441.6 59.6 
2003 7,200 480.4 66.7 
Table 1- Global merger activity (1980-2003) (Mergerstat, 2003b) 
As stated previously, the transaction being studied cost in excess of US$11 billion, 
which is large (a factor of thirty nine) compared with an average banking merger, 
which costs about US$282 million in 2003 (Mergerstat, 2003b). 
1.3 Expense of mergers and acquisitions 
Mergers are expensive undertakings. The acquiring bank (Bank G) paid almost US$11 
billion to acquire Bank B [D0008C]. In addition to the purchase price the direct 
12003 is for the year to 31« October 2003 
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transaction cost exceeded US$120 million POC27q. That does not include 
opportunity costs, costs not directly attributed to the acquisition or the post-integration 
costs (which included over US$400 for redundancies charges (Harris, 1999)). 
This trend is not unique to the target bank, and the size of mergers (average monetary 
value of individual deals) is also growing (Mcrgerstat, 2003b; Bremner, 1999; Time, 
2000; Foust, 1998; Business Week, 1998; Mergers & Acquisitions, 1981; BBC Online, 
2000b; Spitzer et al., 1999). 
In the investment banking industry there are many factors that encourage banks to 
engage in M&A activity. Many banks wish to increase their capital or asset base 
(Rowley, 1999; Mergers & Acquisitions, 1998), and this leads to industry consolidation 
(Laffie, 2000; Bremner, 1999). Changes in the regulatory environment, particularly in 
the United States (Henriques, 1998; Mergers & Acquisitions, 1998; Anonymous, 1999), 
means that the traditional boundaries between investment banks and other banks and 
financial institutions are becoming less well defined (Harrison, 1997), which offers 
merger opportunities to investment banks. Some banks respond to this by extending 
their geographic scope (Mergers and Acquisitions, 1998; Gart, 1998; Uhlenbruck and 
De Castro, 2000), extending their product set (Bawden, 1999; Sikora, 2000), or 
enhancing their existing market position (Connor, 1985; The Banker, 1999b; Creswell, 
1999). Another attraction of M&A is the opportunity to improve their operating 
environment in terms of efficiency (Hoffman, 2003) or technology cost (Hoffman, 
1992). 
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1.3.1 Failure intensity 
While there are many reasons to engage in M&A activity, it is, nonetheless, failure 
intensive by its nature. There are no specific statistics on merger failure, however, 
estimates suggest that between 70% (BBC Online, 1999) and 80% (Spitzer et at, 1999) 
of all mergers and acquisitions fail. Failure is interpreted in its broadest sense, covering 
everything from the collapse of the merger deal in the negotiation phase before 
completion due to suitable regulatory approval not being forthcoming or simply the 
negotiation failing, through to the benefits of the M&A not being realised. For the 
purposes of this research, failure means failing to attain any of the goals of the merger 
or acquisition whether they are tactical or strategic, this is similar to view taken by 
Meeks (1977) in his research. 
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1.3.2 Expense of failure 
When a failure occurs it is very expensive. The failure of the first attempt at a merger 
between Glaxo Wellcome and Smith Kline Beecham resulted in a fall of over 110 
points in the FTSE 100 index (BBC Online, 1998). The damage to a company can 
range to its reputation being undermined through to it failing to have the resources or 
capability to grow once the merger is complete. The merger of AOL (America Online) 
and Time Warner resulted in AOL Time Warner posting the largest loss in commercial 
history, US$45 billion, as a result of the largest single write-off in commercial history 
(Thal Larsen, 2003). 
Failure of mergers reduces shareholder value (Sudarsanam, 1995). Three long term 
studies suggest that over time the average effect on the corporate performance of the 
acquiring organisation (which includes the acquired firm) is never positive. Firth 
(1980) found no improvement in performance; Limmack (1991) found a negative 
impact of 4.5% on expected financial performance, and Franks and Harris (1989) 
found a negative impact on performance of 12.5%. This type of performance is also 
reflected in other studies by academic researchers (Kitching, 1974; Herzel and Shepro, 
1990; Meeks, 1977; Ramaswamy, 1997), practitioners (IIabeck, Kröger, and Trim, 
2000; Arthur Andersen, 2000; Spitzer et al., 1999), and anecdotal evidence (Currie, 
1999) in the public media (Economist, 2000; BBC Online, 2000a; Major et al., 2000). 
In addition to the traditional understanding of the risks involved, practitioner and 
professional sources have recently highlighted other risks that have become more 
prevalent in the last five years or so. These include the cost of stock options (Van 
Vleet, 2000), staff retirement costs (Germano and Will, 1998) and an increase in 
litigation activity resulting from M&A activity (Parker and Balto, 1999) which requires 
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careful legal management (Drexhage, 1999) which is beyond the capability of many 
firms and their financial advisers. Additionally, financial markets may not behave as 
anticipated, which can place the merged organisation under greater strain in managing 
its liquidity (Foussianes, Harris, and Lavine, 1999), which in turn can limit the firm's 
tactical and strategic flexibility and impact upon its performance (Das and Elango, 
1995). 
1.3.3 Unique regulatory requirement 
In the United Kingdom, a number of statutory bodies supervise the regulation of 
mergers and acquisitions. These general regulations separate the acquiring and target 
company to protect the shareholders' interests. These operate to ensure that the 
merger is allowable (i. e. not against the public interest) and that it is conducted in a fair 
and appropriate manner. The main bodies which are interested in protecting the 
public interest are the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Monopoly and Mergers 
Commission (MMC). The City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ("the Panel"), which 
has implemented the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers ("the Code" - also known 
as "the Blue Book" because of the colour of its cover), oversees the conduct of a 
merger. In addition, there is also European Union regulation, and most countries will 
have their own specific merger legislation, which is important in the case of trans- 
national and cross-border M&A. This means that international or cross-border 
mergers may be subject to many different regulations and regulatory bodies. The 
broad aim of this regulation is to protect the public and shareholders by assessing the 
validity of the merger and making sure that it is conducted correctly. This results in the 
two parties to a merger being required to keep a certain distance apart until the merger 
is transacted, and the Change of Control (CoC) is completed. 
Page 12 
This research is conducted in the financial services industry. In the United Kingdom, a 
single statutory body, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), regulates this industry. 
The PSA regulates firms that are involved in trading activities in a special way. Like 
other financial regulators, the PSA requires detailed daily reporting. This reporting can 
cover many areas depending on the specific business activities of the firm in question. 
Typically, the FSA requires reporting on capital adequacy (the amount of cash and 
liquid assets held to cover any outflows that may occur), large equity positions (typical 
equity holdings greater than 5% in a public company), anti-terrorism and money 
laundering (activities to "hide" money gained from illegal activities) and exposure to 
credit (risk of not being paid) and market (losses resulting from movement in market 
prices) risk. 
In order to appreciate the complexity of these regulations, it is necessary to appreciate 
the complexity of the reporting requirements, and thus, just how difficult they are to 
satisfy. The easiest to imagine is large equity holdings. Banks, for example, are 
required to report their holdings of a given stock if the total position is greater than 5% 
of that total stock issued. It is necessary to gather that information from its trading 
businesses and systems across the globe. It is possible for a large investment bank to 
operate many businesses around the world in many different markets. This has to be 
calculated and reported slightly differently for each country in which the bank operates, 
for each of the regulators, in order to meet specific local requirements. In addition, 
many countries have multiple regulators with differing areas of responsibility. The 
United States has both State (regional government) and Federal (national government) 
regulators (Anonymous, 1999). To gather this information, calculate it and present it 
in the correct format in the time allowed is an extremely difficult task because of the 
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time zone differences. The close of business in New York is only a few hours from 
the start of business in Sydney and Tokyo. This is complicated further by the need to 
conduct the reporting across the two enterprises immediately after the CoC. In order 
to meet these sorts of regulatory requirements straight after a merger, advanced 
preparation, and integration and co-ordination of business controls are required. 
To maintain this level of reporting, the financial regulator requires a high degree of 
integration from the moment the two firms are legally joined, which is potentially at 
odds with the need for separation required by the Panel, OFT and MMC. This 
potential source of conflict does not appear to exist in any other regulated industry, 
because other regulated industries do not require daily business reporting for the whole 
of the enterprise. 
1.3.4 Merger and acquisition risk 
As mentioned earlier, the target organisation had experienced two acquisitions which 
failed. This is not unusual considering the considerable practitioner evidence to 
suggest that failure rates for M&As are in the 70% - 80% range (BBC Online, 1999; 
Spitzer et al., 1999). 
Failure occurs when a deal is attempted and is not legally agreed, when transfer of 
ownership is not completed, or when the deal is completed but in the period following 
completion, the acquirer or the new merged organisation does not attain the goals 
which were expected of the deal in the first instance. Research into practitioner 
attitudes across a number of industries conducted by A. T. Kearney, referenced in 
"After the Merger" (Habeck et at., 2000: 4), suggests that the risk of failure is most 
likely in the "post-merger" phase, but that the likelihood of failure is only slightly 
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higher than in the preceding due diligence and execution of the change of control 
(CoC) of the deal. Their findings are shown in Table 2- Risk of merger failure. 
Phase Probability of failure 
Strategy development, candidate screening 
and due diligence 
30% 
Negotiation and closing (including the CoC) 17% 
Post-merger integration 53% 
Table 2- Risk of merger failure 
1.3.5 Regulation 
All of this activity is taking place in a changing regulatory environment where some 
regulators are having to reappraise their position and role (Santomero, 1999), 
addressing fundamental questions such as how big should a single organisation be 
allowed to become (Brown, 1999), and some are even having difficulty in keeping pace 
(McLeod, 1999) with the rate of change. 
There have been many high profile corporate scandals in recent years, such as Enron 
(Stabile, 2002), IIIH (BBC Online, 2003a) and \VorldCom (BBC Online, 2003b). 
These have resulted in a greater public awareness which has seen further commitment 
to improving the regulatory environment, and will almost certainly result in more 
regulation (Larkin and Casscles, 2003). The most significant changes to the regulatory 
environment have been the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act 2000" (Sarbanes and Oxley, 2002) and the continued development of 
the Second Basle Accord (FSA, 2000a; FSA, 2000b). These changes, plus new 
regulations centred around conflict of interest (Croft, 2003) and arbitrage (Gimbel, 
2003), combined with stricter enforcement of existing legislation (Brewster, 2003), 
show a desire both to prevent illegal activity and also to reduce organisational risk 
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because of their impact on stakeholders (Stabile, 2002). This change has been in the 
pipeline for some time (Winer, 2000), but its goal is complicated by the need to find a 
balance between corporate performance, risk and accountability (Spira, 2001). 
1.4 Motivation 
There has been a considerable focus on understanding the merger process in general. 
This research has tended to focus either on the total merger process (Jameson and 
Sitkin, 1986; Mahoney, 2002; Pablo et al., 1996), or pre-CoC (Johnson, 1999; 
Sudarsanam, 1995; Breadley and Myers, 2000) or post-CoC (Chevriere, 1999; Hitt et 
al., 1996). None of these focus on the change of control period itself, let alone the 
procedures and controls around it. This even applies to those investigating the 
technology integration (Robbins and Stylianou, 1999; Robb, 2003), the technology 
security impact (Tuesday, 2003) or the reward and motivation aspects (Wright et al., 
2002). In most industries these are CoC and post-integration activities. 
M&A activity, let alone CoC in this specific circumstance, is not well researched. To 
illustrate this, I examined articles published in the Academy ofMalrager»ent josrrnal and the 
Academy ofManagement Review during the period January 1995 - February 2003, in which 
there were twenty-four articles relating to merger, acquisition or takeover activity. Of 
these three referenced banking mergers. There were no published articles on 
investment banking specifically, and consequently, none addressed the control issues 
surrounding the merger that result from the regulatory reporting requirements in an 
investment bank, which are the subject of this research. 
There are three reasons for undertaking this research. The first is personal interest, this 
is the area in which I work. During the merger under study, I was responsible for the 
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planning and implementation of the change of control (the weekend when ownership 
is transferred and the regulatory integration must be transacted) mechanism across 
both organisations. Because of my experience I feel that this is a poorly understood 
area, though I had no evidence for this at the time the research began. I wanted to 
learn about the risks and decision-making involved, so that the next time this type of 
action is required we could embark on it with a lower degree of corporate risk. 
The second reason for undertaking this study is the importance of both the activity and 
the industry. Over the last twenty years there has been a move towards consolidation 
in the banking industry, driven in part by globalisation, and in part by the piece-by- 
piece removal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which was fully repealed in 1998 
(Harrison, 1997; Henriques, 1998). In addition to their organisational complexity, 
these mergers are also very expensive, with a number exceeding the US$10 billion 
level. 
"7n the past Syears alone, oter (US) $S trillion has been spent on mergers and 
acgsrisitions (M& A). Althosgh the pace dropped slightly dsnin 2001, an 
incredible 9,472 deals took place during the coarse of 2000. lf%ith so many mergers 
and so mich money involved, it would be reasonable to belieee that the princess would 
be so well understood and bmken down into its component parts that it could be 
placed in the category of exact science by now. Yet most M&As fail " (Robb, 
2003: 1). 
The third reason is that for all the importance of the industry, M&A activity, and the 
risk involved, it is hard to identify any academic research or practitioner work relevant 
to investment banking change of control. There is a gap in our collective knowledge, 
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which this research could address. For these reasons, I decided to undertake the 
research. 
1.5 Bridging academia and practice 
There are a number of differences between this research and the "traditional" Doctor 
of Philosophy degree. This is the result of three factors. The structure of the research 
is different, being composed of three projects. A management practitioner undertakes 
the research. Finally, a company sponsors the research, which is a requirement for 
admission to the programme. 
This changes the nature and the structure of the research. As will be discussed later, 
the research and the thesis structure are composed of three pieces of research. More 
significantly, this research aims to address a practical business issue and as such 
contributes to management practice, in addition to academic knowledge. 
This is an exciting time to undertake this type of doctoral research. The question of 
how research is conducted and what value it holds has become a highly charged 
debate. The question as to the nature, and more fundamentally, the need for a 
relationship between academia and business remains unresolved (Pettigrew, 2001; 
Tranfield and Starkey, 1998; Tranfield, 2002b; Tranfield, 2002a; \Veick, 2001). 
My personal experience of this issue highlighted the fundamental nature of the debate 
with greater clarity than any academic paper. I am sure there are elements of the 
business community who care little for academics in their "ivory towers". What I 
found surprising is the number of academics who lack interest in changing this. At a 
luncheon at the 2000 British Academy of Management in Edinburgh, I sat at a table 
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where the discussion was not about how to get management research into practice, but 
if there was value in doing so. This attitude presents a challenge to universities. As 
universities become more dependant upon private funding, they will need to be able to 
attract capital from industry. Britain is probably in a strong position to be able to do 
this, but the conversation needs to move on to how to establish a successful 
relationship or face a gradual decline into being just education providers. A chance is 
before us to influence the world as part of its intellectual powerhouses. The DBA 
programme is a key link between two very different worlds, which must be built upon. 
Of course some researchers are responding to this. \Veick (2001) identifies the nature 
of research (frequently too abstract), timing (frequently too late), the generality of the 
findings, lack of industry information and the nature of the findings (frequently too 
obvious) as key challenges to be overcome. Thus, while ensuring that the research is 
academically rigorous, I have constantly aimed to keep it practical and valuable to 
practitioners. 
2 Research design overview 
This section describes the research undertaken and presents a summary of it. The 
research is composed of three projects. The main questions, methods and findings are 
illustrated in Figure 2- Project method. 
2.1 Thesis and research structure 
The thesis is presented in three parts; A, B and C. Part A is divided into three 
chapters; the linking chapter, a literature review and the discussion and conclusion. 
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Part B is the three project reports. Part C is the appendices which pertain to the 
research. 
The linking chapter introduces the research, the target organisation, the business issue, 
the nature of M&A activity, and therefore the importance of this research. It then 
discusses the motivation for the research, the need to link business practice and 
academic research, the structure of the research, a presentation of the findings and 
contributions, followed by a discussion of the findings and their contribution. 
Following this is the literature review, a summary of which follows this section, which 
is completed by the discussion and conclusion. 
The first project examines which risks are present during a merger and has a particular 
focus on the change of control period. It does this by putting together a panel of 
experts drawn from within the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, industry consultants 
who worked on the acquisition, and academics. The panel members were first invited 
to take part in an interview, and then to take part in a Delphi study. The findings of 
this project identified 55 risks and rated them in terms of significance and mitigation. 
It found that there was an inverse correlation between the two. From my perspective, 
this was "irrational" behaviour. 
The second project attempts to address the question as to why risk management 
appears to be "irrationally" managed, as observed in Project 1. To do this the two 
most excessively (i. e. Mitigation is greater than risk significance) and the two most 
negligently (i. e. Mitigation is less than risk significance) managed risks identified in 
Project 1 are examined. This was undertaken by producing a case study for each risk. 
This analysis is conducted by using an analytical framework that was constructed based 
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on the theoretical Reconceptualized model (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and the Temporal 
model (Das and Teng, 2001b). This project strongly suggested that industry regulation, 
organisational controls and outcome history were key risk behaviour determinants in 
this situation. Based on these findings propositions are produced for each of the three 
risk behaviour determinants. 
The third project uses statistical testing based on data collected in the first project to 
test the validity of the three proposition pairs from Project 2. This testing supported 
the findings that organisational controls and outcome history were particularly 
prevalent. 
The final part of this research is the conclusion and summary, which is presented in the 
final chapter. This section examines not just the immediate findings, but also their 
impact for managerial research and managerial practice. 
In response to the current economic downturn and the growing geo-political risks, it is 
likely that more organisations will have to operate outside their normal operational 
domains with ever-greater frequency. The findings of this research suggest that 
regulators and those responsible for managerial controls need to consider the scope of 
their controls and regulatory validity, and in addition, put in place people or 
mechanisms that can be effective when the normal controls are no longer valid. 
3 Summary of research 
This section presents an overview of the research projects. These are addressed in 
detail in Part B, the project reports. The projects, their research questions and findings 
are summarised in Figure 2- Project methods. 
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The section describes the three projects in terms of how they are linked, the research 
question that each answers, the methods followed, results found, limitations of the 
research and findings 
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3.1 Overview of literature 
The full literature review is presented in Chapter 2. No literature relating to the 
context of this research (i. e. the management or execution of the change of control 
period) has been found. The literature relating to the merger context, mergers and 
acquisitions, banking regulations, the likelihood for failure, and its impact, are 
addressed earlier in this chapter. 
The risk literature is reviewed by examining three broad bodies of research; the 
classical or engineering theories, the single cognitive factors theories which 
demonstrate the role of single risk determinant factors, and the integrated theories 
which combine multiple determinants of risk behaviour. 
Classical / 
Engineering risk 
theories 
Context: 
Banking 
Mergers & Single Risk 
Acquisitions Determinants 
Banking 
Regulation 
Risk perception & Integrated theories: 
Risk preference theories March (88) Risk Behaviour Models 
Sitkin & Pablo (92) 
Das & Teng (2001) 
--L 
Timing Multiple Risk Determinants 
Figure 3- Summary of the Literature Reviewed 
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3.2 Linking the research 
The study consists of three projects, each of which is a stand-alone piece of work, but 
each project flows into the next, providing the basis for the subsequent research in the 
next project. 
The first project examines a particular event: the merger of two very large investment 
banks and are referenced in the "document references" section towards the rear of the 
thesis [D0008C; DOC20B; DOC21B; DOC22q. It is a rare activity which happens 
only once every few years, and from the perspective of the investment bank, it is an 
extraordinary event. Using a cognitive risk identification and measurement technique 
based on the Delphi method, the first project identifies: 
1. A set of risks; potential events with undesirable outcomes which could befall 
the organisation while it is undertaking the acquisition 
2. The risk probability, impact and how well-prepared the firm is to deal with 
those risks should they actually occur, and 
3. The fact that all the participants recognise the merger model as being 
representative of the major steps of the merger. 
The second project explains why we see the behaviour observed in Project 1. It 
focuses on four risks which are "outliers" in terms of the proportion of mitigation to 
significance. It takes two extremely negligently managed risks and two extremely 
excessively managed risks and examines them. This is not done from a rational, 
traditional perspective, but rather by examining various cognitive theories; 
predominantly those of the Reconceptualized model (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and the 
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Temporal model (Das and Teng, 2001b), and applies these to the various situations to 
identify which risk determinants are appropriate and which are not, in order to 
understand those outliers. In a few cases, it has also identified where there is evidence 
of risk determinants coming into play which are not addressed in the theories that 
underlie the analytical framework. These represent findings that can support the three 
theoretical propositions. 
The first proposition suggests that industry regulation plays a significant role in why we 
manage certain risks in certain ways when we do so in unfamiliar problem domains. 
The second proposition examines the role of dominant domain familiarity, and the 
third looks at the role of organisational controls. 
The second project presents a number of possible avenues that warrant investigation 
which may explain why the risk behaviour is as observed in the case studies. 
Project 3 takes the propositions developed in Project 2 and uses statistical population 
variance tests to decide whether or not these propositions can be supported. The 
application of this method does not support the first proposition, but does support the 
second and third propositions. 
This chapter brings together the findings from the three research projects that were 
conducted. It discusses the work undertaken and provides an overall conclusion. It 
also identifies areas where there are weaknesses in the research, and where there are 
future opportunities for research. The chapter also examines the contribution made by 
this research to knowledge and management practice. I also present some of my own 
thoughts on the work and the process followed. Finally, it covers the impact of this 
research and its findings. 
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3.3 Research questions 
Primarily this research is about identifying and understanding the risks faced by 
investment banks when undertaking an acquisition, to understand whether there are 
any risk determinants which play a particularly dominant role in determining risk 
behaviour during the change of control and if so, which determinants are they. The 
first of these questions is addressed in Project 1. Project 1 addresses two questions: 
" What risks are faced by the target organisation during this period? and 
" What is the significance and mitigation relating to these risks? 
Project 2 examines four risks identified in Project 1. The four risks are selected based 
on the relationship between the significance and the mitigation scores of the risks. The 
two risks with the largest ratio and the two with the smallest ratio were selected. The 
project identifies, via a case study approach, which determinants were dominant in 
determining the observed risk behaviour. Three determinants were found (industry 
regulation, a successful outcome history and the ability to manage the risk using normal 
management controls). This answered the second research question. 
Project 3 looks for evidence to support the two projects among the data collected in 
Project 1. It does this by looking for statistical tests that supported the role played by 
two of the three determinants in the form of the following propositions: 
Proposition A- When a risk has a successful outcome history under normal business 
conditions, the organisation will tend towards excessive risk management behaviour. 
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Proposition B- When a risk is managed, using effective organisational controls in 
normal business operation, the organisation will tend towards excessive risk 
management behaviour. 
Proposition C- Wien a risk does not have a successful outcome history under 
normal business conditions, the organisation will tend towards negligent risk 
management behaviour. 
Proposition D- When a risk is not normally managed, using effective organisational 
controls in normal business operation, the organisation will tend towards negligent risk 
management behaviour. 
These propositions apply only in the circumstance under research, that is, investment 
banks in the unfamiliar problem domain of making an acquisition. By this, the third 
research question is addressed - which propositions, if any, are supported by the data 
collected in Project 1, thus identifying which determinants of risk behaviour play a 
dominant role. 
3.4 Project methods 
Project 1 used three different methods to answer its research questions. The first was 
to use interviews to get practitioners to comment on a merger model which was 
produced to describe the chronological stages of the acquisition. All the participants 
felt that this model reflected the events involved. 
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H and Engagement Embrace Holding 
Prelude Agreement Announcement Pre Change of Post Integration Control Integration 
Figure 4- Merger model 
The second method was applied to the company's documentation. The objective was 
to identify and classify the risks that were formally identified and recorded by the 
organisation. The first step was to secure the documentation, which was not too 
difficult because Bank C was sponsoring the research, which meant they were willing 
to provide it. Such a large volume of data was made available that it became necessary 
to identify a subset that would be representative and yet small enough to be workable. 
This set of documents was reviewed and 105 risks were identified. 
The third method employed in Project 1 was the Delphi technique, which was used to 
identify and evaluate risks faced by the bank during the acquisition of Bank B. An 
expert panel of 14 employees and consultants and one academic was gathered. These 
were drawn from a potential employee and consultant pool of 70 - 80 people. This 
population is made up of the individuals who would be in a position to experience the 
acquisition from both Bank B and Bank C, and not only a single business line. The 
Delphi method identified 55 risks through the interview phase. By completing two 
iterations of the questionnaire phase the risks were evaluated in terms of probability, 
impact and level of mitigation. These risks were also classified using the same 
classification method as the risks identified from the documentation review. The 
scores are mapped as follows: 
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The second project is composed of four case studies. Each case relates to one of four 
"outlier" risks; the two which were the "most excessive" and the two which were the 
"most negligent". The four risks are: 
9 Excessive risks 
o Number 54 - Trading desks not aware of their positions at the start 
of Change of Control 
o Number 31 - Control centre staff become complacent or fatigued 
due to being overly practiced 
" Negligent risks 
o Number 17 - Poor systems may be selected over better ones as a 
result of the need to rationalise technology speedily 
o Number 20 - Management may focus on the "business" of the merger 
and not the human resources side of it 
3.4.1 Findings 
Project 1 finds that the merger model is a suitable description of the chronological 
sequence of events in the acquisition. The project identified 55 risks which are listed in 
Appendix II, and arrived at a consensus among the panel of experts as to the level of 
significance (probability X impact) and mitigation of those risks. The results are 
illustrated in Figure 5- Significance V mitigation scores from Project 1. 
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The research also shows that there is an inverse correlation (-0.41) between the 
significance of the risk and its mitigation, and that technology is the source of most of 
the risks faced by the organisation. 
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Project 2 identifies three risk determinants which are particularly important in 
explaining the risk behaviour observed in the four cases. From these, three pairs of 
propositions are produced: 
Proposition 1- When a risk is addressed by industry-specific regulation, the risk will 
be well managed, tending toward excessive management. 
Proposition 2- When a risk has a successful outcome history in normal business 
conditions the risk will be well managed, tending toward excessive management. 
Proposition 3- When a risk is managed using effective organisational controls in 
normal business operation the organisation the risk will be well managed, tending 
toward excessive management. 
Proposition 4- When a risk is not addressed by industry-specific regulation, the risk 
will not be well managed, tending toward negligent management. 
Proposition 5- When a risk does not have a successful outcome history in normal 
business conditions the risk will not be well managed, tending toward negligent 
management. 
Proposition 6- When a risk is not managed using effective organisational controls in 
the organisation's normal business operations the risk will not be well managed, 
tending toward negligent management. 
Project 3 finds evidence to support four of the propositions: 2,3,5 and 6. 
Propositions 1 and 4 are not supported. 
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3.4.2 Acknowledged weaknesses 
The research that was conducted is subject to four possible limitations on the grounds 
of practicality. This section discusses what I believe to be the areas where there are 
weaknesses in the research and explains what was done to minimise them where 
possible. 
The first of these is the sample size. My research is drawn from a pool of 15 
individuals. Some took part in all parts of the research, others did not (see Table 6- 
Delphi participation data). All things being equal a pool with fifteen people does not 
generally seem like a large statistical population to draw from, considering that the 
organisation has over 100,000 employees according to its annual report, see document 
references section towards the rear of the thesis [D0008C], however, the activity 
being monitored is a rare event; furthermore, it is a specialised activity because the 
constraints that apply in an investment bank do not apply generally. Within these large 
organisations there are relatively few people who are in a position to have a significant 
view of the overall activity. I believe that with the acquiring and acquired banks there 
were probably no more than 25-30 such people in each firm who were in a position to 
understand the entire project and were also involved at a sufficient level of detail to 
understand the operations and issues relating to the project. Many board members and 
senior managers might have been involved, but they would have day-to-day activities 
that would prevent them from being able to get involved in the details of the 
acquisition. The number of active participants is twelve, just one below the number 
generally considered to be the optimum for Delphi research (Dalkey, 1969; Mandanis, 
1968; Helmer, 1968; Fourlis, 1976; Jenkins and Thoele, 1991; Linstone and Turoff, 
1975). The sample group is drawn from a number of population subgroups 
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(managers, staff, and consultants for example) which gives an appropriate structure 
(Black, 1999). The sample population at 15 represents at least 25% of the total 
population and is therefore a reasonable number of people to draw from this total 
population. 
The second limitation of the research is that the data is from one industry, investment 
banking. Without further research it could not be claimed that the findings in this 
research are generally applicable, and this therefore is a weakness of the research. 
Though conducted within one industry the research findings are not necessarily unique 
to that industry. By this I mean that the research examines how an organisation 
behaves outside its normal operational domain. It is true that the organisation is an 
investment bank; it is also true that the activity is unique to its industry, and only 
because it is outside the normal operational domain is it a rare event. Nonetheless, 
organisations are continually being challenged to operate outside their operational 
domains, so it is possible that the findings of this research are more generally 
applicable, and I think that further research would support this view. The reason for 
believing this is that it is understandable that people should try to make sense of the 
situation by holding to existing controls, as observed in other research (\Veick, 1993). 
The high reliability organisations that have been studied have been able to operate 
beyond normal control structures (Weick, 1987; LaPorte, 1988; Roberts, 1990; LaPorte 
and Consolini, 1991; Brown, 1993) the ability to improvise (\Veick, 1998; LaPorte, 
1988; McCay, 1999) and creatively make sense of the unveiling situation (Weick, 1988; 
\Veick, 1993). 
A third potential weakness is that the data is in some way biased toward a certain 
position or viewpoint. Because the research activity is limited to a small number of 
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people, in many ways it is research among a group of "insiders". Most are employed 
by one of the two firms. Almost all have experience of that industry and would 
perceive themselves to be part of that industry. It is possible too that, as a researcher, I 
could input bias of some description. To protect against this the research has been 
conducted in a systematic and objective manner. As part of the tightly knit group 
under study I could influence the findings. However, this is a risk with many forms of 
research, such as co-operative enquiry (Reason, 2000). This challenge has been faced 
in other studies, such as "classic" (Yin, 1994: 4) pieces of research like "Street Corner 
Society" (Whyte, 1943-1955). This does not invalidate the research, but it does serve 
as a constant reminder of the need to be aware of it. 
I have addressed this throughout the research in a number of ways. While 
acknowledging that those who input information to the research are a small and 
somewhat closed group, I have tried to involve people who are not just employees of 
the firm. I have tried to gather information from consultants and people with a wider 
range of backgrounds within the firm, and not only people from a single level within 
the firm. I have involved an academic in the starting process. So, from the start, the 
panel is as balanced as can be achieved. Of course, ultimately the interview data drives 
much of the discovery of risks. The risks identified define which risks are evaluated in 
Project 1. These risks form the basis of the cases in Project 2. Because of this I have 
taken a number of steps in constructing the questions in such a way as not to lead 
people down any particular route of thought or enquiry within the scope of the 
research. The interviews are semi-structured; there are a number of open questions. 
This is a mechanism to keep the responses as unbiased as possible. It is important to 
recognise that the research has a scope and that the scope, in turn, has resulted to a 
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certain degree in shaping the open questions. As I have focused on the risks relating to 
the merger, it is conceivable that that might drive a certain bias in the minds of the 
respondents. 
The more difficult source of bias to address is the bias that could be influenced by 
myself as a researcher. There are a number of reasons why I am concerned about this. 
Firstly, I have approached this research in a fair-minded and pragmatic way. I have 
been very positive in terms of the mechanism and method of research. I don't 
particularly feel that I need to excuse this, but at the same time I have to recognise it 
and realise that it does tend to lead one toward more black and white views of what is 
being studied. It also leads one to a black and white understanding of what is being 
observed. That is most prevalent in the first and third research projects. I also have a 
leaning toward the classical views of risk management. Because of this, I expected 
certain forms of behaviour. In my defence I was willing to recognise the limitations of 
this view and consider oilier motives to explain the behaviour. To conduct the second 
project I had to make myself engage closely with more subtle and "greyer" 
explanations for risk behaviours, and reconsider my own positions. This is a very 
positive process and is a crucial part of education, particularly at the doctoral level. 
Embracing the mindset of cognitive theories allowed me to consider other 
explanations. It allowed me to consider the organisation's needs, preferences and 
perceptions of a whole set of risks that it faced. Out of this I am able to propose a 
number of ideas that would explain some of what was observed and provide a degree 
of refinement and enhancement to works of the likes of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) and 
March (1988). These frameworks should be considered as enhancements to the 
preceding work. 
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The other major source of data is the documentary data. This provides extra detail 
describing the cases. It is a formal record and is therefore subjective to a degree, if 
interpreted as a result of organisational conflict. It too can be subject to bias. As 
someone who works in a large organisation I understand that one can write formal 
documentation from various perspectives; from one's own perspective, from that of 
the intended audience, or that of actors who are not currently involved. We live in a 
litigious age (Parker and Balto, 1999), as this is being written, many financial firms in 
the United States are being investigated by the New York State Attorney's Office. 
Those investigations show that what many organisations have shown in formal 
published documentation does not necessarily concur with what the individuals within 
the organisation believe. 
A final influence is that I was a participant in this merger process. I need to be 
cognisant of this, and not act in a way that justifies any decision or action I have taken 
during the period under study. It also makes me see that in performing my role in the 
organisation I may have contributed to excessive controls within the organisation. I 
was responsible for the Change of Control mechanism and the Control Centre, so I 
approached this problem with a high degree of domain familiarity. And from the 
research it is clear that this was excessively managed, and I have contributed to this 
effect. 
3.5 Future research opportunities 
As a result of this research I see new opportunities for further research which hold the 
promise of certain benefits for management practitioners, and which I believe would 
enhance our understanding of risk management. 
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The first opportunity relates to generalisation of the findings. While I believe that the 
findings are probably valid in the context of regulated organisations operating outside 
their normal operation domain, it would certainly be valid to test these propositions 
across the financial industry, and probably across other similar industries. 
Some of the findings from this research, in particular those from Project 1, are 
significant. For a management practitioner they are "attention grabbing". It is 
significant to have a numerical quantitative measure based upon a qualitative research 
method that shows that an organisation is behaving irrationally. It shows the areas in 
which it is behaving irrationally and illustrates the nature (excessive or negligent) and 
the degree of that mismanagement. 
From the data collected in Project 1, meta-data relating to the risks was also gathered. 
This describes the characteristics of those risks, such as the degree to which the risk 
was subject to formal control, or its timing in the merger process. Initial data analysis 
was performed upon these similar to the analysis used to test the propositions in 
Project 3. Some of these are statistically different from the remainder of the 
population. From this I believe that certain characteristics may also be determinants of 
risk behaviour. The results are shown in Appendix D and Appendix M. These should 
be investigated. The potential determinants are: 
" Use of formal controls 
" Problem domain familiarity 
" Degree of impact on the change of control 
" Culture 
" Physical nature; and 
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" When the risk impacts. 
As a result of this, further research is required within investment banking and other 
industries to ascertain what role, if any, they play in determining risk behaviour. 
This work has combined the previous research of both Sitkin and Pablo (1992) and 
Das and Teng (2001b), so it provides a richer model for the understanding of risk 
behaviour. The findings broadly enhance the model proposed by Sitkin and Pablo. 
Interestingly, the cases studied showed that the expected results and the actual results 
in three of the four cases varied in terms of behaviour, and the role of temporality in 
the form of future orientation. This causes me to question the importance of future 
orientation in moderating risk behaviour in these circumstances. It is possible that the 
findings of Das and Teng are not applicable in these circumstances. 
I do believe their general observation relating to temporality, and in particular, future 
orientation, are important and valid. I think they are contributors and modifiers to our 
risk behaviour. I also think that the actual findings do not bear out what they 
proposed and so we must be prepared to accept that, in this situation, temporality is 
impacting upon behaviour. 
4 Personal reflections 
This section presents my own personal learning and observations that have come out 
of the research and undertaking the research process. 
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4.1 Learning 
I started this DBA research as an examination of high reliability control research. I did 
this for a number of reasons, the two most important of which were my personal faith 
in the ability of control mechanisms to prevent undesirable outcomes, and secondly, 
my belief (prior to the events of WorldCom and Enron) that the capitalist system was 
at risk of being undermined by the lowering of both ethical standards and controls in 
corporations. Failure of these controls can and may by now have started to push 
civilisation towards a more unstable future. 
As preliminary reading and research got under way I quickly realised that, important as 
these issues were, if we could not understand the risks and how we are inclined to 
respond to them, then we would never be able to protect ourselves from them. 
The second piece of learning for me was to gain an appreciation of the academic 
approach, in particular the need to consider one's own view of reality and being 
(ontology) and to consider the methods, validity and scope of knowledge 
(epistemology). Thinking about ontology and epistemology has caused me to question 
what is presented to me in my daily work. It has become much harder to accept 
"facts" presented just on face value alone. 
I also discovered that the DBA process is a solitary and lonely one. Like much of life 
you are responsible for your own motivation, application and progress. However, you 
are also engaged in a process over time in which you are acting in isolation from your 
university cohort. For me this has resulted in a very strong need to take advantage of 
the DBA structure and the points of contact with both class mates and staff. The 
process, in both of the banks for which I have worked during this research, places the 
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individual in isolation from their colleagues and employer in the work environment. In 
a competitive career the title "academic" is a dangerous one to earn. I am certain that 
my research activities have impeded my progress (in the short-term) at work. This is 
because the perception of being academic is not a particular advantage. It is a demand 
on my time, and my continuous questioning can cause me to focus on aspects of a 
problem that are not deemed to be of great value to a commercial organisation where 
we live by the 80/20 rule. 
It seems to me that the public, and business as a whole, is crying out for leadership in 
the fields of ethics, governance and related areas. We need to provide answers to these 
issues, but must do so in a way that is meaningful and applicable. 
Page 43 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents the theoretical position from which this research is conducted. It 
examines published literature addressing the nature and definition of risk-, decision- 
making under uncertainty, in particular examining risk determinants and how they 
relate to risk perception and risk preference. It will also look at the role of individual 
risk behaviour and organisational risk behaviour. As the context of this research is 
very important literature relating to mergers and acquisitions, in particular in banking, 
will be reviewed in order to explain the procedures and the motivations for this 
activity. 
1 The nature of risk 
There are two broad views about risk and how we should respond to it. One view is 
the classical engineering view (Brown, 1993), the other is a more holistic view often 
referred to as a cognitive view. The engineering view deals with the quantitative 
qualities of risk, while, the cognitive view deals with the perceived aspects of risk. 
Correspondingly, the engineering view promotes a quantitative understanding of risk 
that fits well with classical theories. While it is attractive to consider these two views to 
be at opposite ends of a subjective-objective divide that would be incorrect. There are 
many researchers who take a cognitive perspective but explain their work in 
engineering terminology (Brown, 1993; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984; Pidgeon, Jones, Turner, and Gibson, 1992; Sitkin and Weingurt, 1995). 
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This section addresses the concept of risk and its constituent elements. These 
elements are hazard, probability of occurrence, scale of impact and in the case of this 
research the perceived level of preparation or mitigation of the risk. 
Though the term "engineering" is used to represent this body of knowledge by many 
authors such as Brown (1993) and LaPorte and Consolini (1991), it is not wholly 
appropriate as it is applicable to many areas such as toxicology and epidemiology 
(Crossland, Bennett, Elis, Farmer, Gittus, Godfrey, Hambly, Kletz, and Lees, 1992). It 
is a rational and quantifiable approach which allow managers to make "rational" 
decisions. As such it belongs to the "classical" body of literature (Hatch, 1997) of 
organisation theory. The terminology and understanding of the relationships relating 
to this field have been defined in many countries as part of the national quality 
standards such as the British Standards Institute (BS), International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) and Deutschland Industry Norm (DIN). For the purposes of this 
research I have selected the British Standard BS4778/1991 (British Standards 
Institution, 1991) as the basis for my terminology. 
BS4778/1991 has a number of key concepts. Those most relevant to this work are 
"hazard" and "risk". 
Hazard -A hazard is the potential for an adverse consequence resulting from a single 
event, sequence of events or a combination of events. Hazards can be classified 
according to their potential effects in such terms as safety or economics (Varner, 
1992). 
The BS4778/1991 definition of hazard is: 
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"rduced to a single sub, jectize correlate of a particular aspect of a risk, such as the 
pro duct of the probabilities and consequences of an et nt" (W"anier, 1992: 1-111) 
He then proceeds to mention other factors, such as public perception of risk, the 
manner in which risk information is transmitted, the acceptance of risk as an element 
of the nature of life, the ability of humans to handle risk, and differences of opinion 
about how risk can be handled (Coppola and Hall, 1981). Finally, he raises the 
question of the difference between risk assessment and risk management. In doing so 
he poses the question of whether certain groups (e. g. scientists) have a preference for 
or acceptance of risk that is different from other groups. 
Some instances of risk are measurable. They have quantitative properties that, to a 
point, can be defined and predicted. But in reality, in order to manage risk, 
consideration has to be given to a vast array of other cognitive factors that will play a 
role in determining which risks are addressed, and how they are addressed. These 
problems are not addressed by the engineering risk literature, but rather by the 
literature relating to risk perception and decision-making under uncertainty. 
The classical view of risk is that it involves a trade-off between risk and expected 
return (March and Shapira, 1987). Furthermore, risk can be understood as reflecting 
"the distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihood, and their subjective values" 
(March and Shapira, 1987: 1404). This perspective is often referred to as the 
engineering view (Brown, 1993). This approach to risk management is highly rational. 
Risk can be classified as falling into one of three categories, similar to those put 
forward by Cohen and Pritchard (1999), which are: 
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1. Risks for which statistics of identified impact are available 
2. Risks for which there maybe some evidence, but where the connection 
between cause and impact in any individual case cannot be traced (e. g. 
developing cancer after exposure to radiation); and 
3. Risks for which there are estimates of provability for events which have not yet 
happened. 
In addition, Crossland et al. (1992) identify another category of risks which are not 
foreseen. 
1.1 Determinants of risk behaviour 
It is easy to imagine that we behave in a very rational manner, as proposed by the 
classical or engineering model. However, even ancient observers have been aware that 
there is an apparently irrational side to human risk behaviour. Catullus (58 B. C) 
observed that people could act in a manner that was contrary to their own self-interest. 
The possibility that there might be cognitive factors which determine one's approach 
and behaviour to risk was first recorded in the eighteenth century with the observation 
in 1738 by Bernoulli of the "utility of money" (Bernoulli, 1954). Bernoulli's focus was 
more on what we would call "game theory" than on risk management. He observed 
that most people, if given the choice of whether or not to play a game of 50/50 for the 
same prize/loss, would decline. In terms of probability and reward there is as much 
chance of winning as there is of losing, and so the statistical probability of each 
combined outcome is neutral. 
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Bernoulli called this inclination to consider the loss of money more significant than the 
gain, the "utility of money". A £1000 loss is more significant than a £1000 gain and so 
a 50/50 chance of losing is more significant to us than a 50/50 chance of winning. 
Average Outcome = (Pmbabi/iy X Inpact, ý) + 
(Pröbabibiy 
.X 
Impacts! ) 
r. e. 
0=(0.5x1000)+(0.5X-1000) 
Equation 1- Average outcome of Bernoulli's game 
I found these two early theories useful because they indicated the type of "mindset" 
that I would require to understand the risk behaviour identified in Project 1. Later 
work by Neumann and Morgenstern (1945) validated Bernoulli's findings. In addition, 
they investigated the politics of risk and risk decisions. They discovered that risk is not 
just a simple probability and outcome equation (as traditional engineering literature 
would consider it) but is related to whom it impacts, the political element. 
This work demonstrated that while risk itself is related to impact and probability, our 
ability to respond to these includes other factors such as the utility of money and 
political risk. One cognitive sociologist observed that. 
'To assess perceived risk it is necessary to estimate the pmbability of outcomes and 
" to evaluate the magnitude of the outcomes. These are not observable nrearrrres. 
OP'allrten, 1980: ix xv). 
It is with this type of statement that the cognitive and engineering literature share 
terminology, but not necessarily understanding. 
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Most researchers have focused on single determinants of risk behaviour (Sitkin and 
Pablo, 1992), both at the organisational and individual level. Like a number of 
researchers in this field, such as March and Shapira (March and Shapira, 1987), Sitkin 
and Pablo (1992) and \Veiek (1996a), I feel this is too simple an explanation for 
complex behaviour. In addition, a number of determinants have had conflicting 
evidence presented about their role. Kahneman and Tversky's "prospect theory" 
(1979) is quite at odds with research into the role of prior risk behaviour. Kahneman 
and Tversky found that individuals who protect prior gains are risk averse, but both 
Osborn and Jackson (1988) and Thaler and Johnson (1990) found the opposite to be 
true. Even so, many researchers have investigated single determinants. This section 
presents firstly the various theories around single determinants, and then three 
attempts to present unified understandings by Sitkin and Pablo (1992), March (1988) 
and Das and Teng (2001b). 
1.1.1 Risk propensity 
This section examines determinants which relate to risk propensity, and explores 
theories relating to risk preference, inertia and outcome history. 
Decision makers within and organisation may display a certainty propensity for risk. 
This can vary from individual to individual. One of the factors that influences this is 
the individual's own desire to seek or avoid risk. This is called "risk preference". 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) showed that there is a varying disposition toward risk 
among different people. There is also a relationship between achievement orientation 
(McClelland, 1961), managerial position (Brockhaus, 1980; Sitkin and \Veingart, 1995) 
and gender (Siegrist et al., 2002) in determining risk seeking and avoidance behaviour. 
Personal experience and beliefs (Wildavsky, 1988; Slovic, 1972) and cultural 
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background (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) can also have a deterministic effect on an 
individual decision-maker's personal risk preference. 
Individual risk behaviour has generally been found to be consistent over time (Heath, 
1998; Kogan and Wallach, 1964; Rowe, 1977; Slovic, 1972). In practice this "risk 
inertia" means that an individual who has tended to be conservative in the past will 
tend to be conservative in the future, and one who has been risk-seeking in the past 
will tend to be risk-seeking in the future. This is context dependent, which means that 
a decision-maker can be risk averse in one context and be a risk taker in another. 
The history of outcomes of a decision-maker's experiences can influence their risk 
decision processes; this is often called "outcome history" (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
This can operate in different ways. Successful outcomes from risky decisions in the 
past can encourage one to take further risks, but can also encourage the opposite 
behaviour (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). To modify an example from Thaler and 
Johnson's work, if an individual had been flipping a coin and it had turned up "heads" 
five times in a row, they might be inclined to bet that it would be "tails" the next time, 
because their perception is that six "heads" in a row2 would be unlikely. At the same 
time, the fact that they may have been lucky in picking "heads" might just as easily 
encourage them to pick it again. 
The nature of the outcome itself is also a factor in the role of outcome history. Where 
risks have significant negative outcomes which happen rarely (such as the recent Foot 
and Mouth outbreak), Staw and Ross (1987) found that there tends to be a narrow 
2 Of course, the probability of six `heads' in a row is exactly the same as five `heads' in a row followed by a 'tad'. 
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focus on future possible actions. During the recent root and Mouth epidemic 
scientific advisors working for the Department of Agriculture were not willing to 
consider other courses of action for managing the spread of the disease, such as 
vaccination, even though this might have aided the situation (Mason, 2003). Where 
these large losses are more frequent it is thought that a state of learned helplessness 
(Seligman, 1975) and a more passive management approach may emerge. \Vhere 
intermittent minor risks occur, reinforcement and the history, of failed outcomes will 
lead to varied responses; indeed experimentation could be expected (Sitkin, 1992). 
1.1.2 Risk perception 
This section examines the risk determinants relating to risk perception. It explores 
theories relating to the perception of risk consequence, acceptance, problem framing, 
top team homogeneity, social and cultural influences, organisational controls and 
problem domain familiarity. 
When making decisions with financial outcomes we tend to look at small outcomes in 
terms of winning of losing, while large outcomes tend to be viewed as changes in 
wealth (Vlek and Stallen, 1980). Generally we tend to be more cautious in the face of 
potential wealth changes than in the face of small losses or gains (Kachelmeier and 
Shehata, 1992; Ranjith, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). This means that the 
"risk consequence" is also able to influence risk behaviour. 
The tolerance for risks of a certain nature can be very different between groups of 
people (Allman, 1985). There is, for example, a great degree of difference between 
experts and lay people (Allman, 1985). Allman quotes research showing how these 
two groups rate a series of risks in terms of the chance of dying in a given year as a 
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result of them. The two groups rated the risk quite differently. Out of a list of 30 risks 
the public rated nuclear power as the most likely, which the experts rated as 20'h. An 
explanation offered for this is that certain risks are acceptable and so people are happy 
to take them, while other substantially less likely risks are not. As a society we 
sometimes codify these ideas of risk acceptance into formal rules, an example being the 
legislation relating to land-use planning (Health & Safety Executive, 1989) and informal 
perceptions, an example being that of smoking, which although much more risky than 
living close to a nuclear power plant, is more acceptable. It is surmised that some risks 
are therefore more acceptable (Allman, 1985) because they have localised impacts 
(smoking has a high probability of death, but usually only kills the smoker) while others 
are not because they have societal impacts (a nuclear power accident is very unlikely, 
but if it were to occur, could destroy a whole community). This nature of the outcome 
and acceptability should also be considered in terms of risk consequence, discussed 
earlier. 
What is considered acceptable or "safe" may also be influenced by organisational 
culture. Rochlin (1999) found the idea of safe operation was partly a social construct. 
I-Iow we respond to risk and uncertainty can be influenced in terms of how the risk is 
presented (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This is referred to as "problem framing", 
and the theory to explain this is often referred to as "prospect theory" (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory proposes that the way we evaluate risky decisions is 
influenced by how the options relating to the risk are presented. 
An example presented by Kahneman and Tversky in their 1979 paper showed that 
when they presented the same possible responses to a risk in different ways, depending 
on the way in which the options were presented, the action people were likely to select 
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would change. This means that the way in which a risk, or the options to respond to it, 
is presented, impacts the options that are selected. 
Positive framing may operate because presenting the risk in a positive light directs 
management's focus toward the benefits and opportunities at the expense of focusing 
on the potential downside (March and Shapira, 1987). Negative framing of a risk can 
bring about risk avoidance by causing threat-rigidity responses (Staw et al., 1987) or 
hyper-vigilance (Janis and Mann, 1977) 
The homogeneity of the senior management team is the most frequently cited factor 
that influences risk behaviour (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). This is sometimes referred to 
as "groupthink" (Janis, 1972; Brockhaus, 1980; Wright and Schaal, 1988). Theorists 
believe that companies prefer certainty to uncertainty as part of the organisational risk 
profile (Douglas and \Vildavsky, 1982). Research has also found that low risk 
companies actually perform better (Brown, 1993). 
The experience of leaders (Jacofshy, Slocum, and McQuaid, 1988) can also shape the 
top team's risk behaviour in a manner not unlike the experiences of the individual. 
Leaders shape the organisation's culture in relation to risk by adding their personal 
legitimacy toward risk avoidance or propensity. 
Research has also shown that both national (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Hofstede, 
1980; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Tromperaars, 1993) and organisational (Janis, 
1972; Wright and Schaal, 1988) culture can exert considerable influence on decision- 
making. Davis-Blake and Pfeffer (1989) propose that organisations are "strong 
situations" which can dominate other potential individual perceptions and behaviours 
because they channel individual attention and action. This view is also supported by 
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Snyder and Ickes (1985). The role of culture is supported by the influence of the 
organisational culture and its leaders (Martin, Sitkin, and Boehm, 1985; Schein, 1985). 
A concern with this is that as individuals become socialised they can come to accept 
perspectives which can shape they way in which they address problems (Louis, 1980). 
"Organizational members come to view their world through the lens of their 
organisation's culture, which can distort their perceptions of situational risks, 
sometimes by overemphasizing or underestimating risk" (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992: 21). 
The organisation's control structure influences the company's risk behaviour (March 
and Shapira, 1987; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). Furthermore, the reward, punishment, 
monitoring and evaluation of risk behaviour (Ouchi, 1977) will contribute to 
determining risk behaviour. 
Controls can also be used to create environments where risks are less likely to happen 
(Clint, 1981; LaPorte, 1975a; LaPorte, 1988; LaPorte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 
1990; Weick, 1983; Weick, 1988; Weick and Roberts, 1993). Research into activities 
similar to mergers, such as strategic alliances, show that the likelihood of less risky 
behaviour is founded on the balance between control and trust (Das and Teng, 2001b). 
Research also shows that controls cannot eliminate risk (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 2000; 
Reason et al., 2001), and indeed in a crisis the organisation may benefit from 
abandoning the appropriate controls (LaPorte, 1988; \Veick, 1993; Weick, 1996b; 
Weick, 1996c). 
The importance of the history of risk-taking has already been discussed, and the degree 
of familiarity with the problem domain acts as a similar risk determinant. Experience 
allows managers to identify those parts of a problem (problem domain familiarity) that 
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they have experienced before, and this helps them to make a decision (March and 
Shapira, 1987). This also fits well with "availability theory" (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1973), which proposes that in making a decision, we evaluate potential courses of 
action in the order in which they "come to mind". This would be impacted by the 
degree of familiarity with the domain and certain possible options. Familiarity also 
supports the escalation commitment model (Staw and Ross, 1987), which proposes 
that our ability to accept risk increases with experience. 
1.2 Multi-determinant perspectives on risk behaviour 
Each of the theories presented so far explains risk behaviour as the result of a single 
risk determinant. As expressed earlier, I consider this to be too simplistic a view to 
take of organisations and their behaviour. In looking at the complexity of 
organisations I can see that decisions are made based on various factors coming into 
play. This view is echoed by many contemporary researchers. "Organisations are 
some of the most complex phenomena studied in the social sciences" (Jenkins and 
Ambrosini, 2002: 21). \Veick and Roberts describe the "collective mind" (Weick and 
Roberts, 1993) of the aircraft carrier "organisation". Decision-making is carried out by 
many people working together to achieve their part of the overall goal. The 
complexity of the organisation makes it necessary to consider it as having multiple 
strands working and interrelating concurrently (Koot, 2002). I cannot see any reason 
to suggest that decision-making in unfamiliar domains should be any different. A 
growing number of management researchers are taking the view that organisations are 
so complex that we cannot expect to understand them using simple models (LaPorte, 
1975b; Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001). Some researchers have been concerned with the 
impact of practitioners thinking that there is a single solution, a "silver bullet", to 
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organisational issues. Responding to this is a renewed focus not only on the 
complexity, but also the ambiguity of organisations (March, 1978; Hatch and Ehrlich, 
1993). In general, organisational research has seen attempts to bring various ideas 
together (Weick, 1996a; Weick, 1998; Schultz and Hatch, 1996) and create a new 
language for the organisational discourse (Hatch, 1997; Hatch, 1998). Such attempts 
have of course met with both resistance and support (Hatch and Weick, 1998). This 
attempt to combine paradigms and find new ways of looking at organisations is also 
reflected in the field of risk. There have been three attempts to create integrated 
theories to address multiple risk determinants which may modify perception and 
propensity simultaneously. These three attempts are the "Reconceptualized model" 
(Sitkin and Pablo, 1992), March's model (1988), and the "Temporal model" (Das and 
Teng, 2001b). 
Sitkin and Pablo's (1992) "Reconceptualized model of risk behaviour" is a significant 
attempt to bring these together. 
Human decision-making is far too complex to be explained by relatively simple 
theories such as taste or availability. It is clear to me that decision-making is driven by 
various factors all operating at the same time. I can imagine that the relative 
importance of these factors varies from person to person and from situation to 
situation. 
Like other researchers (March, 1978; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Das and Teng, 2001b), I 
believe that in most cases the risk decision-making process is not driven by a single 
determinant, which is not to say that there are not cases where one risk determinant 
does dictate. At any given time various determinants are contributing to the risk 
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behaviour. A number of researchers have pursued this approach, and have tried to 
bring various single determinant theories together. 
This follows the general development of thought in risk theory. March, who 
developed theories on risk perception (March and Shapira, 1987), and taste and 
rationality (1978) came to this conclusion too (March, 1988). This section looks at and 
summarises these three integrated theories. 
1.2.1 The Reconceptualized model 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992) noticed that some theories of risk determination such, as 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), have been contradicted by findings 
from other studies such as Osborn and Jackson's (1988) and Thaler and Johnson's 
(1990) research in risk behaviour. The existence of these contradictions and the failure 
to resolve them is attributed to three concerns with prior research approaches. Firstly, 
previous researchers have followed single theories, which is considered to be 
"fragmented and issue oriented" (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). Secondly, their review of 
existing research suggests that the risk determinants influence the risk decision process 
indirectly as mediating influences on risk perception and risk preference. Thirdly, 
examining the influences in this manner shows where there are contradictions, and 
shows the relative influence of each determinant on both the perception and 
preference for risk. 
This model tries to unify a number of risk determinants by organising them into two 
groups; those which influence risk propensity, and those which influence risk 
perception. The organisation's risk behaviour is influenced by risk propensity, which is 
a combination of the effects of risk preference, inertia and outcome history. Risk 
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perception, on the other hand, is a result of single determinants, such as problem 
framing, top management homogeneity, social influences, the problem domain 
familiarity and the organisational control systems. The model is illustrated below: 
Risk Propensity: 
Risk Preference 
Inertia 
Outcome History 
Risk 
Risk Perception: 
Problem Framing 
Top Team H rrwenerty 
Social Influence 
Problem Domain Fanmiany 
Organlsetimel Cantrd 
Systems 
Risk Behaviour 
Figure 7- Reconceptualized model of risk determinants (Sitkin and 
Pablo, 1992) 
In this model the eight determinants are considered in the given decision-making 
process. From these eight determinants Sitkin and Pablo developed a number of 
propositions, which are contained in Appendix J. 
Based on these propositions a new model has been constructed that juxtaposes the 
theoretical model with risk behaviour prediction. This is shown in the following table: 
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Situational Characteristics 
(Objective or Perceived) 
Positive Negative 
Prospect theory - Threat rigidity 
Conservation of prior gains Hyper-vigilance Risk 
Loss prevention bias Averse 
Prediction: Low risk Prediction: Low risk behaviour 
behaviour 
Attention to opportunities Prospect theory - Going for 
a Risk broke 
U a, 
Seeking Prediction: High risk Prediction: High risk behaviour P. 
y behaviour 
Table 3- Integrated Reconceptualized model (Sitkin and Pablo, 
1992) 
The Reconceptualized model addresses many of the risk determinants that have been 
previously discussed. However, it does not directly address the relationship between 
national and organisational culture. It also fails to integrate the role of large 
(Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992) and small (Vick and Stallen, 1980) risk consequences, 
or risk acceptance (Allman, 1985). In addition, the model does not consider the 
temporal aspects addressed by Das and Teng (1997; 2001b), which were proposed 
after the Reconceptualized model. 
1.2.2 Temporal model 
A more contemporary attempt to produce a unified model to explain risk behaviour is 
the risk horizon model (Das and Teng, 2001b). The basic proposition is that the 
various determinants of risk perception and risk propensity do not fully explain risk 
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behaviour. They argue that this is because the temporalities of the risk decision are not 
considered. They consider two aspects to temporality: the risk horizon (short-term or 
long-term) and the individual's future orientation (near future or distant future). They 
present their theory as the following model. 
Future orientation Near-future Distant-future 
orientation orientation 
Risk propensity and 
decision context 
Risk averter and Low-risk behaviour Low risk behaviour 
positive context 
Risk averter and High-risk behaviour Low-risk behaviour 
negative context 
Risk seeker and positive Low-risk behaviour High-risk behaviour 
context 
Risk seeker and negative High-risk behaviour High-risk behaviour 
context 
Table 4- Temporal impacts on risk behaviour (Das and Teng, 
2001b) 
Like Sitkin and Pablo, Das and Teng believe that the question of the determinants has 
not been satisfactorily resolved so far because of the lack of focus on the role of time 
in risk behaviour. They argue that risk is embedded in time, and that two aspects of the 
temporal dimension should be considered. Firstly, risk horizons, the short-range or 
long-range risk horizon of the risk. Secondly, the individual future orientations of top 
managers (top team), which can be near-future or distant-future orientations. 
They propose a temporal framework of strategic risk behaviour in which the two 
temporal aspects are integrated with risk propensity and perceived in risk decision 
making. 
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1.2.3 Taste and rationality 
March is the earliest of the integration theorists. He takes a different approach to 
integration of the various theories of risk behaviour determinants, starting by 
examining human rationality. Of course, he was able to cite many examples of the 
apparent lack of rationality in human behaviour, and use theories to explain these as 
the basis for his research. 
March does not present his model in a format similar to those of others, such as the 
Temporal model (Das and Teng, 2001b). Instead, he presents an understanding based 
on integrating the various determinants in terms of rationality and tastes. He addresses 
the issue of apparent irrational behaviour by considering various types of rationality, 
including "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1955; Simon, 1956; March, 1978). He looks 
not just at how we "bound" our rationality with techniques such as "backward" 
planning from a desired future state, but also at the evidence of organisational 
behaviour as an extension of individual behaviour (Williamson, 1975). This is 
important from my perspective because I believe an organisation can take on a 
"collective" behaviour. This behaviour can thus become a "boundary" to the 
rationality of those who are part of it. An example of this happened during the merger 
under study. The chairman of the acquiring back (Bank C) announced at a press 
conference that the merger would complete five weeks after the US Federal Reserve 
granted approval. This resulted in planners working back from that date in their 
planning. 
March also presents other rationalities, each of which emphasises a different aspect of 
individual and group behaviour. These are: 
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" Limited rationality - the degree to which an individual or group simplifies a 
decision or problem because of the difficulties of anticipating all alternatives 
and all information. 
" Contextual rationality - the degree to which individual or group choice 
behaviour changes as a result of the combination of various sources of risk 
determinants, which form the "context". 
" Game rationality - the degree to which individual or group choice behaviour 
changes in pursuit of personal objectives within the organisation. 
" Process rationality - the change in behaviour that results from the decision 
processes, as opposed to the decision outcome. 
" Adaptive rationality - the degree to which judgement changes as a result of the 
learning process. This is akin to the notion of prior knowledge. 
" Selected rationality - the degree to which changes in the choices selected is a 
result of selection or growth. This is similar to a resource-based model. 
Certain behaviours bring about successful results while others do not. This can 
lead to homogeneity of managerial outlook, which was discussed earlier. 
9 Posterior rationality - the degree to which choices change is discovered 
through the actions themselves. 
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March considers it to be the case that decision-making requires a lot of human 
attention in the processes of information gathering, information processing and 
decision-making. This decision-making requires a scarce resource of finite capacity. 
Considering the various factors that drive human personalities, it is necessary to 
consider the idea of tastes. March suggests that taste has a number of properties. Taste 
is: 
" Absolute: Normative theories assume a formal position of moral relativity 
(March, 1978). Because of this we are uncomfortable with decisions and 
actions that are contrary to this position. 
e Relevant: Decisions should be consistent with preferences when probable 
outcomes are considered. 
9 Stable: Tastes should not change. 
" Consistent: Tastes should be consistent with each other. Normative theories 
of choice allow mutual inconsistent choice only so far as they can be made 
irrelevant by the specification of trade-offs. 
" Precise: There should be no ambiguity about the degree to which a particular 
outcome will satisfy taste. 
" Exogenous: Tastes are not affected by the choices they cause to be taken. 
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March is aware that these propositions are the result of normative theories which are 
not reflected by our behaviour in everyday life. More importantly, he also finds 
examples in research that would seem to refute each property. 
Nonetheless, he presents an integrated understanding of decision-making with 
uncertainty. The process of filtering and decision-making may be influenced by the 
factors of taste and rationality. 
Therefore, in order to have a complete understanding of risk behaviour, it is necessary 
to consider risk both in terms of something that can be quantified, but also something 
that requires an appreciation that the organisation's reaction to it may be more 
complex and cognitive than qualitative factors might suggest. 
1.3 Other views on organisational behaviour 
Even these integrated theories may be incomplete. Before that can be explored, it is 
important to understand what it is about organisational risk behaviour that requires 
answers from multiple perspectives. 
The answer to this question does not lie in risk management; it lies in organisational 
research. It is clear that many organisations are large and complex. The complexity of 
organisations is a key contributor to failure of the merger within these organisations 
(Reason, 2000; Reason, 2002; H inninen, 2000). The drivers for organisational 
complexity include technology and the evolving economic environment. Ultimately, 
the organisation's behaviour is the result of the behaviour of the individuals within it 
(Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
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It is quite easy to think of an organisation as a network where each person is a nodal 
point, all of which are interconnected via formal and informal links, which may be 
either direct or indirect. The way each node behaves is influenced by how the 
organisation as a whole behaves, in conjunction with the desires of the individual. This 
is essentially how \Veick and Roberts (1993) describe the way aircraft carriers operate. 
They are not unique in viewing organisations in this way, as Hogg and Terry (2000: 121) 
describe organisations as: 
`Internally stnrctaredg v: s that are located in coil lex (organisational) network of 
interims p relations characterised b, y power, status and prestige d erentials " 
They take this view further by asserting that the need for social identity is met by being 
part of an organisation, and that the need is so strong that it is central to the person's 
own self-image. It actually reduces uncertainty about their place in the world. This 
means that just as the organisation's behaviour is altered by the individual's behaviour, 
so the individual's behaviour is altered by being part of the organisation. 
In response to the complexity of organisations we need to produce models of 
behaviour in order to explain it. Single determinant theories of risk behaviour, while 
valuable, are not sufficient to offer a workable understanding. 
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"Ot 
, ganizalional researzbers 
in the late 20' century face a variety ofparadignis : vith 
which to theoiiZe their subject matter.... (Paradigm) interplay complements well 
known contrasts between paradigms with connections pwnposed fy post-modern 
critiques of modernist social science. Conside, ed sinmultaneously, these contrasts and 
connections position the reseawher to mom back and forth between paradigms and 
invite ieseamhe1s to see and use the diversity of organization theory in new ways" 
(Schultz and Hatch, 1996: 529). 
Schultz and Hatch argue the need to use all of the "paradigm diversity map" (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979) in research. This approach has only attracted significant research 
focus in the last ten to fifteen years (Hogg and Terry, 2000), both in the fields of 
multiple paradigms (Schultz and Hatch, 1996), complexity (LaPorte, 1975b; Tsoukas 
and Hatch, 2001) and searching for new forms of description (Hatch, 1998; Hatch, 
1999; Hatch and \Veick, 1998; Weick, 1998). This has also taken place in the area of 
risk behaviour. There is a weakness in trying to express the complexity of risk 
behaviour with a single determinant. This is implicit in some research (March, 1988; 
Pablo et al., 1996), but is explicitly addressed by others (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Das 
and Teng, 2001b). 
The review of literature focuses upon risk and risk behaviour. It is useful to look 
beyond his to find other possible explanations for what is being observed. There are 
two other areas I wish to focus on. The first of these is decision-making. It is 
suggested that risk perception plays a more dominant role than risk propensity, and 
that of these, outcome history is the most significant determinant (Sitkin and \Veingart, 
1995). Sitkin and \Veingart put forward the concept of "domain career", which is a 
type of measure of how familiar one is with the given domain. Arguing that an 
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individual's risk propensity for the domain is set in early experiences of the domain, 
they find that it may become fixed over time. This is important because in this 
research we will see the organisation move outside its familiar domain. In this situation 
the organisation is familiar with the risks, and so its propensity is already set. In other 
areas it is not familiar, and so the propensity is not fixed. This would explain 
inconsistent risk propensity observed from both the individual and the organisation. 
Another factor is the role of conflict and politics in decision-making. A merger or 
acquisition is full of opportunities for conflict, many of which have been identified by 
practitioner and academic research (Pablo et at., 1996; Pritchett, Robinson, and 
Clarkson, 1997; Galpin and IIemdon, 1999; Carter, 1999; Chevriere, 1999; Miller, 
1999; I Iabeck et al., 2000; Tuesday, 2003; Robb, 2003; Cuneo, 2003). Politics can play 
a part in causing these, as well as being a tool to prevent and disarm conflicts (Sitkin 
and Bies, 1993). The organisations involved in this acquisition are very resource rich, 
in terms of financial strength, capability and human resources. This is important in 
crisis situations, allowing the organisation adapt and create solutions to risk as required 
(Weick, 1988; LaPorte, 1975a). 
The final factor is culture. We have already examined the role of national culture 
(Douglas and \Vildavsky, 1982) and organisational culture (Hatch, 1997). In separate 
research, Hatch and Schultz (1997) and Sims (2002) shows that culture, identity and 
corporate image are both intertwined and interdependent. Therefore, the image that 
the organisation projects is contextualised to suit its needs, while its culture can be 
different. In addition to this, the need for self-identity is influenced by the total 
culture, as well as by the individuals within it (Hogg and Terry, 2000). 
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2 Conclusion 
The age of some of the references makes it clear that risk has been a cause for 
consideration and concern for some time. It is clear that there are many definitions of 
risk and its properties. Obviously this presents a potential difficulty if like for like 
comparisons cannot be made. The basic descriptive elements in the engineering-based 
literature is broadly similar in terms of the risk properties (probability, impact, hazard) 
and term t differ in terms of the precise scope, illustrated by the various definitions 
offered by Vleck and Karen (1991), who found ten different definitions. 
The engineering view presents a model of risk behaviour that is rational and 
quantifiable. The elements of the risk can be mathematically manipulated, which is 
probably why the terminology of risk and probability is used by cognitive researchers. 
In application it is very difficult to measure the values of probability and impact for all 
risks, and cognitive research has shown that risk perception and propensity also play a 
crucial role. 
To address the need to understand the roles of perception and preference, a series of 
cognitive theories have been developed which propose, and in most cases test, the role 
of single determinants of risk behaviour. These determinants have been shown to play 
a role in risk behaviour. Some are predictive, and have a consistent impact on risk 
behaviour (either to increase or decrease the likelihood of risk behaviour), whilst 
others, such as outcome history, can impact risk behaviour in a contradictory manner, 
which can increase or decrease the risk behaviour. These theories have also tended to 
examine decision-making at the individual level. Contemporary research such as 
March (1988), Sitkin and Pablo (1992) and Das and Teng (2001b) have put forward 
models of risk behaviour which attempt to address some of these shortcoming, all look 
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at multiple determinants and their interrelated ability to modify risk behaviour and 
examine the role of risk behaviour in an organisational context, rather than at the 
individual decision-maker level. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONTRIBUTION, DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has five purposes; the first of these is to provide a linkage between the 
three projects, pulling them together to facilitate a comprehensive discussion of the 
research, from which conclusions can be drawn. The second is to identify areas of 
weakness in the research, and opportunities for further research. The third is to 
demonstrate where there are contributions to knowledge arising from this research. 
These contributions are in the areas of theoretical, empirical, methodological and 
practical knowledge. The fourth purpose is to present my own observations, both on 
the research and the research process that I, as a management practitioner, have gone 
through. The fifth and final purpose is to present a discussion of the impacts of this 
research. 
1 Contribution 
This section highlights the contributions made by this research. These are summarised 
in Table 5- Matrix of contributions, below. The contributions are made under four 
headings. These are contribution to theoretical knowledge, empirical evidence, 
methodological approaches and management practice. 
In total eighteen contributions are made by this research. Five are in the area of 
theoretical knowledge, four of the contributions are to empirical evidence, four to 
methodological approaches and five to practice of knowledge. 
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1.1 Contribution to theoretical knowledge 
The research makes five contributions to theoretical knowledge, as indicated in the 
table above, Table 5- Matrix of contributions. 
The first contribution is the merger model, which is a chronological description of the 
merger process between two investment banks. This model is based on the integration 
plans for the acquisition under study, and the earlier acquisition of Bank A. They 
extend and enhance similar descriptive models (IIabeck et al., 2000; Pritchett et al., 
1997). 
The second contribution of the research relates to the determination of risk behaviour 
played by successful outcome history. The research shows that when the organisation 
is operating outside its normal operation domain its behaviour towards risks it is 
familiar with, and has a successful outcome history of managing, is to manage the risks 
particularly well. This partly supports the findings of Thaler and Johnson (1990), that 
the degree of success or otherwise of managing the risk in the past can encourage or 
discourage risk-taking behaviour. In this case the organisation is clearly focusing 
strongly on managing these risks well, which constitutes risk-averse behaviour. The 
findings are contrary to what was found by Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) research 
on availability theory, which suggested that because of the familiarity, the decision- 
maker would be less risk-averse. 
The third contribution demonstrates that under these conditions, the organisation will 
well manage the risks which can be managed using ordinary controls. The application 
of controls can reduce the risk probability being faced (Flint, 1981), even if it cannot 
eliminate them (Perrow, 1983; Perrow, 1984). A number of researchers have explained 
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the desire to apply normal controls in unfamiliar circumstances (LaPorte, 1975a; 
\Veick, 1987; \Veick, 1977). This is often the "sensible" choice for the decision-maker 
as it is generally rewarded (Ouchi, 1977) and might be the first solution to present 
itself (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). However, once the organisation is outside its 
normal domain, this behaviour is only good to a point, and high reliability in 
organisations requires decision makers to be able to abandon normal controls and 
either use different controls (LaPorte, 1988) or create new behaviours (Weick, 1993) to 
manage the being faced. 
The fourth contribution relates to the way in which the future orientation of the 
organisation influences risk decision-making (Das and Teng, 2001b). The expected 
risk behaviour that would be predicted by the Temporal model (Das and Teng, 2001b) 
only occurred in one of the four case studies conducted in Project 2. This challenges 
the Temporal model; it is not to say the Temporal model is incorrect, however, it does 
indicate that it is not applicable in this circumstance, and therefore it is not universally 
applicable. 
The final contribution supports the general view of risk behaviour proposed by March 
(1988; 1992) that to understand risk behaviour in organisations you need to consider 
multiple risk determinants. This "multiple-paradigm" (Schultz and Hatch, 1996: 529) 
approach to organisational research is necessary. The case studies in Project 2 illustrate 
how a number of risk determinants could explain an aspect of the risk behaviour 
observed. No single determinant theory could fully explain the risk behaviour 
observed for any single risk, let alone the four studied in the cases. 
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1.2 Contribution to empirical knowledge 
The research makes three important contributions to empirical knowledge. 
Firstly, the data collected supports a number of existing theories (outcome history, 
organisational controls and availability theory) which explain risk behaviour. This is 
discussed in the preceding section and so will not be repeated here. 
Secondly, the evidence from the cases shows that in three of the four cases the 
behaviour that would be expected, according to the Temporal model (Das and Ten, 
2001b), did not in fact occur. This evidence is therefore contradictory to the 
experimental evidence found by Das and Teng (2001b). This is very different data 
from that used to support the Temporal model. There are two key differences. The 
first is that is this is drawn from practitioners working on real business problems, while 
Das and Teng use experimental data under a controlled setting. The second is that this 
relates to a specific and unusual event with compact timelines, which probably impacts 
on decision-making and the organisation's future orientation. 
Thirdly, this research also presents new empirical evidence. The data collected in the 
first project appears to be the only research data collected in relation to the change of 
control period in an investment bank acquisition. While there has been prior research 
into mergers (Meeks, 1977; Herzel and Shepro, 1990; Limmack, 1991; Pablo et al., 
1996; Donnelly, 1998; Johnson, 1999), they do not examine the CoC. A possible 
reason for this is that regulated financial acquisitions are relatively rare; there were 338 
(4% of all M&A activity) banking and finance mergers and acquisitions in the first ten 
months of 2003 (Mergerstat, 2003a). Only a percentage of these would be banks that 
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would be subject to the type of regulation that would make the CoC such a complex 
event. This is the only data that examines this phenomenon. 
1.3 Contribution to methodological knowledge 
The research makes four methodological contributions. Three confirm existing, but 
not necessary common approaches, and one develops current methods. 
The first two of these contributions relate to using the Delphi and case methods. The 
use of the Delphi method is not very common in academic research (Fourlis, 1976). 
There are probably two reasons for this; the first is that the method is usually used for 
forecasting purposes (Fourlis, 1976; Jenkins and Thoele, 1991; Helmer, 1968; Dalkey, 
1969), and the second is that as it is not frequently used, it may not be well understood, 
and therefore may seem to lack the necessary rigour of research Genkins and Thoele, 
1991; Fourlis, 1976). By using the method I am re-confirming the ability of the Delphi 
method to be used in research. 
It is much the same with the use of the case method. It is not frequently used in 
research for a number of reasons, and this can undermine its perceived rigour (Yin, 
1994). Three areas for concern exist, the potential for lack of rigour on the part of the 
researcher, the limited opportunity for generalisation, and the fact that case studies can 
be very time consuming. Each of these can be overcome (Yin, 1994), and this is 
described in detail in Project 2. By using it, I hope to further the acceptance of the 
method. 
The two methodological contributions are that the research is multi-paradigm based 
and it applies the Delphi method is a new way. 
Page 75 
This research draws on many paradigms to explain risk behaviour. At the highest level 
it uses the Reconceptualised model (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and the Temporal model 
(Das and Teng, 2001b). In addition to these, it also examines the eight risk paradigms 
that underpin these models. This type of multi-paradigm method is rare in 
organisational research (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Schultz and Hatch, 1996), though 
clearly researchers are seeing an increasing need for this type of research (Weick, 1995; 
Hatch and Weick, 1998). 
The final contribution is the use of the Delphi method for the retrospective analysis of 
an event instead of for forecasting. This is a completely new departure. The use of 
Delphi in a post-facto manner is not a usual approach, as Delphi is usually used for 
pre-facto work. This type of post-facto use, combined with the development of the 
scoring mechanism, allows its results to be presented and interpreted in a way that 
makes it easier for the data to be understood and interpreted. 
1.4 Contribution to practical knowledge 
'T'his research makes five contributions to management practice. 
Firstly, the findings in Project 1 re-confirm the fact that organisations do not 
necessarily operate in a rational manner. The inverse correlation between the level of 
risk significance and the level of mitigation is evidence of this. This shows that it is not 
sufficient to assume that managers will act in accordance with what they believe to be 
right. Considering the strong adherence to management controls, this may be seen in 
the adherence to rules in practice (\Veick, 1983). 
Page 76 
The second contribution is the proposal that technology is a key source of risk. This is 
understandable in investment banks, as they are information-intensive enterprises 
(Porter, 1985) and invest heavily in technology. For example, in 2002 Merrill Lynch 
spent US$1.75 billion (14.8% of expenses) on technology and telecommunications 
(Merrill Lynch, 2003: 15). It is further confirmed by this research, which shows that 
technology risks account for about 65% of all risks identified. Risks which cannot be 
quantified are less likely to be managed well. This is shown in this research by 
examining the management of human factors risks, which are hard to quantify 
compared with risks relating to financial controls. This has been a concern for this 
industry for some time and has in recent years been the subject of consultations papers 
on future operations risk management (FSA, 2000a; FSA, 2000b). 
The third contribution comes from other pieces of data that progress management 
practice. The first is that Project 1 demonstrates how risks with which the organisation 
has a high degree of familiarity will be managed better than those with which it is not 
familiar. This is probably a development for management practice as risk management 
in this organisation is based around prioritisation of risk based on likely impact and 
probability [Doco5q. 
Risk characteristics of the dominant national culture can become the risk behaviour of 
the organisation. This can be seen in the second project. The tendency to need formal 
controls within the dominant national culture (1-iofstede, 1980) could be exerting more 
influence than the organisation realises. 
The fourth contribution is that, once the organisation moves outside its normal 
operational domain, it applies its organisational controls in risk management in an 
excessive manner. This is inefficient, but also means that other risks are not receiving 
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management attention, which is a risky strategy in itself (Reason, 2000; 'eick and 
Roberts, 1993; Hudson et al., 1994; Reason et al., 2001; Reason, 2002). 
The final contribution comes from the use of the Delphi method for risk analysis, in 
conjunction with the risk measurement and scoring system, is a new tool to aid 
management practice. It is important because it can hold up a mirror to the 
organisation that applies it. It is also important because it provides a method that is 
relatively inexpensive, quick to apply, and is free of many of the issues of group 
dynamics that similar methods can suffer from. 
The other new finding is the insight into the behaviour of a large organisation when 
operating outside its operational domain. It has shown that the regulatory and 
organisational controls will be adhered to very strictly, though this was probably not 
the intent. This is important for the industry's regulation. 
2 Discussion 
The discussion of this research is undertaken from two different perspectives; the 
academic findings and impact, and the practitioner perspective. The research makes 
several important findings and raises several important questions. The practitioner 
discussion considers three levels; management practice in general, industry regulation, 
and the target organisation itself. 
The phenomenon under study in this research is one that has not been examined 
before. This type of I`vi&A activity, a trading investment bank, is a rare event, 
particularly among banks of this scale. Among such large and complex investment 
banks there have been typically only a handful every year. It is an expensive and risk- 
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intensive undertaking bounded by tight time constraints of the change of control week- 
end (typically from the close of business on a Friday until the opening of business on 
the following Monday). In spite of this it has attracted no academic research prior to 
this study. No articles relating to this specific undertaking have been found. This 
surprises me from an academic standpoint, but my experience of working with some 
of the largest organisations in this industry suggests that they would not like to draw 
attention to the process in detail, partly because of fears relating to confidentiality, and 
partly because they would not like the scrutiny that such study would necessitate. 
Having undertaken this research, I hope that other researchers will now consider this 
area for further investigation. 
The complexity of organisational risk behaviour is very clear from this research. Single 
determinant theories are all insufficient to explain the processes at work. Even 
integrated theories are either incomplete (Sitkin and Pablo (1992) do not consider 
temporal aspects) or inaccurate (Das and Teng's (2001b) model failed to predict the 
actual outcome in three out of four instances). So we clearly have a long way still to 
go. I would make two suggestions based on these observations. The first is that risk 
behaviour is highly contextual. By this I mean that all the determinants are at play, but 
the relative importance of each may vary depending on the situation. Recent research 
into large economic losses and gains (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992) suggests that 
large losses or gains can change our propensity for risk. Yet we are also aware that 
people are capable of risking, and even sacrificing their own lives for no economic 
reward to save others under some circumstances. It is clear to me that in under some 
conditions the importance of the determinant will change. What is needed is the 
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development of an explanatory model which can account for and explain these shifting 
prioritisations. 
The second suggestion relates to temporal considerations. Das and Teng (2001b) 
considered temporality as a factor that moderates the risk behaviour post the impact of 
risk perception and risk propensity. There is no reason to suspect that temporal 
considerations are any different from other risk determinants, save one. Time 
considerations can operate on a risk preference level between national cultural groups 
(Tromperaars, 1993), and therefore also at the individual decision-maker level. 
However, risk perception can also be affected by time considerations (Das and Teng, 
1997), such as the amount of time before the impact of the risk is experienced in 
comparison to the potential reward. 
The research has identified the risks faced by a major investment bank while executing 
a proprietary acquisition, specifically the change of control. This is not been 
undertaken before. While this type of acquisition is relatively rare, it is very important, 
and the lack of prior research indicates a gulf between management practice and 
academic knowledge that needs to be bridged. 
The research does not necessarily contradict any previous theories of risk 
determination based on single risk determinants. It does support Ouchi's (1977) 
findings on the importance of organisational controls in influencing behaviour. It also 
supports the opinion of \Veick (1996b; 1996c) that when placed outside the 
operational domain, many teams will adhere strictly to their training and will not be 
able to improvise, should that be necessary. Of course, once outside the normal 
operational domain the ability to improvise is crucial, whether it be a life and death 
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situation (\Veick, 1993) or responding to change (Hatch, 1998) or ambiguity (IIatch, 
1997). 
In this research we will see how the risk behaviour observed is influenced by many risk 
determinants, particularly the outcome history (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) and the 
controls (Ouchi, 1977) that are in place. There is also a strong suggestion that the 
nature of the dominant national culture has played an important role, reflecting earlier 
research by Hofstede (1980), Tromperaars (1993) and Douglas and \Vildavsky (1982). 
The importance of national culture in terms of the closeness of the match of cultures 
was found to be important in the similar activity of strategic alliances, by Das and Teng 
(2001a). This suggestion may be the result of the dominant culture or the cultural 
similarity of the top team, resulting in "groupthink" (Janis, 1972) behaviour. 
It is clear that no single risk determinant explains the observed risk behaviour. The 
need for more complex multiple perspective approaches has been argued by a number 
of researchers (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Schultz and Hatch, 1996; \Veick, 1996a). 
Those who have produced models for risk behaviour, such as March and Shapira 
(1987), have done so in order to overcome the limits of single perspectives. The 
integrated models provide an opportunity to better explain the complexity of what is 
happening within the organisation. However, even these models are found to be 
lacking. The findings in Project 2 contradict the expected behaviour predicted by the 
Temporal model (Das and Teng, 2001b). Of course, because this is a rare event, the 
conditions are unusual; nonetheless, the research shows that there is a need for a newer 
and more robust theory. 
This research examines how one company behaves when it operates in an unfamiliar 
problem domain. This is different from operating in a familiar problem domain. The 
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new operational domain will present many problems. Some of these are familiar to the 
organisation, some are not. During a time of strong economic performance of the 
global economy, many companies engaged in acquisitions and mergers, which places 
them into an unfamiliar problem domain. In more recent times, the economy has 
deteriorated and organisations are faced with new and unfamiliar challenges. Some of 
these are economic changes, while others are of a geo-political nature. 
The long-term survival and performance is, of course, crucial to the shareholders in the 
organisation and many of its other stakeholders. Failure to manage long term risk in 
financial products has led the Britain's longest established mutual society, Equitable 
Life, to close its doors to new business. Yet its policyholders (who are in effect its 
shareholders) expected long term security from the firm. It is implicit in the 
expectation that long term risk be managed that short term risk should also be 
managed; after all, without short term risk management there may not be a long term 
for the organisation. There is growing evidence that pressures for reliability from 
corporate organisations are greater than at any point in recent years (Stabile, 2002), 
combined with significant new sources of risk combine to present new challenges for 
corporations. 
In responding to these challenges, my research indicates that organisations will focus 
on issues that are addressed by specific formal controls. This is important because the 
regulation in place shapes the controls, though it may not be designed to address the 
unusual problem domain. Regulators need to be aware of this. The message to 
regulators is that they need to consider extraordinary situations in framing their 
regulations. 
1. Day-to-day business controls will be applied in abnormal situations 
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2. Risks not normally managed successfully will be managed negligently; and 
3. Where there is an existing management control the organisation will tend to be 
overly manage the risk. 
The findings can be generalised to areas of unfamiliar operational domains, at least 
within this industry. The operation of the organisation outside the normal operating 
environment is, by definition, unusual for the organisation. However, while it is 
unusual for the organisation, the events appear to be happening with increasing 
frequency. Looking at a macro level, in the 1970s organisations had to deal with two 
main asymmetric shocks; the two oil crisis. In the 1990s, in addition to the instability 
caused by the first Gulf war, organisations had to respond to a series of debt default 
crises (South America, South-East Asia and Russia), but also to the Euro conversion 
and the Year 2000 problem. In this century we have seen a rise in the need to respond 
to terrorism, which places new challenges on large organisations. This research 
provides a rudimentary tool to allow the enterprise to quickly identify and measure the 
risks faced in these unusual circumstances. The research also shows that organisations 
should not depend on existing controls and staff to protect their commercial interests. 
New techniques are required in order to give organisations higher operational 
reliability by being able to respond creatively and with improvisation to these 
challenges through heedful interrelations (\Veick and Roberts, 1993; Roberts, 1990) 
and creative sense-making (Weick, 1988; \Veick, 1998). Otherwise, organisations' 
performance will suffer and the organisations may fail in their entirety. 
These findings are significant for management practice. If an organisation wishes to 
ensure that it is successful when placed outside its normal operating domain, it needs 
to appreciate that normal managerial controls and approaches will generally be applied. 
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Faced with this, practitioners need to make one of three responses, or a combination 
of those three. 
Firstly, the organisation needs to strengthen its normal day-to-day control and decision 
making process to ensure that it is robust enough and broad enough to address the 
risks it will face in an unfamiliar problem domain. 
Secondly, the organisation can ensure that its decision-makers are trained to be aware 
of the different approaches and decision requirements they might face and guarantee 
that they are empowered and feel empowered to create solutions and make sure that 
there is not a collapse in sense-making (Weick, 1993) in the face of an unfamiliar 
problem domain. 
Thirdly, the organisation can consider creating separate controls and control 
mechanisms to manage ad hoc situations as they occur. Like the control centre for the 
acquisition under study, the organisation can develop the capability to rapidly respond 
to new situations by bringing together (physically or virtually) the necessary resources 
and expertise, and allow them to take control of the organisation during the period of 
exposure to the unfamiliar problem domain. 
The methods used in Project 1 and Project 2 are not commonly used. Case studies are 
rare (Yin, 1994) and I have never seen a post-facto use of the Delphi technique 
described in any of the reviewed literature relating to Delphi, whether it be from its 
original creators (Dalkey, 1969; Helmer, 1968), academics reviewing it (Fourlis, 1976; 
Hiltz and Turoff, 2001; Linstone and Turoff, 1975; Jenkins and Thoele, 1991; 
Mandanis, 1968), or from those using it in practice (Flynn and Belzowski, 1999). 
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However, the findings have been comprehensive and have avoided many of die issues 
relating to group dynamics which have been discussed in the literature section. 
While it does answer what it set out to answer at the start, the research also leaves a 
number of important questions unanswered. These questions prompt further querying 
into this area. It is easy to perceive organisations as rational structures composed of 
people who act in a broadly rational manner. However, failings within the 
organisation, such as politics, expertise, resource limitations (Teng and Cummmings, 
2002), along with other factors, cause the organisation to act in a manner that is not 
aligned to its own self interests at all times, which we have observed. From this 
perspective, organisations may act irrationally, at least when they are, as seen in this 
situation, operating outside the usual operational domain. 
This in itself is not surprising to me. As a practitioner, I frequently see situations 
where the organisation acts in a manner that is not in its overall best interest. This is 
usually the result of members of the organisation taking action which is in some way 
optimal to them, but not to the organisation as a whole. \Vhat made this very 
interesting, and a little disturbing, is that the members of the organisation knew that 
there were other important risks that it was not addressing, but as a group they either 
accepted or ignored this (Janis, 1972). 
For a listed organisation this is very serious. The directors and managers of a listed 
company have a duty of care to protect the interests of the shareholders. For the 
organisation to knowingly act in a manner that does not look after the shareholders' 
interests is a serious concern. 
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The risk behaviour is influenced by many risk determinants, in particular the outcome 
history and the controls that are in place. Other risk determinants can play a role too, 
and these need to be investigated further. In addition, the understanding of the 
importance of future orientation, and how it relates to risk preference and perception, 
does not appear to hold true in this situation. This should also be investigated. 
With this understanding, and with a tool which allows an organisation to see its 
collective understanding of the risks, it is possible to address not only the particular 
risks to which it is exposed, but also those determinants of behaviour which need to be 
addressed. This means that more focused, and therefore more efficient, efforts can be 
applied to the issue. 
The basic technique used in this research has been applied in three different 
organisations and is being considered by a number of others. From a practitioner 
perspective it offers a number of advantages over other methods: 
" It tends to give back more complete coverage in terms of risk identification 
" It avoids group think 
0 It can help to build up a degree of consensus which reduces the resistance to 
and difficulties of instigating the change necessary to respond to the risk 
because the group agrees on the prioritisation. 
" It can be implemented very quickly and can offer initial results in a short 
period of time 
" There is little impact on the organisation; and 
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" The cost is relatively low. 
The Delphi-based technique used in Project 1 is a very useful implementation of the 
Delphi Method. By conducting the research in this manner it was possible to gather 
the information without the interference of group dynamics. It also makes it possible 
to engage a wider range of individuals, and to combine all of their individual inputs. 
In studying the acquisition of Bank B by Bank C, the research set out to discover what 
risks the organisations faced during the acquisition, and in particular, during the change 
of control phase. In identifying the risks faced, the research also identified the 
significance and level of mitigation of the risks. This showed an inverse relationship 
between the two. Many of the most significant risks are not well managed, while the 
lesser ones were excessively managed. The next goal of this research is to find what 
possible explanation for this may lie in the clusters of excessive and negligently 
managed risks. 
There are two clusters among the excessively managed risks. These are the control 
centre itself, and clarity around trading and settlement positions. The latter cluster 
represents risks which can be managed using day-to-day controls and which are largely 
a "mechanical" activity. At the other end of the scale are the negligently managed 
risks. Most of these are human-centric in nature, and are poorly mitigated. This 
indicates that the organisation has a propensity to manage non-human issues well. 
This may reflect a tacit decision by the organisation to be less concerned with taking 
risks with human capital, or it may be a reflection of the high power distance of the 
dominant national culture (IIofstede, 1980). Of course, in an acquisition situation, 
these risks come to the fore. 
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The potential exists for a series of risks to combine and result in a risk coming to pass 
for which the organisation is simply not prepared. This is similar to what has been 
described as a "Swiss cheese" effect (Reason, 2000). This is when various weaknesses 
in the protection levels align and allow a threat to penetrate the defences, much like 
aligning the holes in slices of Swiss cheese. Naturally, this sort of scenario is a 
substantial concern for an investment bank. The source of this organisational 
weakness requires further investigation. This will be the focus for my future projects. 
Because this is a regulated industry, organisations are obliged to incorporate the 
regulation into their operating procedures. This means that the regulator indirectly 
determines part of the organisation's control mechanisms. Since the research finds 
that these are likely to be followed closely in the unfamiliar as well as the familiar 
problem domain, the regulator needs to consider the impact of the regulations on the 
whole industry. 
Regulators need to consider this and regulate in a way that reflects this situation, either 
through making robust regulations or through allowing organisations latitude in the 
application of the regulations in the face of exceptional situations. 
The research has a significant potential impact for how the target bank manages not 
just its acquisitions, but potentially all risks in general. If later research allows the 
findings to be generalised beyond the target organisation, it could have a major impact 
for investment banks and similar financial institutions. 
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3 Conclusion 
The research looks at risk behaviour in an important area of banking activity which has 
not so far been researched. The research has successfully identified the risks, their 
relative importance and mitigation, and the behavioural determinants which determine 
the risk behaviour. With this knowledge and techniques, organisations can repeat this 
process and identify the risks that need addressing and the behavioural changes 
necessary to improve the overall risk behaviour of the organisation. 
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PART B: PROJECT REPORTS 
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REPORT: PROJECT ONE 
his chapter addresses the research conducted in Project 1. This project is concerned 
with identifying the risks that the target organisation (Bank C) faced during its 
acquisition of Bank B, how significant they were, and how well mitigated they were. 
This chapter is divided into three parts and is based on the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2. The first part of the chapter describes the research method followed, why it 
was selected, and how it was conducted. There is a particular focus on the Delphi 
method, which was adapted for this research. The second part of the chapter presents 
the results of the project. The third and final part is a discussion. This discusses the 
findings and poses the research questions which the follow-on project, Project 2, 
addresses. 
1 Method 
This section describes the method of research undertaken in Project 1. It discusses the 
methods which were considered, and why some were selected over others. In 
particular, the use of the Delphi method as adapted for this research is discussed in 
some detail, as is the method of review of company documentation that was available 
to me. 
The objective of the project is to identify risks and quantify their significance 
(probability and impact) and their mitigation. Because of this a method would be 
needed that would answer diese questions in a quantitative manner. It is also necessary 
to be able to analyse the risks in terms of their timing, and the nature of the risks, 
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which as a practitioner I believe to be an important aspect of the management 
processes, given the compressed time frame involved. Also discussed are the selected 
method of research with the two sources of data available to me; company records and 
a small pool of professionals. 
1.1 Initial approaches considered for the research 
Considering the data sources, time and objectives of the research, appropriate methods 
that could be considered for the research needed to be found. To aid this I reviewed 
Doiig Qi antitatitr Resea, rh in the Social Sciences (Black, 1999) and Qualitali e Data Analysis 
(Miles and I-Iubcrman, 1994) to inform and to provide an overview of the options that 
one should consider. Black (1999) proposes a process for hypothesis which is not 
appropriate for this project, however he does outline approaches to data gathering 
which can be used. It became clear that the selected method needed to be appropriate 
for post-facto investigation. Three broad approaches were identified. 
The first approach was to review the company records and identify the risk to the 
merger's success documented in the company's records. This could then be followed 
by producing a questionnaire which could be used to poll the panel of experts. This 
approach could be operationalised, provided that there was a way to manage the 
volume of data in the company records. However, I was uncomfortable with it 
because I would not be gathering data from the experts and so I might miss the benefit 
of their experience. It is also entirely possible that a questionnaire would not be 
interpreted in the same way by all respondents. There is also no real scope for follow- 
up with this approach. Because of these concerns I discounted this approach. 
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The second approach to be considered would be to interview the experts. Then, based 
on a content or similar analysis, extract the risks identified and produce a questionnaire 
which the panel could complete. This offered a lot of benefits because it would base 
the work on the experts' opinion and so include their input. They would be able to 
incorporate whatever they wished, and as it is based on the interview; I could structure 
it to bring greater focus on the change of control part of the merger. In spite of the 
advantages of this approach, there were also concerns. There could be ambiguity in 
the results returned by the experts, and in addition, there could be disagreement over 
the answers, : und there would have been no opportunity to address these. 
A third consideration was to organise a workshop or focus group session with the 
experts. his offered the possibility of the experts getting into a detailed discussion 
and debate relating to the central issues. This offered a lot of scope to arrive at an 
agreement and to elicit greater depth in relation to understanding the issues. On the 
other hand, such a focus group would be very difficult to chair as there were many 
senior people involved. I could not be sure that I would be able to manage and direct 
it appropriately so as to cover all the issues in a reasonable time frame. In addition, 
finding a time and venue agreeable to all of the parties was not practical because some 
were in locations overseas. Also, it was quite possible that the group could be 
dominated by a small number of individuals, which is a common problem with group 
discussions (Fourlis, 1976; Jenkins and Thoele, 1991). 
The second option, while attractive from an operational and data quality perspective, 
still suffered from the possibility of there being disagreement on the importance of one 
given risk versus another, which would make it difficult to achieve management 
commitment to address the risks from within the organisation. The solution to this 
Page 93 
was to modify the basic approach so as to incorporate the approach used in the Delphi 
forecasting method. This would allow the respondents to answer the question more 
than once, and thus modify their answers once they became aware of the answers of 
the others in their group. 
The use of the Delphi method is not very widespread in academic research (Fourlis, 
1976), partly because it is usually used as a forecasting tool (I Telmer, 1968; Dalkey, 
1969), and partly because many academics are not comfortable with it as a rigorous 
research tool (17ourlis, 1976; Jenkins and Thoele, 1991). These concerns need to be 
addressed. 
1.2 The Delphi method 
The Delphi method was developed as a group consensus technique to produce 
forecasts for a particular topic or area of interest (IIiltz and Turoff, 2001). It was 
developed by Olaf Helmer and Norman Dalkey at the Rand Corporation (J-Ielmer, 
1968; Dalkey, 1969). 
The use of the method has grown substantially in terms of frequency of use and 
purpose for which it is applied. Today, it is applied to a wide range of forecasting 
activities in many industries Qcnkins and Thoele, 1991). It has been found to be more 
appropriate than numerical forecasting methods in many circumstances (Fourlis, 1976). 
Fourlis found that successful use of the Delphi method depends upon: 
" Anonymity of the members of die panel - the panel would be unaware of the 
identity of any oilier panellist, so as not to influence their opinion. 
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" Controlled feedback - the panel make their estimates (give their opinion) in a 
uniform way. 
" Statistical group response - the opinions are weighted in some manner. This 
would depend on the topic, such as favouring the views of recognised 
specialists, or those with long experience. 
One attribute that is often considered beneficial by contemporary writers is the fact 
that it is asynchronous. Some consider this to be a prerequisite (Hiltz and Turoff, 
2001), partly because of the use of mail to co-ordinate and correspond with the 
members of the panel. Today, we can use technologies to support us to work in a 
more iterative fashion if so desired. When Helmer was describing the Delphi method 
in the late 1960s, he made no specific reference to this. He described the process as a 
series of sequential steps. 
'lie Delphi method can be applied to activities other than forecasting. Some consider 
and use the Delphi method as a "decision support" tool (IIiltz and Turoff, 2001), 
though there is no indication that this was IIelmer's original intention. I elected to use 
the Delphi method because of the consensus-building nature of the method. Using it 
allowed me to extract and gain a degree of consensus about the risks, their significance 
and mitigation, which the organisation believes that it faces during the acquisition. 
Another advantage of the Delphi method is that it can lead to higher quality of 
decision-making. In the late 1960s research into the issue of the quality of decision- 
making was conducted within the Rand Corporation (Dalkey, 1969). Dalkey expressed 
the opinion that the lack of a "face-to-face" procedure and the anonymity of the 
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Delphi method results in a better quality of decision-making, thus resulting in a better 
consensus. 
Jenkins and 111oele (1991) point out the potential high quality of group decision- 
making. In support of the accuracy of group forecasting compared to that of 
individuals, they quote the findings of Sniezek (Health & Safety Executive, 1989). 
Jenkins and Thocle also point out that sometimes a group of experts was not 
significantly better at forecasting than the general public. They cite an example from 
Wright and Schaal (1988) relating to the quality of decision-making, in terms of the 
selection of high performing equities between the general public and experts. 
The process also allowed for better learning. By going through multiple iterations of 
the opinions of various stakeholders, it was possible for each to gain an appreciation 
and understanding of the knowledge, issues and perspective of the others. Mandanis 
(1968: 17) found that "the Delphi method can take the form of a detailed 
understanding by corporate executives of the reasoning that underlies their respective 
staffs recommendations, or it can help the latter appreciate more intimately, the biases 
and style of those they counsel". 
One of the dangers of group decision-making is the impact of a dominant individual 
Qenkins and Thoele, 1991). The anonymity of the Delphi method avoids contact 
between participants, thus greatly reducing the impact of dominant individual 
behaviour. There is no threat of a single individual "setting the direction" or 
intimidating others and preventing them from taking part, as there is no group 
interaction. 
Page 96 
1.2.1 Other concerns 
A number of researchers have identified weaknesses with the Delphi method. Fourlis 
(1976) identifies and addresses a number these. 
" Panel selection - the members of the panel need to be deemed to be "experts". 
'Iliose: selected for the panel are all experts in that they have either considerable 
professional or academic expertise of the subject area. Of course, some 
experts can have a greater degree of expertise on some aspects of the issue 
th: ul others. It is possible to allow participants to assign a self-weight to the 
questions if necessary. 
" Group size - like any sampling method, the error decreases as the sample size 
increases. Group sizes of 13 to 15 are optimal (Dalkcy, 1969). '111is is possibly 
a reflection of the technolog used at the time. Today, using interactive 
technologies, it is possible to have any number of experts take part. No 
research has been undertaken to determine whether or not this is the case. 
'11ic questionnaire - the questionnaire needs to be clear to the respondent, in 
that they must be c1trar as to the questions being asked of them. Because of 
this, it may be necessary to provide the participants with extra background 
knowledge. 
" Reliability of the technique - the conclusion that l1ourlis (1976) comes to, and 
quotes a number of sources to support him, is that the method is reliable when 
used in the right context. The sort of economic and academic value placed on 
the findings of Delphi studies by commercial organisations also supports this. 
An =. unple: is the recent Delphi-X study (l'ynn and 13elzowski, 1999) which 
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examines trends within the petroleum industry. He also concludes that there 
are a number of potential issues relating to the respondents' interpretation of 
the questions that in turn bring into question the researcher's ability to 
compare answers. There are also issues that surround other group techniques, 
such as polling. Therefore, we should conclude that the issue relates to the 
application of the technique, rather than to the technique itself. 
The method of qualitative data collection selected was adapted from the Delphi 
method. This process started off initially as a series of interviews. In order to draw 
these interviews together, the process described below was followed. 
The need for an expert panel for the Delphi method required people who had played 
an important role in one of the mergers. They were broadly categorised as consultants, 
managers, senior managers, staff and external specialists. Appropriate individuals who 
would fit the criteria were identified. They were approached, and all bar two agreed to 
take part in the research. In practice, there was not 100% participation as can be seen 
in Table 6- Delphi participation. 
1.3 The merger model 
To structure the research a merger model that could describe the merger was required. 
This had to be a chronological descriptive model, in order to allow clear demarcation 
of the phases of the merger. The initial models examined were unsuitable because they 
ignored the change of control period, which is particularly important in this context. 
Two models in particular were identified. The structure of the Watson Wyatt (Galpin 
and Herndon, 1999) consulting model captured the focus on the "deal" making aspect 
and was useful because the M&A process is driven by a deal. The model proposed by 
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Habeck et al. (2000) has the advantage of recognising the basic chronological "chain" 
of the merger. 
Using the model presented by Habeck et al. as a basis, I began to incorporate the 
Watson Wyatt model. I wanted the resulting model to be something that practitioners 
would find useful and easy to remember. My first attempt to combine these two 
models was unsuccessful. My next attempt was to structure the merger process into 
three steps much as I-Iabeck et al. had done, and then to sub divide these into two 
more stages. This seemed to be a clearer model. Figure 8- Merger model shows the 
new merger model. 
The model is supported by two research steps. Firstly, the bank's literature (primarily 
the planning documents) and public domain literature relating to the two mergers was 
examined. 
This process began to validate the model. Publicly available interviews [DOC26C] 
described the prelude and agreement phases of the merger. These resulted in the 
announcement and the initial efforts surrounding that to manage external and internal 
communication. Examination of the Following this there were many examples in the 
planning documents to substantiate the following three steps; pre-integration, change 
of control and post-integration. The process showed that the language of the model 
needed to be changed to reflect the wider use of the terms "change of control" and 
"integration" within the acquisition. From this, the current model is produced: 
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Hand Engagement Embrace Holding 
Prelude Agreement Announcement Pre Change of Post Integration Control Integration 
Figure 8- Merger model 
The next step in the validation process was to present this at the start of each interview 
to the interviewee and invite them to comment on it in the form of a brief discussion. 
From this process there were no further recommendations, but all interviewees said 
that they found the model appropriate. The model also helped to focus the 
conversation on the change of control period. 
The design devised was therefore intended to tackle the data sources in two similar 
ways. The experts available would be used in a Delphi-type study to identify and 
evaluate the merger risks. At the same time, I would review the company records 
available to me so as to identify the risks presented within them. A risk classification 
would then be applied to the risks so as to make it possible to compare the two sets of 
data. 
1.4 The Delphi study 
This section describes the method followed for the Delphi study. A Delphi study 
usually takes the form of creating a questionnaire. Next, a panel of experts is formed. 
The questionnaire is circulated to the panel, who answer each question. Then they are 
asked to answer the question again, and they are able to see the average results from 
the previous iteration. This is usually continued until there is little difference between 
the answers from each iteration, or until the number of iterations is considered 
sufficient. In practice the number of iterations rarely exceeds three or four (Dalkey, 
Page 100 
1969; Fourlis, 1976; Iiiltz and Turoff, 2001; Jenkins and Thoele, 1991). I decided to 
deviate slightly from this approach by interviewing each member of the panel and 
using their feedback to produce the questionnaire. 
My first task was to select a panel of experts. Panel selection was made easier because 
I had worked in a central role in this acquisition, so I knew who these people were, and 
I had access to them. In addition, because the research was supported by Bank C, I 
did not have to face any ethical issues with confidentiality. I started by drawing up a 
list of people who had worked on the project at various levels, but in a position that 
was sufficiently central to allow them have a cross-organisational view of the 
acquisition. Of those with whom I could still make contact, over twenty were 
identified as potential participants. These were classified into a number of categories 
based on their role. These were external consultants, managers, senior (top team) 
managers and control centre staff. A panel size of 15 was selected because it was 
possible that there would not be 100% participation, and this is the "high end" of the 
optimum panel size. Panel members were selected by their areas and business unit to 
elicit as wide a group of responses as possible. From this a panel of 15 participants 
was formed, and of these two declined to take part in the process and one who agreed 
did not partake. The panel was balanced in terms representation from each group. 
The method of qualitative data collection is based around the Delphi method. For it 
to be effective I needed a body of individuals with expertise and knowledge of the 
merger being studied. The people needed to have worked in areas where they would 
have been exposed to a wide range of issues, and thus not bias the data. As it is quite 
possible for a group of people with similar backgrounds to exhibit groupthink 
behaviour (Wright and Schaal, 1988), this can lead to rationalising behaviour, which 
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might bias the research. To reduce the possibility of bias resulting from a 
homogeneous panel, a cross-section of people was drawn from different levels within 
the organisation, including external resources. All of the external resources were 
consultants who had worked on the acquisition. To this I added an external member 
who had not worked on the acquisition, but who is a leading academic, and is generally 
considered to be one of the UK's experts on mergers and acquisitions. His input was 
included because he could bring a wider perspective than merely this particular 
acquisition. All the members of the panel were approached and agreed to take part. In 
total two iterations of the questionnaire were circulated; these are referred to as Delphi 
1 and Delphi 2. Not all panel members took part at every stage of the process. The 
actual level of participation is shown is shown in the table below. 
Area Interview Delphi 1 Delphi 2 
Consultant 1 es Yes es 
Consultant 2 Yes es No 
Consultant 3 Yes es No 
anagerI No No es 
Manager 2 'es es es 
Manager 3 No es No 
Senior Manager I No es No 
Senior Manager 2 es No es 
Specialist 1 Yes No No 
Staff 1 Yes es es 
Staff 2 'es 'es 'es 
taff 3 'es es es 
Table 6- Delphi participation 
To start the process I decided to conduct two semi-structured pilot interviews. The 
basic structure of the interview was: 
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" Introduce myself 
" Explain the research in general terms 
" Explain Project 1 and its goals 
" Explain the method of research 
s Ask the interviewee to describe their position at the time of the merger 
" Present the merger model and invite any comments; and 
" Conduct the interview by asking a series of questions, prompting where 
necessary by asking follow-up questions. The focus of Project I is around the 
CoC, so the questions focused on this period. 
As I was satisfied with the result of the two pilot interviews and the data collected 
during them, it was possible to progress and attempt to interview the remaining 
candidates. All participants agreed to the use of a cassette tape-recorder. 
1.4.1 Identifying and extracting risks 
To allow me to analyse the risks from both the Delphi study and the review of 
company records, it was necessary to create a structured classification for the risks 
identified. This was developed by starting with the root risk `The merger fails' and 
working "back" from there. If a risk did not contribute to the primary risk-, then it was 
outside the scope of my research. By "working back" from there, a six-tier hierarchy 
was developed, into which each risk could be classified. This is illustrated below: 
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Merger failure Risks that could result in the merger Yes 
failing 
Chronology When the risk can firs occur Pre-CoC 
CoC 
Post-CoC 
Significance What is the significance of the risk? High 
For interview data this is based on the Low 
impact multiplied by the probability. 
Above average is rated high, otherwise 
it is rated as low. For document 
originated risks this is rated as high. 
Preparation The level of preparation. For Significant 
interview-originated risks this is based Moderate 
on the quartile into which the Low 
mitigation is rated as falling. For 
document-related risks this is rated as 
described earlier. 
Impacts CoC structure Can the risk impact the CoC control Yes 
structure in any way? No 
Organisational element To which organisational element does Technological 
the risk belong? Physical 
Cultural 
Social structure 
Environment 
Specific risks The specific risks which must fit into the structure. 
Table 7- Risk classification 
This structure is clearly very useful for risk classification. I also require the data and 
structure to be useful for business practice. To facilitate this, the data is also available 
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as a database, which allows the risks to be treated as an n-dimensional cube which is 
"sliced and diced" in various ways, and is called the "risk cube". This means that a 
user of this database could select, for example, those external risks which could impact 
the CoC. This is useful because it allows practitioners to divide the risks for allocating 
each one to the person who is going to manage that risk. 
The risks are entered into a database as they are identified. Each risk is tagged with as 
much meta-data as possible. For each risk the following meta-data could be entered: 
Metadata Description 
Risk number A unique number assigned to each risk 
Short name Brief description of the risk 
Description More elaborate description of the risk 
Merger Can the risk impact the merger - Yes/No 
CoC impact Can the risk impact CoC -Yes exclusively/Yes inclusively/No 
CoC 
manifestation 
Can the risk manifest itself during CoC - Yes exclusively/Yes 
inclusively/No 
Immediate 
impact 
Does the risk have immediate impact - Yes/No 
Impacts control 
centre 
Can the risk impact the control centre or control centre structure - 
Yes exclusively/Yes inclusively/No 
Average 
probability 
Average probability of the risk occurring (only applies to the risks 
identified in the Delphi process) - score between 0 and 6 
Average impact Average impact of the risk occurring (only applies to the risks 
identified in the Delphi process) - score between 0 and 6 
Average 
mitigation 
Average level of mitigation of the risk occurring (only applies to the 
risks identified in the Delphi process - score between 0 and 6 
Source interview The source of the risk is an interview - Yes/No 
Source 
documents 
The source of the risk is a reviewed document- Yes/No 
Source literature The source of the risk is public literature -Yes/No 
Page 106 
Metadata Description 
Source A reference to the source of the risk 
Contributes to Number of the risks that this risk contributes to 
Pre-CoC This risk can manifest itself during the pre-CoC phase 
CoC This risk can manifest itself during the CoC phase 
Post-CoC This risk can manifest itself during the post-CoC phase 
Significance 
rating 
The rating of the significance of the risk - High /Low 
Mitigation rating The rating of the mitigation of the risk - High /Moderate / Low 
Organisational 
element rating 
Coding of the organisational elemental category the risk belongs to - 
Technical/Social Structure/Culture/ Physical/Environment 
Table 8- Meta-data added to risk data 
The original intention was to transcribe every interview, and initially three interviews 
were transcribed, but this proved deliver little benefit. Instead, each interview was 
carefully listened to, and from it, a series of risks to the successful completion of the 
merger was identified. These were entered into a work document with a page for each 
interview. To guide this activity a comment would only be considered a risk if such a 
thing, should it occur and be unchecked, no matter how small, could impact or delay 
the completion of the change of control or the merger itself. 
From each of these sheets the various risks are distilled down to the essence of the 
risk. For example, a risk that might suggest that there is a danger that staff cannot use 
a particular tool is in essence the fact that staff are not familiar with or trained to use 
the tools available to them. By following this distillation process, and by combining 
risks from various interviews, a list of 55 risks was created. Each risk was assigned a 
unique reference number (Risk Number). The data relating to the classification of the 
risk was also entered with it. These included the phase of the merger the risk could 
impact, whether it would have an immediate impact, and so fords. 
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Within this database there is a special report which was used to produce the risk 
questionnaire. This questionnaire, plus a two-page instruction sheet was sent to each 
participant. Participants were then invited to evaluate each of the risks in terms of: 
" Severity of the impact if it were to occur 
" Probability of it occurring and 
" Degree to which the organisation was prepared to address the risk, i. e. the 
degree of mitigation. 
Participants indicated any identified risks which they felt were not actually a valid risk. 
They were also instructed that if they felt they could not comment on a risk, they 
should just leave it blank. These results were also entered into the risk database. 
Following initial analysis a second questionnaire was prepared for Delphi 2. This was 
similar to the first but also included the average value for each parameter (probability, 
impact and mitigation) from the first round (Delphi 1). This was sent to each 
participant. In addition, each participant was given a copy of the values they had 
chosen in Delphi 1. They then returned the questionnaire with their replies. This data 
was then entered into the database with the earlier data. The data from the two Delphi 
iterations was then copied into a spreadsheet to facilitate its analysis. 
In addition, participants' replies were also tested between iterations to see if they had 
changed significantly. This was done using the non-parametric Wilcoxon test (Jenkins 
and Thoele, 1991). The analysis of the results from Delphi 1 and Delphi 2 indicated 
that a third iteration was not required, and so no further iterations were conducted. 
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This process is somewhat different from the usual model of how the Delphi method is 
conducted (Jenkins and Thoele, 1991). The main difference in this instance is that the 
risks are extracted from the participants through the interviews, rather than presenting 
risks based on prior research. A pilot questionnaire was not used. This process 
continues until there are no significant changes in the group's response, identified 
using the Wilcoxon test. 
1.5 Data from company records 
A large amount of documentary records are produced as a product of mergers of this 
size. A substantial amount of the non-financial data was available for this project. 
This data existed in three forms; paper documents, electronic files and electronic 
databases. The data presented two important problems. The first was how to make 
copies of any documents which were unique. The second was how to manage the 
volume of data. 
Because some of this data is unique, the first step was to create a copy. The paper 
documents were photocopied, and electronic documents were copied onto CD ROMs. 
To appreciate the volume of this data, the paper documents filled ten A4 lever arch 
files. The electronic files required eight CD ROMs to hold all the data. 
Because of the volume of data involved, I needed to develop an approach to enable me 
to reduce the amount of data quickly and efficiently. I developed a process that was 
designed firstly to filter out non-CoC data, then to classify the remainder and the 
selected examples that might be used as the basis of a documentary review. 
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The first step was to look at every document, both electronic and hard-copy, and 
identify those which related to the CoC. This was done by looking at the date of the 
document, the title and the table of contents. Where there was no table of contents, 
the main document headings were reviewed. If they made no reference to the CoC, 
they were discounted. In the case of electronic documents, it was also possible to 
search their entire contents. This was achieved by searching for a number of key 
phrases that would indicate whether or not they were related to the CoC. These key 
words were: 
" Change of control 
" Sign-off 
" Control centre 
" Dates of the CoC and CoC dress rehearsal dates; and 
" Integration week-end. 
This process took several weeks. It facilitated the reduction of the set of documents to 
around 200. These were then classified according to the acquisition to which they 
related (Bank B's acquisition of Bank A or Bank C's acquisition of Bank B). In 
addition, risks were classified based on the type of document in which they were 
identified. The categories were: 
" Plan - Project schedule 
" Plan - Project discussion 
" Control document 
" Control record 
" Rota 
" Business approach document 
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" Internal communication 
" Public document; and 
" Other. 
The documents within each classification contained a number of duplicates, and there 
were multiple versions of some documents. This allowed duplicates and older versions 
to be deselected. The contents of some categories were largely similar. Where this was 
the case further documents were deselected. The remaining subset of documents was 
then revisited. Each was reviewed and treated in much the same way as the interview 
data. Risks were identified in each document and entered in the risk database. They 
were coded in the same way as the interview data. All were tagged as significant risks 
based on the premise that they had warranted formal recognition from management. 
All were tagged as being well mitigated, except for the situations where I was aware of 
problems with the way the risk was managed. 
2 Results 
This section describes the analysis and findings based on the data collected in this 
project. 
The first concern is the degree of confidence one can have in the reliability of the data 
and method. Confidence in the reliability of the data and method is derived from four 
factors. The first of these is that the sample group of participants is drawn from the 
(small) population who are in a position to observe the acquisition process across the 
whole of the two organisations. The second is the use of the Delphi based approach 
offers anonymity which makes it possible to avoid many of the issues such as the role 
of dominant individuals which can impact similar methods. The third is the similarity 
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between the risks identified in the Delphi technique and the review of company 
records in terms of classification, in particular the dominance of technology risks. The 
fourth and final factor is the use of a consensus based approach to evaluate the risks 
which means each participant has had a chance to add their input and thus the data is 
not biased by one or two people's opinions. 
2.1 Delphi study 
In total 14 participants were invited to take part in the Delphi study. Of these two 
declined and one who accepted did not actually take part. Of the remaining 12, 
interviews were given by 9 (75%), 9 (75%) returned the questionnaires for the first 
Delphi iteration, and 7 (58%) returned questionnaires for the second Delphi iteration. 
In total, all of the 12 who agreed to take part participated in some way. When a 
respondent responded to the first questionnaire but not the second, their answers were 
carried through to the second project. This made it possible to compare data between 
the two iterations. It is thought that 13-15 participants is the optimal size for a Delphi 
study (Dalkey, 1969). 
From a statistical point of view, the quantitative data analysis is based upon a very 
small sample set (12 people, of whom 11 have responded to some stage of the Delphi 
iterations). 
The distribution of risks identified in terms of the organisational element to which they 
relate shows a high focus toward technological risks, which is to be expected in a 
highly technological and information-centred industry. The distribution is: 
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Organisational Area Number of risks (%) 
External 0 0% 
hysical 3 5% 
Social structure 13% 
Culture 9 16% 
Technology 36 65% 
Table 9- Classification of risks identified through the Delphi 
process 
2.2 Significance versus mitigation 
This section examines the data from the Delphi process in terms of significance and 
the level of mitigation. 
In this research, when I refer to significance of a risk I am referring to the product of 
the impact and probability of the risk occurring. This is very similar to the definition 
of risk as presented by Warner (1992), which is based on British Standard BS4778 
1991. The difference is that each risk identified in the Delphi process is assigned a 
score. The score for significance is calculated as follows: 
sigh ficance.,; t, = 
MIN(impact,.. ss x probability,.. 5, 
significance,,, =MAX(impact,, ss x probability,. ss 
significance. _ 
impact x probability) - sigI zf cancemj,, 
X100 1 significance.,,,., - sigii icance 
Equation 2- Formulae for calculating risk significance 
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The mitigation score is also calculated for each risk. The participants in the process as 
asked to evaluate the degree of mitigation of each risk on the questionnaire. This can 
be seen in the sample questionnaire in Appendix A. The latest values recorded by each 
participant in the process are averaged for each risk and then used in equation below to 
calculate their overall score. 
The score for mitigation is: 
nriligalion 
_ scoremi,, = 
MIN(mitigalion,.. 55 
nziligalion_score, 
i,,, =MAX(iltilib'alio111.. 55) 
nriligationn -millgalion_scoremin mitigali0lJ_SCOPe =x 100 
Illiligation_score. -mitigation _score 
Equation 3- Formulae for calculating risk mitigation 
These two scores are calculated for the risks identified in the Delphi research. The 
significance of risk represents the level of danger to which the organisation is exposed 
during the M&A process. The migration score represents the organisation's degree of 
preparation to deal with the risk. In this it would seem desirable that there be some 
correlation between these two variables. With good risk management one would 
expect that the level of ability to address a risk would be largely proportional to the 
significance of the underlying risk. 
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Figure 10 - Classification model of level of mitigation and 
significance of risks 
This is illustrated as the region of effective risk management in the figure above. This 
illustration also shows two additional regions, one which I call excessiz and the other 
negligent risk management. The excessive region is composed of the ten risks whose 
points are furthest from the average mitigation/significance line and which have a 
mitigation value greater than the significance value. The negligent region is composed 
of the ten risks whose points are furthest from the average mitigation /significance line 
and which have a mitigation value less than the significance value. 
In order to visualise the data it is plotted on a graph showing the risks at the 
intersecting point of their level of mitigation and significance of impact. Excessive 
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risks are illustrated by having their risk number in red, the ten most negligent are in 
blue, while the ten most balanced are shown in green. Other risks are shown in black. 
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Figure 11- Significance versus mitigation scores 
This illustrates interesting findings about the risks identified, in particular those in the 
excessive and negligent regions. 
The relationship between the risks and their organisational classification is shown in 
the table on the following page: 
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Risk 
Number 
Classification 
1 Culture 
2 Technology 
3 Culture 
4 Culture 
5 Social Structure 
6 Technology 
7 Technology 
8 Social Structure 
9 Technology 
10 Technology 
11 Technology 
12 Technology 
13 Physical 
14 Physical 
15 Physical 
16 Social Structure 
17 Technology 
18 Technology 
19 Social Structure 
20 Social Structure 
21 Culture 
22 Culture 
23 Culture 
24 Technology 
25 Culture 
2G Technolo 
27 Technolo 
28 Technology 
Risk 
Number 
Classification 
29 Technology 
30 Technology 
31 Technology 
32 Technology 
33 Culture 
34 Social Structure 
35 Technology 
36 Technology 
37 Technology 
38 Technology 
39 Technology 
40 Technology 
41 Technology 
42 Technology 
43 Technology 
44 Technology 
45 Technology 
46 Technology 
47 Technology 
48 Technology 
49 Social Structure 
50 Culture 
51 Technology 
52 Technology 
53 Technology 
54 Technolo 
55 Technology 
Table 10 - Classification of risks identified in the Delphi process 
2.2.1 Excessively managed risks 
The table below shows the ten risks that are excessively managed, sorted by degree of 
excessiveness. These ten risks fall into two sets, each forming a cluster in the graph. 
The first are those relating to the CoC control structure (risk numbers 13,31,16,45, 
51,44) and the second are those relating to the holding and valuation of financial 
position (risk numbers 54,55,47). 
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Ranking Risk Description Mitigation Control 
number rating3 centre 
related? 
1 14 Control centre staff do Significant Yes 
not 'know' their 
counterparts in other 
locations. 
2 54 Trading desks not aware Significant No 
of their positions at the 
start of the CoC. 
3 31 Control centre staff are Moderate Yes 
overly practiced 
4 13 Control centre Significant Yes 
environment not 
comfortable 
5 45 No event tracking in Significant Yes 
place 
6 51 Control centre not set up Significant Yes 
correctly 
7 55 Trading desks not aware Significant No 
of their positions during 
the CoC 
8 47 Settlement function not Significant No 
clear as to which 
positions need to be 
settled, or when 
9 44 Control centre staff not Significant Yes 
well trained 
10 16 Inadequate mix of Moderate Yes 
experienced and energetic 
staff in the control centre 
Table 11- Ten most excessively managed risks 
These two clusters of risks are clearly well managed. It is possible that they are overly 
managed, that is, that they receive management attention and corporate resources in 
3 Significant = upper quartile, Moderate = second and U rd quartile, Low = lower quartile 
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excess of their relative importance. This indicates a possible inefficient use of 
resources. It also raises the question as to why they are overly managed when others 
are not sufficiently well managed. 
2.2.2 Effectively managed risks 
These risks are those which are rated as having a level of mitigation in proportion to 
the level of risk. Many of these (7/10) relate to the control centre, which is the core 
focus of the research. The others are more mixed, representing a range of risk areas. 
This indicates a significant focus on the temporary control structures introduced for 
die CoC compared with structures that are used for the CoC, but already exist. 
There is a further interesting finding in this analysis. By mistake, in Delphi iteration 1, 
one risk was entered twice (as risk numbers 4 and 56). While this was not intentional it 
is interesting that both were rated as having almost identical mitigation levels and very 
similar significance levels (6% difference). This indicates a degree of consistency in the 
way participants answered questions in the study. 
Ranking Risk Description Mitigation Control 
number rating centre 
related 
1 11 Control staff not aware Significant Yes 
of contingency measures 
2 36 Knowledge diluted by a Moderate Yes 
single point of control 
3 6 Control centre staff do Low Yes 
not fully understand 
what they are reporting 
4 9 Control centre managers Low Yes 
are not good people 
managers 
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Ranking Risk Description Mitigation Control 
number rating centre 
related 
5 27 Valuation of the merger Moderate No 
incorrect 
6 50 Organisation is not Moderate No 
confident that the merger 
will actually happen 
7 41 Progress not reported Moderate Yes 
"down" the organisation 
8 4 Business areas do not Moderate Yes 
report progress in a 
timely manner 
9 2 Inter-organisational Moderate No 
connectivity not achieved 
10 29 Escalation process too Low Yes 
sensitive 
Table 12 - Ten most effectively managed risks 
2.2.3 Negligently managed risks 
The negligently managed set is composed of those risks where the level of mitigation is 
substantially lower than the significance of the risk. Of these ten risks, three are 
classed as technological, two social structure, and five cultural. Comparing this with 
the average for the 55 risks indicates that cultural and social risks are not being 
mitigated to the same degree as other risks. Two of the technological risks, plus the 
social and cultural risks, have significant elements of human-centric behaviour. 
Rank Risk Description Mitigation Human 
number rating centric 
1 17 Need to rationalise software may Low No 
mean that `good' software is 
disposed of 
2 20 Management may focus on the Moderate Yes 
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Rank Risk Description Mitigation Human 
number rating centric 
"business" side of the merger 
and not the "human" side 
3 26 Talented resources not fully Low Yes 
utilised 
4 24 Critical staff dependency Moderate Yes 
5 19 Post merger staff not Low Yes 
"introduced" to the new 
organisation 
6 34 Staff become "burned out" Low Yes 
7 22 Staff are not aware of their Low Yes 
position in the new combined 
organisation 
8 25 Organisations slow to mobilise Moderate Yes 
themselves for the merger 
9 23 Personal contacts network no Low Yes 
longer valid 
10 33 Co-ordination meetings too Low Yes 
large 
Table 13 - Ten most negligently managed risks 
The fact that such significant risks seem to have relatively low mitigation (risk number 
17 has the lowest mitigation of all risks) is naturally a cause for concern for the target 
organisation. 
2.2.4 Top ten risks 
An extraction of the ten most significant risks produces the set of risks shown below. 
This list is sorted by significance. None of these risks enjoy a level of mitigation that 
would place them into the upper quartile, and 70% fall into the negligent category. 
40% of these risks are of a technical nature, 30% social structure, and 30% cultural. 
Page 121 
Rank Risk Description Mitigation Negligent? 
number rating 
1 20 Management may focus on Moderate Yes 
the "business" side of the 
merger and not the 
"human" side 
2 24 Critical staff dependency Moderate Yes 
3 17 Need to rationalise Low Yes 
software may mean that 
"good" software is 
disposed of 
4 25 Organisations slow to Moderate Yes 
mobilise themselves for 
the merger 
5 34 Staff become "burned Low Yes 
out" 
6 33 Co-ordination meetings Moderate Yes 
too large 
7 26 Talented resources not Low Yes 
fully utilised 
8 49 Non-trading areas not fully Moderate No 
engaged 
9 43 System dependencies not Moderate No 
clearly defined 
10 32 Business units not utilising Moderate No 
central PMO resources 
Table 14 - Ten most significant risks 
2.2.5 Relationship between the significance of the risk and the level 
of mitigation 
To understand whether or not there is a relationship between these two variables it was 
necessary to search for evidence of a correlation between the level of significance and 
mitigation of a risk. My initial feeling was that there should be a positive correlation. 
Black (1999) identified five different ways of doing this. The first task was to select the 
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appropriate method. The values to be correlated are both interval, though they are 
based on ordinal values. Because of this I elected to use Pearson's product moment 
calculation. The result of this was -0.411**, an inverse relationship. With a magnitude 
of 0.41, it is moderately large, but when combined with the high statistical significance 
(97.5%) the result are statistically significant. The fact that the correlation is negative is 
of practical interest, because it could be an indication as to the behaviour of the 
organisation in the face of risk in an extraordinary problem domain. This means the 
that organisation is focusing on risks that are easier to mitigate, or which do not pose a 
significant threat. This behaviour is a significant finding and is of obvious benefit as 
something for the target organisation to be aware of. 
Figure 12 - Risk significance (sorted) versus level of mitigation 
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2.3 Documentary-based risks 
The risks identified from the documentary evidence do not allow themselves to be 
evaluated in the same way as those from the Delphi study. This is because they do not 
have quantifiable significance and mitigation values. 
They have been analysed to allow their comparison with those from the Delphi study. 
There are some fundamental differences in the nature of the classification of the risks. 
The organisational classification of the two sets of risks is different. The majority of 
both sets of risks relate to technology. This is over 65% in each case. Because 
investment banking depends on processes that are very information-intensive to 
produce products that are also very highly information-intensive, it is not surprising 
that technology is important. However, the manner in which its prevalence exceeds all 
the others together is surprising. Where the contrast becomes significant is within the 
other four categories, as can be seen from the following illustration, Figure 13 - Risk 
classification of risks identified. 
Environmental risks account for 7% of the risks in the documentation, while none 
were raised in the interviews. Physical risks are five times more prevalent in the risks 
uncovered in the Delphi process. Social structure and culture-related risks combined 
are not substantially different. 
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Organisational Classification of Risk 
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Figure 13 - Risk classification of risks identified 
Figure 13, above, shows the classification of the risks identified through the Delphi 
process (see Table 10 - Classification of risks identified in the Delphi process) and the 
same classification of risks identified through the review of company documentation. 
2.4 Chronological focus 
Another method of comparison is to examine the chronological stages in which the 
risks can manifest themselves. The two Venn diagrams below illustrate the time 
frames in which the various risks can manifest themselves: 
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Figure 14 - Chronological distribution of risks 
The documentary data shows that there is a significant number of merger risks that can 
impact the merger process at any juncture. Half of the risks identified in the 
documentation can have an impact at any point. This illustrates that whilst each phase 
is unique, the risks to be faced are not necessarily unique. The Delphi-identified risks 
are similar. However, there is a far greater number of risks which are focused on the 
CoC only, or the CoC and pre-CoC phase. This is probably a result of the interview 
method. 
The distribution of risks is shown in Figure 15 below. This shows a very different 
focus between the two sources of risks. 
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' he risks identified in the Delphi study have a very tight focus on risks that will impact 
the CoC, while the risks identified in the documentary review are more evenly 
distributed and have ,i greater focus on the post-CoC timeframe. While this is to be 
expected because the documents are not necessarily focused on the CoC, it is 
interesting to note that there are risks identified in the documentation which can 
impact the CoC and post-CoC phase which were not considered by the panel. 
2.5 Volatility in the range of answers submitted 
There is vari. uicc in the answers submitted in the Delphi process. Iýor each parameter, 
I calculated range (difference between maximum and minimum) and standard 
deviation. 'The results of this calculation are shown in Appendix L. 
The calculation of range and standard deviation shows that there is a wide range of 
opinions between individuals in specific risks. This had not significantly decreased, 
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Pre-(Ac cloc Post-Coc 
even with the second Delphi iteration. It was noted that the average of the standard 
deviation of probability, impact and mitigation did drop slightly for all three: 
Average of standard 
deviations 
Probability Impact Mitigation 
Delphi 1 1.15 1.11 1.02 
Delhi 2 1.12 1.10 1.00 
Table 15 - Results of each Delphi iteration 
2.6 Consistency and differences between the two iterations 
of the Delphi process 
There have been some changes in the positioning of risks at the end of the second 
Delphi process. This resulted in changes in the specific risks which constituted the 
various "Top Ten" lists. It was necessary to test whether these changes were of any 
statistical significance. To test this, the pairs of data (scores between the two tests) 
were statistically compared for similarity. This was done using the Wilcoxon test. The 
\Vilcoxon test is useful because it considers the sign as well as the magnitude of 
difference between the pairs of samples. 
Since there were two iterations of the Delphi method, there were pairs of average 
values for each risk's attributes in terms of impact, mitigation and probability and the 
calculated significance score. The \Vilcoxon test considers the difference between the 
values in each matched pair. It is applied to the pairs (Delphi 1& Delphi 2) values 
collected for probability, impact, mitigation and calculated risk significance. 
For each pair (e. g. probability score for each risk) the difference, dbetween the Delphi 
1 (X1) and Delphi 2 (X2) values is calculated and ranked. Where the difference is 0, it 
is discarded thus reducing the sample size, ii. These differences are ranked by absolute 
value and added up by sign, that is the total number of differences for X1 > X2 and 
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the total number where X1 < X2. T is assigned the lesser of these two values totals. 
This value is then compared to the critical value of T for that sample size at various 
levels of statistical significance. Because in this instance I was not concerned with the 
direction of any difference, i. e. I wish to know how similar the two pairs of values are 
only; I used a single sided test. The critical value is read from a table of critical T values 
based on sample size, type of test (one or two tailed) and statistical significance. 
The values used and intermediate calculations are shown in Appendix F- Wlicoxon 
test results. The results are summarised in the table below: 
Probability Impact Mitigation Significance 
n=54 
T=430 
n=49 
T=405 
n=53 
T=119 
n=55 
T=470 
Critical value P=0.100 546 446 526 566 
of T at 
confidence 
P=0.050 510 415 491 529 
interval P=0.025 470 380 452 488 
P=0.010 441 356 424 458 
Table 16 - Results of the Wilcoxon tests 
This tests the hypothesis that the two population pairs have the same median. The 
result of the tests are shown in the table above. This shows that the two sets of data 
are similar at the 95% confidence level for all risk parameters, and at the 99% level for 
all except the risk impact level and significance. This illustrates that a high degree 
consistency was achieved. 
2.7 Degree of correlation 
The calculated values of correlation changed between the two iterations. The sign was 
unchanged, and remained negative. The magnitude increased from 0.36 to 0.41. 
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3 Discussion 
This section presents and discusses the findings of Project 1. There are important 
contributions to methodology, empirical, theoretical and practitioner knowledge. 
Specifically, there are nine contributions to be drawn from the research. These are: 
1. The behaviour of the target organisation in relation to risk management is 
contradictory to that which would be predicted by traditional perspectives of 
risk management 
2. The target organisation has a significant focus on technology risks 
3. The Delphi method can be successfully applied to post-facto investigations 
4. The nature of the risks that are managed in an excessive manner, these tend to 
be risks which can be controlled with formal management processes 
5. The nature of the risks that are managed in a negligent manner; these tend to 
be risks that are behaviour-based 
6. Individuals may place a different emphasis on the CoC from that of the 
collective mind of the firm 
7. Focus of the firm's records is different from that of the individuals in the panel 
8. This is the first project to collect data pertaining to this phenomenon; and 
9. The merger model proposed in this research is supported by field research. 
The first finding is that there is an inverse relationship between the level of significance 
and the level of mitigation, which constitutes a considerably discovery. One would 
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expect that the higher the significance of a risk, the higher would be the level of 
mitigation. The fact that this is not the case in practice raises questions about the 
organisation under study. What could be the cause of such an inverse relationship? It 
could be culture, resource issues or some other factor, such as a symptom of an 
organisational "blind spot", or something that it is just not good at addressing, such as 
human-centric issues or culture. It could also be the case that in a merger situation 
there is not the time to address these issues correctly. Worse still, it could indicate the 
avoidance of addressing difficult risks. 
The relationship between these two also means that we can consider them in terms 
akin to economic efficiency. In an ideal world all risks would be fully mitigated, but 
this would probably be inefficient. The optimum, therefore, is to mitigate risks in 
proportion to their risk significance, assuming there are none which have infinite or 
near infinite value for significance or mitigation. Where there is a resource constraint it 
may be necessary to dedicate fewer resources to mitigate certain risks. This might be 
done by investing less in the less significant risks. My findings do not actually fit with 
any of these hypotheses. 
The second is the bias towards a focus on technology. Almost two thirds of all risks 
identified are technological. At one level this is not entirely surprising. Investment 
banking is an industry where the product has a high level of information content and 
the processes involved are highly information-intensive. Because of this the emphasis 
upon technology that is presented by having so many risks in that classification is not a 
major surprise. 
The practitioners interviewed considered human-related factors to offer the most 
significant risks. This could mean that risk management would be best served by 
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addressing these first. There is also the possibility that the technological-related risks 
are the easiest to imagine and quantify. Furthermore, technological risks require 
solutions that can be imagined in absolute terms. Therefore, they may be the ones that 
are concentrated upon, perhaps to the detriment of others. 
The third is the nature of risks that were excessively managed. These belonged to two 
classifications. Some were related to the CoC structure. This might be explained by 
the importance that is placed on the structure during the CoC. The second cluster 
relates to positions valuation and settlements valuation. These are essentially financial 
accounting activities to facilitate the financial control and trade settlement. These are 
what might be described as "hard" issues. They are procedural and can be managed in 
a procedural way. 
The fourth is the level of mitigation of the most significant risks. Examination of these 
illustrates two important points. The first is that human-centric issues are the most 
important during this acquisition's CoC activity. Regrettably, these are probably also 
the most difficult to manage and evaluate quantitatively. 
The fifth finding is the extension of the Delphi method as a tool for empirical research. 
The Delphi method is just as capable of being successfully applied to analysis as it is to 
forecasting. The project is not just an extension of the method, but also contributes to 
its further use in research. 
The sixth finding is that the focus of the individuals in the expert panel members is 
different from that of the organisation as reflected by the formal documentation 
collected in this research. This indicates that the collective mind is separate from that 
of the individuals who comprise it (Weick and Roberts, 1993). It also supports the 
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view that the organisation can be viewed a neural network (Weick and Roberts, 1993) 
as this is a property of a neural network (Hecht-Nielsen, 1991). 
The seventh finding is that there is a different temporal focus between the organisation 
as recorded in its documentation and the individuals who took part in the research. 
The panel had a far greater focus on the risks that might impact the CoC period, 
compared with what was found in the documentation. This might reflect a bias 
introduced by the research (Sudman and Bradburn, 1982), or it might indicate the 
importance of future orientation and risk perception (Das and Teng, 2001b). It is also 
possible this is the result of the Delphi method being post-facto, while the 
documentation is clearly pre-facto. 
The eighth contribution relates to the identification of detailed and specific M&A risks 
in this industry. Even the most recent and practitioner-focused researchers, such as 
Galpin et al. (1999), have attempted to present the various risks that managers may 
face in these situations. However, these present the risks at high levels (staff retention) 
with only occasional references to specific examples of what these risks might be. One 
of the results of this research is the identification of almost 300 specific risks. Further 
research is needed to ensure that these represent a complete and comprehensive set of 
risks. The risk list needs to be presented in a manner that managers can use in practice. 
The initial "risk cube" described earlier is a step towards this. 
The ninth finding is the support that was found among practitioners for viewing the 
merger using the chronological steps indicated in the merger model. 
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3.1 Conclusion 
This project has identified a number of risks faced by a group of investment banks 
when executing M&A activities on their own account. For many of these there are 
estimations of significance and levels of mitigation, or the ability of the organisation to 
address them. 
Currently the findings apply to the two mergers under investigations. This is certainly 
not proof of generalisation, but the findings do present strong evidence to suggest that: 
" The merger model developed at the start of this research describes the event 
sequence for the acquisition 
" Investment bank acquisitions have a strong focus on technology 
" Significance in relation to mitigation could have an inverse relationship to the 
target organisation 
" The organisation is more sensitive to risks with which it has a high degree of 
familiarity 
" Some risks are excessively managed, while other are negligently managed; and 
" Many of the most significant risks are not technological, and of those that are, 
many have a "human" element. 
The findings raise important questions about the relationship between the level of 
mitigation of merger risks and their significance. The findings would appear to be 
counter to what one might intuitively expect. This begs the question: Why? 
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Further research is clearly required to establish the underlying causes and to establish 
an understanding of the degree of generality that can be applied to these findings. This 
is the goal of Project 2. 
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REPORT: PROJECT TWO 
This chapter presents the second research project. The project examines the 
management of four risks identified in Project 1; two where the risk management was 
the most negligent, and two where it was the most excessive. The chapter follows a 
similar format to the previous one, with four sections. There is a section on theoretical 
position. Much of the literature reviewed in Project 1 is also relevant here. In 
addition, the role of culture and identity, organisational complexity, the collective mind 
and the need for a multi-paradigmatic approach to research are explored. The second 
section addresses the method of research undertaken. This project uses a case-based 
approach to explore each of the four risks. The results are presented in a section 
containing the four cases. The final part discusses the findings and is used to present 
three propositions which are tested in the final project. 
1 Theoretical positioning 
This section addresses the theoretical position of this project. Much of the literature 
that this project draws on has been reviewed in Chapter 2 and should be referred to, as 
it has been reviewed in Project 1. Part of the challenge of Project 2 is to examine the 
cases from multiple perspectives. This is not a common research approach (Schultz 
and Hatch, 1996; Brady and Hatch, 1992). It requires other areas be examined, in 
addition to risk behaviour and decision-making. These areas are partly methodological, 
such as the approach to complex organisational research, as well as exploring further 
\Veick and Roberts's (1993) and \Veick's (1998) theory of the collective mind. 
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The findings from Project I show that a traditional view of organisational or individual 
risk behaviour, based on the expectation that the level of risk mitigation will be 
positively related to the level of risk significance, does not always hold true. In the 
circumstances studied it is clear that this type of perspective does not explain the 
organisation's risk prioritisation and behaviour as observed in Project 1, and that if I 
am to find an explanation, or set of explanations, I need to look to other areas of the 
literature. 
The first project allowed the components of risk (probability and mitigation) to be 
measured. It also measured the organisation's ability to mitigate those risks. This 
approach allowed the conclusion to be drawn that risk management was not rational in 
the traditional sense. This posed a problem: a strictly rational view of the world could 
not explain what was observed. Some cognitive theories can explain aspects of the 
observed risk behaviour in a specific instance, but none appeared to be effective in all 
situations. This problem is clearly what has driven some researchers to create 
integrated theories. However, even these theories may be incomplete. Before that 
speculation can be explored, it is important to understand what it is about 
organisational risk behaviour that requires answers from multiple perspectives. 
The answer does not lie in risk management; it lies in organisational research. It is 
clear to almost everyone that organisations are large and complex. The complexity of 
organisations is a key contributor to failure within these organisations (Reason, 2000; 
Reason, 2002; I-Iänninen, 2000). The drivers for organisational complexity include 
technology and the evolving economic environment. Ultimately, the organisation's 
behaviour is the result of the behaviour of the individuals (Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
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It is easy to think of an organisation as a network where each person is a nodal point, 
all of which are interconnected via formal and informal links, which may be either 
direct or indirect. The way each node behaves is dependent on how the organisation 
as a whole behaves, but also upon the desires and perceptions of each individual. This 
is in essence how \Veick and Roberts (1993) describe the way in which aircraft carriers 
operate. Theirs is not a unique view of organisations. Hogg and Terry (2000: 121) 
describe organisations as: 
`7ntenially stnrctutedgrorps that are located in [a] complex network of intergroup 
relations characterised by power, status wld prestige diferentials. " 
They take this further by asserting that the need for social identity met by being part of 
an organisation can be so strong that it is central to the person's own self image. It 
reduces uncertainty about their place in the world, which this means it adds a degree of 
consistency to their perception of the world. As a result of this tight coupling between 
the individual and the organisation, just as the organisation's behaviour is altered by the 
behaviour of the individuals within it, so the individuals are altered by being part of the 
organisation. 
To understand the organisational network fully, it is necessary to understand the role 
and impact of all possible stimuli in every possible combination. That is the challenge 
for the researcher. Organisations are complex networks, and each node (or person) 
represents a complex process of risk evaluation, perception and preference. The 
collective mind (\Veick and Roberts, 1993) of the organisation is a complex network 
composed of complex networks. The target organisation has close to 100,000 
employees. Predicting the organisational response to any given risk as it presents itself 
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requires the ability to understand the behaviour of every individual within the 
organisation. 
The only response to this is to either give up or to produce models which explain 
behaviour in a simplified manner. To progress learning the latter was chosen, but it 
does carry with it the danger of simplifying down to a level that contributes nothing to 
understanding. Single determinant theories of risk behaviour, while valuable, are not 
sufficient to offer a workable understanding. 
Schultz and Hatch argue the need to use all of the "paradigm diversity map" (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979) in research. This approach has only attracted significant research 
focus in the last ten to fifteen years (Hogg and Terry, 2000), in the fields of multiple 
paradigms (Schultz and Hatch, 1996), complexity (LaPorte, 1975b; Tsoukas and Hatch, 
2001) and searching for new ways of describing it (hatch, 1998; Hatch and \Veick, 
1998; \Veick, 1998; Hatch, 1999). This has also taken place in the area of risk 
behaviour. There is a weakness in trying to express the complexity of risk behaviour 
with a single determinant. This is implicit in some research (March 1988; Pablo et al., 
1996), but is explicitly addressed by others (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Das and Teng, 
2001b). 
The original review of the literature focused upon risk and risk behaviour. It is useful 
to look a little beyond this to find other possible explanations for what is being 
observed. There are two other areas I wish to focus on. The first of these is decision- 
making. There is a suggestion that risk perception plays a more dominant role than 
risk propensity (Sitkin and \Veingart, 1995). Of this, outcome history is the most 
significant determinant (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). They put forward the concept of 
"domain career", which is a measure of how familiar one is with the given domain. 
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Arguing that an individual's risk propensity for the domain is set in early experiences of 
the domain, they find that it may become fixed over time. This is important because in 
this research we will see the organisation move outside the familiar operational domain. 
In this situation the organisation is familiar with the risks and so its propensity is 
already set. In other areas it is not familiar, and so the propensity is not fixed. This 
would explain the inconsistent risk propensity observed in both the individuals and the 
organisation. Another factor is the role of conflict and politics in decision-making. 
There is little direct evidence of this in my research project. However, an acquisition is 
fraught with opportunities for conflict, many identified by practitioner research (Pablo 
et at., 1996; Pritchett et al., 1997; Galpin and Herndon, 1999; Carter, 1999; Chevriere, 
1999; Miller, 1999; IIabeck et at., 2000; Tuesday, 2003; Robb, 2003; Cuneo, 2003). 
Politics can play a role in causing these, as well as being a tool to prevent and disarm 
conflicts (Sitkin and Bies, 1993). The organisations involved in this acquisition are very 
resource-rich, in terms of financial strength, capability and human resources. This is 
important during crisis situations (Weick, 1988; LaPorte, 1975a) in order to allow the 
organisation to adapt and create solutions to risks as required. 
The final factor is culture. We have already examined the role of national culture 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) and organisational culture (Hatch, 1997). In separate 
pieces of research, Hatch and Schultz (1997) and Sims (2002) show that culture, 
identity and corporate image are both intertwined and interdependent. The image that 
the organisation projects is contextualised to suit its needs, while its culture can be 
different, and as was discussed earlier, the need for self-identity is influenced by the 
total culture, but also by the individuals within it (Hogg and Terry, 2000). 
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2 Methodology 
This chapter describes the method of research followed for Project 2 and the reason 
for many of the decisions made while selecting the research method. 
2.1 Preparatory steps before method design 
At the end of the first project, I observed two characteristics pertaining to the risk list. 
Firstly, some of the risks identified were substantially less important than others. I 
refer to these later as the "trivial risks". My second observation was that the wording 
used to describe some of the risks was unclear, or was not a description of a risk, but 
rather the effect of the risk. This may have been beneficial from the point of view of 
conducting the fieldwork, as it probably made it easier for the participants to 
understand the meaning of the risks. However, as the fieldwork has been completed, it 
is not necessary to continue with these descriptions. 
In response to this, the risk description data would benefit from being "cleaned". To 
do this I undertook the following two steps. 
I examined each risk to see if it was "trivial" compared with the other risks. If it was, I 
removed it. The following risks were removed: 
" Risk number 13, Control centre environment not comfortable 
" Risk number 14, Food and drinks available to the control centre staff not 
sufficient; and 
" Risk number 15, Amenity and hygiene facilities not suitable for control centre 
working. 
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I then checked the wording of each risk to see if the risk description could be 
improved. The original and modified text is shown in Appendix H. 
2.2 Method selection and design 
This section describes how and why I elected to use a case-based approach for this 
research. In addition, it describes how the analytical framework based on the 
Reconceptualized (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and Temporal (Das and Teng, 2001b) 
models was constructed. 
The goal of this research is to explain why the four most outlying cases were managed 
in such an excessive or negligent manner. While there was a lot of interview and 
documentary data relating to these, I no longer had unrestricted access to people in the 
target organisation. My research design needed to reflect this. A Delphi study, as used 
in Project 1, would therefore not be appropriate here. In deciding how to answer the 
question, five basic approaches were considered - experimentation, survey, archival 
analysis, history and case study. Experimentation would require that I have some form 
of control over the events being observed, and as this was an event in contemporary 
history, this would not be possible. A survey was not appropriate either because direct 
access to the actors involved would not be available because I was no longer working 
for the acquiring firm. Archival analysis was a possibility as I had still access to the 
company records. The content of the interviews was a richer source of data, which 
should not be excluded. A historical analysis would not be appropriate for such a 
contemporary event either. I elected to use a case study approach because of the mix 
of archival and interview data available to me, and its suitability to answer the research 
question. The research examines four separate risks; because of this the research was 
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designed as a multi-case project, with one case study for each risk. This allowed for 
comparison and contrasts to be made between risks. 
The cases are based on evidence drawn from a number of sources. The three primary 
sources are documentation, archival records and the interviews conducted in the first 
project. I have resisted using my own personal observations, because while they 
undoubtedly add context and some detail, my observations were not recorded at the 
time and might be prone to bias recollection. In addition, they could lead me to place 
too much emphasis on what I observed. It should also be noted that the interviews 
being used are the interviews from Project 1; they were not conducted specifically for 
this project. 
Based on the literature reviewed, only two theoretical approaches seemed sufficiently 
comprehensive; either March's (1988) or Sitkin and Pablo's (1992) model could be 
used as an analytical framework, because only these included a significant number of 
risk determinants. It was necessary to select one to use as an analytical framework for 
this research. The model chosen needed to have clearly-defined risk determinants that 
could be used to illustrate reasons for the risk behaviour, while also being complete 
(containing all known risk determinants) and causal (showing how the presence or 
absence of a risk determinant would increase or decrease the level of risk behaviour). 
From the research described in Project 1, and the review of other researchers' work in 
the theoretical positioning, a number of models based on single causal determinants 
were found, none of which were complete. In response to this I had to decide 
whether causality or completeness was the greater priority. I decided that 
completeness was more important. My reasoning for this was the wish to integrate 
many risk determinants. This would never be achieved without a high degree of 
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completeness. In addition, integrating many different causal models would have been 
very difficult because each model is inherently different and mostly incorporated in the 
integrated models, though it was necessary to incorporate the Temporal model into the 
analytical framework. 
I had already identified three frameworks which were complete but not causal. These 
were the Reconceptualised model (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) the Temporal model (Das 
and Teng, 2001b) and March's Taste and Rationality (1978). The Temporal model has 
an element of causality relating to the impact of temporality on risk behaviour, but it 
does not have any degree of detailed risk determinants, and so had to be discounted. It 
was more difficult to decide between the two remaining frameworks, so I selected a 
single risk and wrote a sample case using each framework as a model. From this I 
concluded that the Reconceptualised model would be of more use. The main factor in 
this decision was the fact that the Reconceptualised model divides itself into a number 
of clear risk determinants, which I found easier to work with than March's model.. In 
addition, the clearly defined determinants made it easy to present the data in a tabular 
format. 
Because of these factors I felt that March's model would be more difficult to work 
with. In addition, I wanted include temporality. Including the Temporal model means 
that the analytical model is based on both the Reconceptualised and the Temporal 
Models. 
The Reconceptualised model (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) is comprehensive. It presents 
the various determinants of risk behaviour and suggests how they influence either risk 
perception or risk propensity. It does not address the influence of temporalities (Das 
and Teng, 2001b). The model of temporalities differs from the Reconceptualised 
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model in two important respects. The most obvious is the inclusion of consideration 
for the role of the temporal nature of the risk. The second is that the Temporal model 
offers a prediction of risk behaviour, while the Reconceptualised model does not. 
However, if the causality is removed from the Temporal model, what remains is very 
similar to the Reconceptualised model, and can be viewed below: 
Figure 16 - The Temporal model presented in a similar 
format to the Reconceptualised model (Das and Teng, 2000b) 
Most researchers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; The Royal Society, 1992) use a form 
of Systems model to describe the decision-making process. Typically, this is input 
(risk), process (perception/propensity modification) and output (behaviour). This is 
implicit in the Reconceptualised model. 
Using the Reconceptualised model, the Temporal model and the Systems model, it is 
possible to illustrate the risk decision-making process below: 
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Risk Propensity: 
Risk Preference 
Inertia 
Outcome stay 
Risk Perception: 
Problem Framing 
Top Team Homogeneity 
Risk Risk Behaviour Social Influence 
Problem Domain Famlharlty, 
oOrganisabonal Control 
Systems 
Temporality: 
Future 0rleitatm 
Figure 17 - Representing the combined models' 
I will use this combined model of the risk decision-making process throughout the 
project. 
2.3 Risk selection 
The selection of risks is quite straightforward because of the prior data cleaning. I 
selected the three risks that were above the diagonal line and had the largest 
perpendicular distance from it, and the three risks that were placed beneath the 
diagonal line, and had the largest perpendicular distance from it. By doing this, I was 
able to select the three most excessive and three most negligent risks. When doing this 
4 Based on a general systemic approach such as the Royal Society's, the Reconceptualized model and die temporal 
model. 
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I noted that risk 26 "Talented resource not fully utilised" has similar drivers to risk 24 
"The organisation cannot maintain or motivate critical staff'. 
Using the results of the risk significance and mitigation obtained from the Delphi study 
in Project 1, four risks could be selected. 
100% . 
54 
s0% 
"55 "48 
80% "4 6 - 45 " 44 
51 
70% 
" 30 " 31 52 3+8 18 36 " 
50 " 32 
60° 0 
cc "16 "12 
"42 
"41 
4 32 
43 
n50°6 *17 
" 
53.35 
40% "70 "28 
6 '8 
Q5 "24 
30% 
"' *39 
2g "1 "34 
20% 
22 
10% 
" 23 
" 21 "26 
0°% 
20 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 80% 100% 
Significance 
Figure 18 - Risk distribution showing the risks selected 
Because this would provide little extra learning opportunity, I decided to address the 
two together and include risk 34 "Staff performance is compromised as they become 
'burned out'. " 
The four risks selected for the case studies are listed below: 
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Risk Description 
No. 
54 Trading desks not aware of their positions at the start of change of 
control 
W 31 Control centre staff become complacent or fatigued due to being U overly practiced 
17 Poor systems may be selected over better as a result of the need to 
rationalise technology quickly 
a äo 20 Management may focus on the "business" of the merger and not the 
$, A human resources side of it 
Table 17 - Risks selected 
2.4 Writing the cases 
Since I had an opportunity to "test" writing one of the cases, I was also able to try and 
End suitable formats for presenting the data. I created a template for the cases, which 
I found to be useful, and decided to write each case as follows: 
" Title of the risk - with an introduction 
" The nature of the risk -a description of the salient features of the risk 
" Actions relating to the management of the risk - how the target organisation 
manages the risk 
" Analysis and evidence - this was sub-divided by the risk determinants that 
were found to be salient, with extracts from interviews and documents as 
appropriate 
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" Areas not addressed or explained by the model - this discusses risk 
determinants that were found but which are not addressed directly by my 
framework 
2.5 Results tabulation 
At the end of the four cases determinants from the model and others found in the 
cases were presented in a tabular form. 
2.6 Searching for common determinants 
From these results it was possible to search the data to determine which risk 
determinants were present in both the excessively and negligently managed risks. 
2.7 Propose reasons for behaviour 
Based upon these findings it was then possible to suggest a series of propositions 
which would explain the behaviour observed in the target organisation. 
2.8 The overall design 
The overall design and flow of my method is illustrated in the following figure: 
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Eliminate Framework 
"Minor' risks 
Edit risk Identify analytical 
descriptions framework 
Select most Select most 
negligently excessive 
managed managed 
Identify where 
each risk 
determinant is 
present 
Produce case for Identify other risk 
each risk determinants 
Tabulate results 
Search for 
common risk 
determinants 
Figure 19 - Method of research for Project 2 
2.9 Potential weaknesses with the research design 
The case study is a commonly used method of empirical research (Yin, 1994). At the 
same time, it has to be recognised that not all researchers approve of it. Yin describes 
their feelings toward the case method as "distain" (Yin, 1994: 9). He identifies three 
areas for concern; the potential for lack of academic rigour on the part of the 
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researcher, the limited opportunity for generalisation, and the fact that case studies can 
be very time consuming. Each of these can be overcome (Yin, 1994). 
The need for rigour applies to all academic work, but there are probably greater 
opportunities in case-based research for the researcher to be influenced by various 
factors which may bias the work. The bias that can impact the case study can just as 
easily impact other forms of research such as experimentation (Rosenthal, 1966), 
surveys (Sudman and Bradburn, 1982) and historical analysis (Gottschalk, 1968). Like 
Yin, I recognise that the case researcher has to work particularly hard to make sure that 
bias does not enter into the work. 
Generalising from a single case study is very difficult. The same can be said of 
experimental research. General findings are usually not drawn from single experiments 
either. In this research I am undertaking four case studies. These provide a variety of 
perspectives which can allow for a limited generalisation about the context of the 
research. 
The third concern is that case studies take too long, but this is not necessarily true (Yin, 
1994). In this research, because I am revisiting field work, that allows me to manage 
the duration of the project, which also fits well with the DBA structure. 
3 Results 
This section presents the results of the research. The results are presented as a series 
of case studies. Each case examines one of the four outlying risks and is presented in a 
similar format. The case is divided into the following sections: 
"A description of the risk 
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" How important the risk is 
" How the risk was managed 
" An explanation as to why the risk was managed in an excessive or negligent 
manner, using the analytical framework for the project; and 
" Any areas that are not addressed by the analytical framework. 
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3.1 Case A- Risk No. 54: Trading desks are not aware of 
their positions at the start of change of control 
This section explores risk number 54. 
3.1.1 The risk 
The risk being studied is that "Trading desks are not aware of their positions at the 
start of change of control". This means that the trading desks do not know the exact 
positions (inventory of assets and liability and their values) that they hold. 
3.1.2 How important was it? 
The bank being acquired and the acquiring bank had substantial trading interests. 
There was relatively little geographical overlap in the markets in which the two banks 
were strong, with the exception of London. These trading activities are organised 
around businesses within the various market areas, such as debt, bonds and equities. 
These are organised around "trading desks". A desk can range from a single trader for 
specialised instruments, often referred to as "exotics", and small markets, through to a 
large team, dealing in large volume business, or a business where the bank is a key 
player. A famous example of this was the Mortgage Backed Securities traders at 
Solomon Brothers in the 1980s (Lewis, 1990). 
The desks make their money through buying, selling and holding financial instruments. 
A financial instrument is a generic name for a variety of financial products, including 
equity (stocks and shares) and bonds (corporate and sovereign debt). 
These trading desks tend to operate in two ways. They buy and sell on behalf of 
clients (brokerage) and charge a commission, or they trade on behalf of the bank 
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(proprietary trading). Most desks do both to varying degrees. In this case, the 
acquiring bank was mostly brokerage, while the acquired bank, although mostly 
brokerage, had a large proprietary trading base as well. Proprietary trading is riskier 
because the bank is exposed to market risk, counter party risk, operational risk and 
credit risk, but offers the potential of substantial rewards. Brokerage is transacted on 
behalf of clients and so eliminates the market risk. The opportunity for gain is from 
the charge of transacting the trade. 
In an acquisition scenario the acquiring bank will wish to know the exact trading 
position of the acquired firm at the start of the acquisition (change of control) and at 
the end of the change of control process. These are important from a legal and a 
control perspective. 
From a legal position the acquired bank needs to know the position at the start of the 
CoC to enable it to be aware of those profits and losses which were incurred under its 
control. This influences corporation tax liability as well as regulatory financial 
requirements, in addition to protecting their shareholders as a final step of due 
diligence. 
From a control perspective this serves two purposes. Firstly, knowing the starting 
position and comparing the ending position means that the acquirer can account for all 
acquired positions and any movements that have taken place. The opening position, 
plus or minus any movements, should equal the closing position. Secondly, this is the 
last opportunity to identify any unacceptable exposures that may be on the acquired 
bank's books. It is not impossible to imagine a disaffected employee trying to place the 
acquired bank in a difficult trading position in response to the merger. From a 
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financial control perspective both the acquired and acquirer must be satisfied that they 
know the positions being taken over and that they also agree on their value. 
In a regular merger, or a partial acquisition, where part of one business is being 
acquired from another, this financial control activity takes on an additional importance. 
The valuation of the positions will have to be "paid for" and so it becomes an asset or 
liability to be transferred. 
Although this is quite an important risk, it is one that the firms are well placed to 
address. 
3.1.3 How was the risk managed? 
At the start of the acquisition process, the bank being acquired had a merger 
management team which, less than 18 months earlier, had executed one of the largest 
acquisitions in European financial history. Most of this team was mobilised as before. 
The most significant difference is that the overall project steering committee was 
reconstituted to reflect the importance of the acquiring firm. 
Because of the need to make rapid progress, the project management team decided to 
reuse as much information and processes as possible from the previous acquisition. In 
terms of managing the change of control (Coq period, the team used the previous 
plans [DOCOIB; D0006C] and documents, such as templates [D000213; DOCIOC]. 
The planning was processed around the shared corporate functions and the business 
streams. In addition, it divided the CoC [D0006C] into steps, each of which acted as 
a control gate for progressing to the next phase. Each of these gates had a tightly 
controlled process of physical sign-offs that needed to be completed before the whole 
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organisation progressed to the next stage. Failure to receive a required sign-off would 
delay, and potentially halt the CoC process. 
The first of these steps was that each area had to confirm that it was operationally 
ready to begin the CoC process. The second step was for the businesses to agree the 
content and value of all positions. Once this was done satisfactorily the two firms 
could legally merge. The legal execution of the merger is the point at which the merger 
is irrevocable; it is the "point of no return". 
Considering the importance of the merger process, one would expect the knowledge of 
traders' positions to be rated more significantly. This apparent anomaly can be partly 
explained by considering the real impact and probability of the risk. 
The worst impact would be if the positions were not valued correctly and the acquiring 
bank became exposed to a significant financial loss; large enough to damage the future 
opportunities of the bank, or worse, to lead to corporate failure. However, that would 
require the position management and valuation process controls to fail, and this is 
unlikely. The failure would have to happen to the same extent in both organisations 
because of the firms' valuing the positions independently. Secondly, both 
organisations perform this set of tasks every single trading day, so it is a core 
competency in which they are well practised. 
Another way in which the position tracking could fail would be through an error that is 
not of a material size, such as mis-pricing a single equity. Such an error would have 
little material impact overall for the merger. While this is more likely, it is not very 
significant because of the low materiality. 
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The final way in which traders' positions could be an issue would be if technology 
processes were to fail in such a way as to simply delay the valuation of positions, and 
thus the CoC might run out of time. This could happen, but both banks would have 
considerable business continuity plans in place. One interviewee cited the high degree 
of confidence they had in the standard business continuity plans [D0004C], plus the 
extra contingency [D0009C] that was already in place. In addition, if traders do not 
know their positions, it would be a risk to the standing of the bank. It would probably 
also impact morale and confidence around the merger. 
A description from one interviewee describes how important a successful merger 
integration was: 
'Thhere was a market perception of [meqerJ integration failure Both [chairmen 
were] on record with a sped c date, which szIgests the process would complete in 
record time. " [Inv A] 
The impact of a failure was commented upon by a number of interviewees: 
`7f mi r red [: vithJ no operational risk or hput, but pe eption offailure would sign 
and streigthen the view that the value of the meager not being fu 4 appreciated and 
[the merger] notfugv necessary"[InvA] 
'The success of the change of control sets the tone for the whole merger" [Inv FJ 
"[There was a] Market peneption of the integration failing; the board had 
committed to a specific date "in record time"- if (the) date (: vas) missed (there was) 
no real operational risk, but perzeption of failure would har e been mg sign rcant 
since the peneption of merger was not unanimous [nary thought it was a] `t'ool 
hardy " commitment" [Inv E] 
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3.1.4 Why the risk was managed in an excessive manner 
This section presents the project data and analyses it using the analytical model and 
framework. It illustrates why it was managed in an excessive manner and how the 
future orientation contributed toward negligent behaviour. 
Risk Preference - The exact nature of risk preference in individuals is not addressed 
directly in my research or in any of the documentation I found. However, there is 
evidence of certain traits of risk behaviour across the combined organisation. One 
interviewee described the acquiring bank's culture as: 
"[Acquithig bank] were perreited as "cowboys"; they mould hire whole teams from 
other banks for millions of dollars, and then they [the teams] would leave a fewyears 
later" /[nv q 
The interviewee did, however, also say that: 
"I think the enthvnnlent (in Bank C) had settled down by the time the merger 
happened" [Inv Cl 
These sorts of statements would indicate that prior to the merger there was a tolerance 
for risk that was generally perceived as higher than would be the case in many banks in 
the industry. 
Risk management is also part of the culture of the organisation. There are large 
organisational areas designed to help the firm to manage it. The main ones are: 
" Credit risk department 
5 Bank A was acquired by Bank; B (now the acquired bank) a year earlier 
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" Market risk department 
" Settlement risk 
" Regulatory compliance; and 
" Internal audit. 
Each of these departments focuses on different aspects of the risks that the firm faces. 
The first two, credit and market risk, play a day-to-day role in the business of the firm 
and impact business decision-making at a level which influences the position the firm is 
able to take in the financial market. 
At the same time, the organisation's manner of dealing with risk was consistent, if not 
apparently rational. Settlement and similar risks were given a high degree of attention, 
while at the same time, people-related risks were not. 
Looking at various pieces of data produced for the merger, it appears that there is an 
over-arching risk and issue management process across the business lines. This is 
embodied in the tools used in the control process [D0005C]. Within the business 
lines the risk and issue processes are supported by similar process and documents 
[D0002C; DOC10C]. Also, each area was asked to produce a business plan, the 
template pocloq for which contained a section on risks and how they might be 
mitigated. 
Perhaps the difference with the settlement process and some of the "softer", non- 
business process-related risks is that there were specific detailed plans to address what 
would happen if the risk occurred. 
Based on the interviews and my own experience I would say that the firm was 
perceived as being inclined toward risky behaviour by its industry peers, who would 
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perceive themselves as relatively risk averse. But there is no evidence to suggest that 
the acquirer was more risk-seeking than general firms in Europe or he US. 
Inertia - There is no direct evidence of either firm exhibiting any particular tendency in 
terms of risk inertia. However, we do know that the acquiring bank was considered to 
be "cowboys". The failure of an earlier acquisition and the high profile fraud case that 
followed would add to this perception. Based on this it is possible that they would 
exhibit a tendency toward risk behaviour. 
The firm was certainly more inclined toward risk than its peers. However, because of 
the risk profile of its peers, I would consider the impact of risk inertia to be neutral. 
Outcome history - In relation to the risk posed by traders not knowing their positions, 
both banks had enough experience to demonstrate an outcome history, which may 
have impacted their behaviour in this circumstance. 
The processes used to manage this particular risk exist in the normal course of events 
and are both quantifiable and prescriptive. The exact same process and responses to 
its outcome applied to this CoC period. The activities, as documented in the CoC 
plan, were identical to those that were used in day-to-day operations (as far as I could 
tell based on my expertise) and were similar to industry practice as described in After the 
trade rr nude (Weiss, 1993). 
Based on the evidence of this risk, there was inertia both in terms of how the risk was 
managed, and how management responded to it. 
In addressing the risks to the settlement process there would have been a history of 
successful outcomes, compared with less familiar risks such as the people-related ones. 
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It should be remembered that this process is followed every day by the bank, and that 
by following it, it has have avoided negative outcomes. Interviewees described the 
impact of failure as follows: 
"Setting the tore for the »hole nlei er" [Inv CJ 
`I think it depends on what type of faikire. If it was a complete and absolute 
disaster, half of it had worked and haze of it hadn't there would have been h«ge 
renlediation. I'ou would emn ham to stop tradiig to stabilise your books and 
records and strf. "[Im' B] 
While highly successful in managing the risk, this could lead the organisation to be 
negligent in managing the risk. However, in this case, there was such a strong focus on 
the impact of the risk that the outcome history would actually lead them toward 
excessive management of the risk. 
Problem Framing - There is little evidence of problem framing of this risk. However, 
in the plans [D0007CJ there is reference to the need to check the traders' positions. 
This indicates negative problem framing. Also, not knowing the financial position of 
the firm would be considered very serious, as the interview quotation above would 
indicate. 
Top Management Team Homogeneity - There is no specific evidence of the role of 
top team homogeneity relating to this risk, although a high degree of homogeneity 
exists in many demographic domains. These include race, age and gender. At the 
most senior levels, with the exception of one board member, all were male, European, 
Caucasian and aged between 40 and 60 [D0003B]. 
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Even in our sample group of 14 respondents on the same parameters there are similar 
high degrees of homogeneity: 
Nationality: European 13 
Gender: Male 11 
Race: Caucasian 11 
Age': 20-29 years 2 
Age: 30-39 years 7 
Age: 40+ years 5 
Table 18- Respondents' demographics 
Social Influence - There were no direct references or evidence relating to the role of 
social influence relating the management of the traders' position risk. 
Problem Domain Familiarity - There is a very high degree of problem domain 
familiarity relating to this risk, as the organisation faces these risks every day. It is a 
fundamental part of the businesses process. One interviewee posed the question: 
"7f we couldn'tget this right, what could sveget right? " /biv D] 
As has been seen already, others felt that it was a key part of the CoC: 
pe of failure. If it was a con plete and absolute I think it depends on what 0 
disaster, half of it had worked and have of it hadn't there mould have been brie 
remediation. I'ou would er en bat v to stop tradiig to stabilise yosrr books and 
records and str1 " [7, w B] 
6'Ihe age figures are approximations only 
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To stop trading would be an almost unimaginable setback. There are also other 
significant related risks. In a market that is changing rapidly a lack of clarity puts the 
firm at a considerable disadvantage. 
`You must make sure traders know their positions if there is wlati#o in the 
market. [IfsoJ we know how to manage that risk"[Inm CJ 
Also, failure to know the financial position can lead to other errors, which would 
damage reputation and incur fines: 
"You need to know ivhich transactions need to be settled, so it needs to be clear so 
that 
1. You don't make mistakes 
2. There are no niis-catches [In trades that are back to back, such as a swap of 
equity] 
3. Manage clientpayment [settlement]" [Inv CJ 
While there was a high degree of domain familiarity, it wasn't quite "business as usual", 
as it was necessary to book trades on specific days so that they could be easily 
identified in the books and records. This was not usual practice. There was also a lack 
of clarity around which dates were appropriate: 
"li7he r doyou bookyour trades on, the end of Friday, or the Satu day? And then 
the legal and tax impacts of that. Some of these issues came out of the woodwork 
de rpemtely late" [Inv B] 
The high degree of problem domain familiarity could contribute to negligent behaviour 
because of the organisation becoming complacent. However, in this instance it 
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resulted in the firm being extra vigilant because they understood how to manage it, and 
understood the impact, which would cause it more excessive risk management 
behaviour. 
Operational Control Systems - Operational control systems played a particularly 
important role in the case of this risk. The acquired and acquiring firms had-stringent 
controls around trade positions and other similar parts of the trading operation, such 
as settlement and funding. As discussed in earlier documents, there is a high degree of 
information content in these processes, which would indicate the need for rigorous 
controls and processes (Porter, 1985). There is also a significant degree of 
documentary evidence as to the nature of the controls that were in place, both at a 
macro and micro level. 
In addition to the controls in place for this specific risk, extra controls had been used 
on an earlier acquisition and the EMU programme conversion. 
"Bank A's [acquisition) success meant it [the contwnl process] was a tried and tested 
process. Batik A cutover and EMU (conversion) control meant they was a good 
competency in managing that type of event. "LIi: vAJ 
"The, were no major issues. The process was well defined .... 
Their was agood 
dort to train people"[hiv D] 
At the highest level each business line and functional area has to plan a series of 
milestones. For the Foreign F. -change (lam') financial control organisation of the 
acquiring bank, these were listed in the integration plan and hourly status reports. An 
extract, with certain names changed, is. presented here. 
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" All pre-COC tasks complete 
" Close on-line day 
" Close external interfaces 
" Start end of day processing 
" Go or fallback to pre-BoD' backup 
" Core FX general ledger processing complete 
" Ready to process XXX trades 
" XXX acquired bank trades processed 
" Begin trade reconciliation process in YYY 
" Trade reconciliation processing complete 
" FX signs off reconciliation 
" lei general ledger EoD processing complete 
" Cash processing systems CoC complete; and 
" EX general ledger ready for on-line day. 
Each of these points has a physical sign-off sheet, which was faxed and then sent via 
internal mail to the control centre. The control centre manual prohibits the staff from 
accepting a verbal notification as proof of completion of any of these tasks. Once the 
documentation was received, the plans and status were updated and reported 
accordingly. Using the control software the status reports were updated automatically 
from the activity tracking system. 
This process ensured that at a high level each business area was controlled. Because 
these sign-off sheets had to bear the signature of the head of that business area or a 
EoD = End of Day 
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previously specified delegate (as this was a 24 hour a day operation it was necessary to 
delegate some activities), there was a degree of personal accountability. 
These procedures are described in the CoC plan [DOCOGC] and the command centre 
handbook [DOC19C]. 
The traders have various technical and manual processes in place to ensure that they 
know their positions. In the normal course of events, this work is done during the day 
when the traders are operating, and then overnight so that the traders know their exact 
position at the start of the day. The trading areas were required to make two important 
changes to their normal operations during the CoC process. Firstly they were required 
to sign off their positions in person immediately after the close of the trading day. 
They were again required to do so before the CoC could be considered complete. This 
is shown in the CoC plan [DOCOGC], the planning templates, and plans for the trading 
areas. In the event that these tasks could not be completed in the time allocated, plus 
an agreed buffer, there was a PONR (Point Of No Return) which automatically 
required the invocation of the CoC Business Continuity [D0009C] plan. 
There was a high degree of confidence in these controls among the interviewees: 
"There were racy small risks ... did not pereeir eag special risk with the contnnl 
center piece" [li wA] 
Future Orientation - The key temporal impact in this risk is related to the short-term 
impact of decisions. Earlier I listed some of the teams related to the management of 
this risk. For this one activity there are many tasks to be executed over the weekend. 
This illustrates the fluidity of the rate of progress involved. 
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The impact of a mistake in the reporting of positions could cause the bank to be 
unsure about which sets of records were correct and which were not. This would lead 
to the inability of the bank to trade; something that no major bank had experienced, 
even after the events of September 11'', 2001. 
3.1.5 Areas not addressed or explained by the model 
Much of the behaviour observed in the management of this risk can be explained using 
the theories that constitute the Reconceptualised model. 
There are a few areas that are not fully explained by this model that deserve to be 
explored further, outside the framework. These are: 
The role of culture as an influence on risk behaviour because of the impact of the top 
team's homogeneity, and the firm's social norms. 
The impact of industry regulation and structure as contributors to the organisation 
controls. 
Dominant National Culture - One dimension of the high degree of top team 
homogeneity is the national culture. Swiss and German nationalities dominate the 
board and senior management of the acquiring bank. The role of culture is not 
addressed in the Reconceptualised model, except for the notion of personal 
disposition. However, culture is an influence on risk tolerance and risk behaviour 
(Douglas and WVildavsky, 1982). Dominant cultures have low tolerance for ambiguity 
and uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980). This can be seen by the way in which this risk was 
managed. The nature of the risk made it possible to use procedures in its management, 
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which is what was done. The existing day-to-day controls were used and augmented, 
with the sign-off and oilier control procedures in place. 
Industry Structure and Regulation - The investment banking industry is a highly 
regulated area. Every country in which both banks operate had one or more regulatory 
bodies. The regulation requires organisations to protect investors and the general 
market from various risks. This is achieved through surveillance (and the reporting of 
that surveillance) and the withholding of capital from the marketplace and holding that 
capital as a reserve. To prove this, firms must report both their financial and non- 
financial (such as exposure to a single client or percentage exposure to a single 
company) position. 
These types of regulatory requirements mandate the necessary control mechanisms be 
in place to deliver high levels of accuracy and assuredness of necessary controls. In 
delivering that information and control it would appear possible that the regulations 
would influence actual operational behaviour. 
The structure of the merger process, and in particular, the very existence of the CoC 
process, is a direct result of the regulatory environment of the banking sector. The 
general regulatory legislation (The City Code on Afe, eis & Acquisitions) requires a high 
degree of separation between the two firms. However, the regulatory reporting 
requirements of the FSA requires that reporting requirements be met immediately 
following the CoC. This results in a high degree of co-operation between the two 
firms before the CoC in order to achieve the integration required. 
Therefore, it is likely that the regulatory environment, which is a result of and a factor 
in the industry's structure, influenced the organisational control structure. However, 
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because of the close correlation between the regulated nature of control and the 
dominant national culture's natural tendency toward control and low uncertainty in 
both firms (and in particular, in the acquiring bank), it seems that they and their inter- 
relationship is a factor in the risk behaviour observed. 
3.1.6 Summary 
This risk is one that the whole trading side of any bank faces every day. There is an 
ability to accept failure within defined parameters, but this equates to a financial loss. 
Even the normal levels of acceptability were not applicable with the degree of extra 
control and vigilance in place. Many of the determinants contributed to the excessive 
management observed. These are summarised in the table below: 
Page 169 
Risk determinant Observed in this Expected 
case behaviour 
Risk preference Risk averse Excessive 
Inertia Neutral Neutral 
0 
Outcome history Positive Excessive 
Problem framing Positive Excessive 
Top team homogeneity Homogeneous Excessive 
Social influence Risk averse Excessive 
Problem domain High familiarity Excessive 
familiarity 
Organisational control 
systems - 
Presence Yes Excessive 
0 
Effectiveness Yes Excessive 
Formality Formal Excessive 
Future orientation Short-term Negligent 
21 
0 C 
E 
U 
Dominant national Excessive N/A 
culture 
Z 
O 
r 
n Industry specific Excessive N/A 
regulation 
E 
V 
Table 19 - Case 'A' Risk determinants summary 
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3.2 Case B- Risk No. 31: Control centre staff are 
complacent or fatigued due to being overly practised 
This section explores risk number 31. 
3.2.1 The risk 
During the change of control (CoC) period there is a specific control structure in place 
to monitor, report upon and direct progress of the CoC. Each business area has its 
own control structure that reports to the merger control centre. This overall control 
centre liases with senior management, who are located in their own centre. This is 
described in the acquisition change of control plan [D0006C] and the acquisition CoC 
business continuity plan [D0009CJ. 
In the period preceding the CoC, the control centre staff are frequently tested in 
accordance with the pre-merger plan poci 1q. In addition, the control centre was 
largely staffed by people who had experience of working in this role during previous 
acquisitions or similar events. The team was well practised, having completed four 
successful practice runs, called "dress rehearsals" [DOC12C; DOC15C]. The risk is 
that the teams will either become complacent because the dress rehearsal weekends 
were all so successful, or that they will become exhausted as a result of completing so 
many within the space of two months [DOC11C]. 
3.2.2 How important was this risk? 
This is an important risk because of the role played by the control centre staff in the 
change of control. As we shall see, in spite of its importance, the decision to be taken 
had to consider the whole organisation, and not only the control centre staff. 
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As the control staff are the key and constitute the formal link between senior 
management and the organisation, efficient and effective operation is important for 
communications and the provision of reporting and management information. 
The significance of the control centre is illustrated by the number of risks that 
specifically relate to it. These include risks number 40 and 41, which relate to change 
of control reporting lines being bypassed and merger progress not being reported 
"down" the organisation. Because of this communications role it is important that the 
control centre functions at a high level. Having said that, in the overall scoring of the 
risk associated with this case, it scored only 2% for significance, which made it the 54`' 
most significant out of the 55 risks rated in Project 1. Paradoxically, it was rated as 12th 
in terms of mitigation, which would place it in the upper quartile. 
It is certainly possible to believe that there was a high degree of confidence in the 
control centre team and its operation. The interviews illustrated this: 
"There were maig small risks ... (but me) did not perceive a/y special risk with the 
contwnl centre 's piece"[InvA] 
The failure of the control centre would result in the breakdown of communications 
and co-ordination of the change of control process at the point where the various 
business areas are co-ordinated by and reporting to senior management. However, 
there were formal business continuity plans [D0009C] to address this, and the senior 
management team did on a number of occasions bypass the formal control channels. 
One interviewee commented that: 
"So much was expected in a shot time .... They (senior management team) would 
bypass the control cenln"[IiwK] 
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It was unlikely that the control would fail completely. The more realistic risk would 
revolve around a failure in the co-ordination of a series of tasks that are time and order 
sensitive. The most likely scenario might be to allow a computer batch to run when all 
of the necessary inputs were not available. If this happened, it would be necessary to 
stop the computer operation, reverse what had been done, and start the operation 
again. This would result in the loss of time, which would be consequential as time is 
critical. This would be similar to risk number 18, "The volume of transactions to be 
processed (transferred) during the change of control may require more time than is 
available in the CoC period", which scored similarly. 
If the control centre failed it could lead to a failure of the CoC process, which would 
have a very high significance. Because of this, this is an important risk. At the same 
time it is possible that management would be able to manage the key elements of the 
merger, if necessary. More importantly, it is clear that the CoC took a "back seat" 
position in relation to the concerns of other areas, so while important, it is clearly not 
paramount. 
3.2.3 How was it managed 
The decision as to how many dress rehearsals needed to be performed was taken from 
the perspective of the whole merger, and not the control centre component. Any 
dress rehearsal would require the control centre. Therefore, the decision as to the 
number required would be taken without direct reference to the risk presented by this 
risk. 
The management of this risk was facilitated by a number of factors: 
" The team was experienced 
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9 The team was practised 
" There were continuity plans in place; and 
" The decision as to how many dress rehearsals were required. 
An examination of the staffing rota for this change of control [DOC1 iq and that of 
the previous merger [D000213] shows a high degree of similarity in the names of 
those present. This shows that the experience gathered in one merger was being re- 
used in the second. Considering that these are rare events, it is a significant benefit to 
be able to have the same staff available. 
Because of their experience and the number of dress rehearsals (four) [DOC11C]- 
[DOC15CJ the staff were well trained. However, that may not have mitigated against 
complacency. 
The acquiring bank had a business continuity plan [D0009CJ in place to deal with the 
extraordinary processes and controls of the merger. This included the control centre. 
3.2.4 Reasons as to why the risk was managed in an excessive 
manner. 
Most of the risk determinants would lead one to expect this risk to be managed in an 
excessive manner. This section highlights this, and how some aspects of the control 
structure could have influenced negligent behaviour. A number of the risk 
determinants are constant for all cases. These are risk preference, inertia, top team 
homogeneity and social influence. These will not be discussed in this case or in cases 
"C" and "D" as it would only be repetition. 
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Outcome History - The risk of control centre staff being over practised or complacent 
is one that the organisation faces with each dress rehearsal for the merger, taking into 
account the previous merger and also the Euro conversion process six months earlier. 
In each of these dress rehearsals there was no indication of failure of the CoC control 
centre. 
The decision relating to this risk had been faced on a number of occasions before, and 
in each case, the control centre did not fail. This would indicate that the decision to 
hold the final dress rehearsal was probably taken with a high level of confidence 
because of the outcome history. 
However, in reality the decision was being made with a greater degree of focus being 
placed on the larger organisation than on the control centre. Therefore, the firm was 
managing the risk in an excessive or balanced manner from an overall firm context, but 
negligently from the control centre context. 
Problem Framing - There is no specific evidence relating to the framing of the 
problem at the time it was addressed. However, when it was raised in the interviews, 
the context and wording was negative. More importantly, however, is the fact that the 
impact on the control centre is clearly secondary to the whole of the firm in this 
context. Even though the framing itself may be negative, it is probably positive 
compared with the framing of risks to the whole organisation. This could explain 
excessive behaviour in relation to the risk. 
Problem Domain Familiarity - There is a high degree of problem domain familiarity 
in 
dealing with this risk. This is because of the number of times that there had been dress 
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rehearsal weekends. This high degree of familiarity allows management to understand 
the risk, and thus focus on managing it. 
Organisational Control System - There was no specific evidence relating to the control 
system surrounding the way in which the decision was taken. There was clearly a 
commitment to rapid execution. If you consider that a dress rehearsal could not take 
place without the CoC command centre in operation, it would seem unlikely that the 
decision would be taken locally to the command centre. Therefore the interest of the 
whole organisation would have been considered, and not just the CoC control centre. 
The general lack of controls would be expected to lead toward negligent behaviour. 
Future Orientation - The impact of the risk associated with this case would be 
experienced at the CoC or dress rehearsal weekend. The timing of the risk is 
intermediate compared with most of those addressed elsewhere in the research. It 
does not have an immediate impact, but the "go, no-go" decision is taken days in 
advance of when it can have an impact. At the same time, that is not a very long 
period either. The effect of the decision relating to the final dress rehearsal weekend 
might not have an impact until the CoC weekend. The Temporal model does not 
allow for intermediate time frames. Because of this I have considered this to be near- 
term, which would cause the firm to act in a more risky manner, i. e. to treat the risk 
element in an excessive manner. Based on the Temporal model, this would lead to 
"low risk", or excessive behaviour. 
3.2.5 Summary 
This section includes Table 20 - Case "B" Risk determinants. It presents a summary of 
the risk determinants and the role they played in the excessive management of this risk. 
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Risk Determinant Observed in this case Expected 
behaviour 
Risk preference Risk averse Excessive 
Inertia Neutral Neutral 
CL 0 
Outcome history Positive Excessive 
Problem framing Positive Excessive 
Top team homogeneity Homogeneous Excessive 
Social influence Risk averse Excessive 
Problem domain High familiarity Excessive 
familiarity 
Organisational control 
systems - 0 n, Presence None Negligent 
Effectiveness Yes Excessive 
Formality Informal Negligent 
Future orientation Short-term Excessive 
0 C E 
Table 20 - Case "B" Risk determinants 
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3.3 Case C- Risk No. 17: Poor systems may be selected 
over better ones as a result of the need to quickly 
rationalise technology 
This section explores risk number 17. 
3.3.1 The risk 
When the two banks merge there is obviously an issue with duplicated systems. Where 
there is overlap in business function there will be an overlap in technical systems 
capability. It is not desirable that two sets of systems are maintained because there is 
an economic cost and operational risk in having this duplication. It is expensive in 
terms of data centre capacity, human capacity and complexity, which contributes to 
systemic risk. This situation leads the acquiring organisation to rationalise the systems 
environment in as rapid and controlled a manner as possible. One of the stated 
objectives of the merger integration is: 
"SPEED. 
The sooner the i; ttegratioýt is completed, the more quickly the benefit of the me ger 
will be reaksed and a stable state achieved" [DOC18C] 
There are strategic considerations to this, such as technologies used, hardware platform 
and skills availability. The concern is that in this rationalisation process there is not an 
optimal selection process. This would result in the attainment of a sub-optimal 
process and the loss of key skills. 
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3.3.2 How important was this risk? 
This is an important risk as it involves the rationalisation of overlapping systems and 
controls. It is also important as it involves the disposal of assets and might limit the 
capabilities of the firm in the future. 
Decisions around technology strategy are clearly important. Although banks do not 
publish their technology expenditure levels, they are clearly a significant part of total 
expenditure. An equivalent sized American investment bank spent about US$2.2 
billion on technology in 2002 (Merrill Lynch, 2003). 
My findings from Project 1 rated this risk as having a risk significance score of 97%; a 
score that places it in third place in terms of significance. In terms of risk mitigation it 
has a score of 0%, the lowest score possible, even though there is documentary 
evidence of a process in place. 
Optimising the environment of the two banks is a very difficult task. In this research 
the applications inventories used for just two areas of the acquired bank were 
examined. Financial control listed 14 major systems [DOC16B] while risk controlling 
listed 16 major systems [DOC17B]. The integration plans, even at a high level, listed 
several hundred systems between the two banks [D0006C]. This is a difficult and 
complex activity, made more difficult by the desire for speed. 
If the risk should come to pass it could drive up technology costs and operating costs. 
More importantly it could result in the firm divesting itself of key skills, much as 
envisioned in risk 24 "The organisation cannot maintain or motivate critical staff" 
which scored 98% for significance and 34% for mitigation. The reason for this is that 
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divesting in certain technologies can lead to the loss of the staff whose skills support 
that technology. 
This is an important risk. Mis-handling can lead to the destruction of shareholder 
wealth as the superior systems (assets and sources of competitive advantage) can be 
abandoned. It can also impact the skill base and staff morale. 
3.3.3 How was the risk managed? 
The risk was managed using a simple formal procedure. Each area produced an 
inventory of their systems, including data relating to technology used, the number of 
people needed to support it, cost and so on. These were then compared and in each 
area a set of systems selected. The systems not selected were then retired. 
There was a perception that the systems of the acquiring bank were generally preferred 
over those of the acquired bank. 
`A lot of good (Bank B) systers were jest dumped for no reason" [lire B] 
To see if this was the case I looked at the strategic systems that were on the inventories 
and compared them with those that were in production. All the systems that had been 
retired, or were due for retirement, came from the acquired bank. This obviously 
encourages the perception of bias in making the systems retirement decision by the 
acquiring bank. 
3.3.4 Why the risk was managed in a negligent manner 
This section describes the factors that explain the behaviour relating to this risk. 
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Outcome History - The bank does not appear to have any significant experience in 
relation to this risk. This means is that there is not a history relating to this activity. 
However, this might explain why the associated risk might not be understood, or even 
perceived. This could lead the organisation to operate in a negligent manner because 
there is not a strong understanding of the significance of the risk. 
The lack of any experience could lead to excessive behaviour in this organisation, 
however, in this context it contributed to negligent behaviour because of a failure to 
articulate the impact. 
Problem Framing -I didn't find any evidence of problem framing, but when one 
considers the emphasis being placed on speed of execution, the risk associated with the 
risk may seem less significant than slow execution of the integration process. This 
could explain the negligent behaviour witnessed. 
Problem Domain Familiarity -The problem domain is outside the normal operation of 
the bank. Like most organisations, the bank would frequently focus on environment 
optimisation, and that would often include system reduction. There would never be a 
situation like this in the normal operation because if it was out of the ordinary, the 
organisation may not be able or willing to identify or articulate the associated risk. As a 
result, this could contribute to negligent behaviour. 
Organisational Control - There is no evidence of a detailed organisational control in 
place, and this could explain why the risk was negligently managed. Without a 
balanced control the decision-making is decentralised. This means that managers in 
the business areas would have to make the decisions. Since they were mostly from the 
Page 181 
acquiring bank, it is likely that they would prefer to work with the systems they are 
familiar with 
Future Orientation - Because the time frame is long and the organisation is slightly 
risk-seeking, the behaviour is likely to favour more high-risk activities. Considering 
this, we would expect to see low risk behaviour (i. e. excessive behaviour). 
3.3.5 Summary 
This section includes Table 21 - Case "C" Risk determinants. It presents a summary of 
the risk determinants and the role they played in the excessive management of this risk. 
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Risk determinant Observed in this case Expected 
behaviour 
Risk preference Risk averse Excessive 
N Inertia Neutral Neutral 
OJ 
Mö 
Outcome history No experience Negligent 
Problem framing Positive Negligent 
Top team homogeneity Homogeneous Excessive 
Social influence Itisk averse Excessive 
Problem domain Low familiarity Negligent 
familiarity 
Organisational control 
systems - 0 
Presence None Negligent 
Effectiveness Low Negligent 
P. 
Formality Informal Negligent 
Future orientation Long-term Excessive 
0 a V 
aý 
Table 21 - Case "C" Risk determinants 
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3.4 Case D- Risk No. 20: Management may focus on the 
"business" of the merger and not the human resources 
side of it 
This section explores risk number 20. 
3.4.1 The risk 
This risk is concerned with the focusing of management attention on areas where there 
are formal business processes involved, as opposed to areas involving human-centric 
areas, and thus potentially not addressing risks of a human-centric or behavioural 
nature. Examples of these would include productivity impacted through the failure to 
utilise all skilled resources, or by low staff motivation. 
3.4.2 How important was the risk? 
The phrase "People are our greatest asset" is a common business maxim. This issue is 
about how the acquiring firm treats that asset in the face of this managerial challenge. 
The risks associated with this risk are very non-specific and would be impossible to 
quantify using a statistical probability approach. The views of the panel from Project 1 
do give a strong sense of how the management team perceived the risks. The risk was 
rated as having a risk significance of 100%, the highest score achieved. The mitigation 
was rated at 19%, ranking it 49th of the 54 risks. 
Because of the nature of the risk it is difficult to identify the precise consequences 
should it occur. However, in addition to the perception of significant risk, there is 
evidence in the literature to illustrate the associated consequences. 
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In the field of high reliability control, when looking at closely integrated groups, such 
as air traffic controllers, it was shown that many of the risks related to fatigue, failure to 
comprehend instructions or the inappropriate enforcement of formal command 
structures (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991). Another example was an investigation into 
the tragic fire at King's Cross underground station, which showed the numerous 
impacts of human failure (Heath, 1998). 
It is impossible to say how important this risk is. Nonetheless it is clearly a cause for 
concern if managerial focus is unbalanced. This can have a strategic and tactical 
consequence for the firm. 
3.4.3 How was the risk managed? 
The management of human-centric risks was formally handled by the Human 
Resources (FIR) department. There was no documentation found relating to any 
management attention being given to this, or any formal controls being in place to 
address the inherent risks associated with this risk. 
3.4.4 Why the risk was managed in an negligent manner? 
This section explains the reasons for the behaviour observed. 
Outcome History - There is no history of how the acquiring bank behaved when 
facing this or similar risks, though it is possible that the organisation is so regulated and 
control-focused that it is used to putting the business issues to the fore, rather than the 
human issues. If this is the case, then it would seem likely that if the human issue 
"takes a back seat", there is a history of it being ignored, which would lead to negligent 
behaviour. 
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Problem Framing - There is no evidence as to how this risk was framed within the 
organisation. Considering the outcome history that non-specific outcomes from a risk 
would seem more like positive framing than "hard" specific risks, one would expect to 
see the risk treated in a negligent manner. 
Problem Domain Familiarity - This sort of risk is likely to fall outside the problem 
domain of the organisation, but it is the responsibility of the centralised HR 
organisation to be familiar with it and to deal with it. This means that the organisation 
as a whole might behave negligently, while at the same time those with responsibility 
for it might treat it excessively. 
Organisational Control Systems - The control of the risk was centralised, which is 
unusual for two decentralised organisations which are organised along business lines. 
This probably means that the controls were ineffective, and therefore we would expect 
to see negligent behaviour. 
Future Orientation - Because the time frame is long and the organisation is slightly 
risk-seeking, the behaviour is likely to favour more high-risk activities. Considering 
this, we would expect to see excessive behaviour. 
3.4.5 Areas not addressed by the literature 
The role of culture could also be a factor. The predominant national culture, German, 
would be considered quite high-scoring in terms of preference for high power distance. 
It is certainly possible that there would be a greater focus on formal, business-focused 
issues, as opposed to those that are "softer", such as staff retention. 
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3.4.6 Summary 
This section includes Table 22 - Case "D" Risk determinants summary. It presents a 
summary of the risk determinants and the role they played in the excessive 
management of this risk. 
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Risk determinant Observed in this Expected 
case behaviour 
Risk preference Risk averse Excessive 
Inertia Neutral Neutral 
ö Outcome history Little history / N/A 
Neutral 
Problem framing Positive Excessive 
Top team homogeneity Homogeneous Excessive 
Social influence Risk averse Excessive 
Problem domain Low familiarity Excessive 
familiarity 
Organisational control 
systems - 
z 
Presence None Negligent 
0 ö. Effectiveness N/A N/A 
Formality Informal Negligent 
Future orientation Short-term Excessive 
0 C4 E 
v 
ý Dominant national Negligent N/A , 
Cvö culture P 
0 
Table 22 - Case "D" Risk determinants summary 
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4 Discussion 
The table below presents the results of the four previous tables, and also shows how 
national culture or industry regulation played a direct role in the management of the 
risks covered in the cases. 
This project has five findings which make a contribution to our understanding. The 
first is that where there is a successful outcome history in managing particular risks, 
they will be managed in an excessive manner. The second is that where there is 
industry-specific regulation, they will be managed in an excessive manner. The third is 
that the temporal theory proposed by Das and Teng (2001b) does not appear to apply 
in the context of this project. The fourth is that where organisational controls exist, 
they will be applied in an excessive manner. The fifth finding is that where there is a 
high degree of familiarity with the problem domain, the organisation will be more 
sensitive to those risks. 
Some of these findings are new, while others support or contradict earlier research. 
Dominant national culture has been shown to impact group decision-making among 
the top team (Janis, 1972). It is possible the this is aided in the case of the target 
organisation because of the role of the risk characteristics of the dominant national 
culture, which tends toward formal controls and risk aversion (Hofstede, 1980). 
Where there is a successful outcome history this has been seen before to play a 
significant role (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995) and may also indicate that attention is 
influenced by availability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). It has also been seen before 
that domain familiarity can influence the risk perception and propensity (March and 
Shapira, 1987). 
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Risk determinant Case "A" Case "B" Case "C" Case "D" 
Excessive Excessive Negligent Negligent 
Risk preference Excessive 
Inertia Neutral 
Outcome history Excessive Excessive Negligent N/A 
Problem framing Excessive Excessive Negligent Excessive 
Top team Excessive 
homogeneity 
Social influence Excessive 
Problem domain Excessive Excessive Negligent Excessive 
familiarity 
Organisational 
control systems - 
ö Presence Excessive Negligent Negligent Negligent 
Effectiveness Excessive Excessive Negligent N/A 
Formality Excessive Negligent Negligent Negligent 
Future orientation Negligent Excessive Excessive Excessive 
0 
Table 23 - Summary of cases 
The summary of the four cases as analysed using the analytical framework is presented 
in the table above (Table 23 - Summary of cases). This shows a number of interesting 
points upon which I will build my proposals. In addition there are the two factors 
identified in the first case. These are the role of industry regulation and the role of 
national culture. 
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Industry-specific regulation only applies to the first case, "A". The role of national 
culture is the same across all cases and so is not specifically examined in the other 
cases. There are a number of specific factors that are constant to all four cases, but at 
the same time I define the constraints within which the propositions apply. These 
constraints are: 
1. The organisation is operating outside its normal operational domain - this is to 
say it is performing functions at an overall (macro) level which are 
extraordinary to normal business activities 
2. The organisation has a risk preference toward risk aversion (excessive risk 
management) 
3. There is a high degree of top team (senior/executive management) 
homogeneity 
4. Within the organisation there is social pressure toward risk aversion (excessive 
risk management) 
5. The dominant national culture is risk averse; and 
G. The top team shares the dominant national culture. 
When these conditions apply, based on what has been seen in Project 2, the following 
will occur: 
Proposition 1- When a risk is addressed by industry-specific regulation, the risk will 
be well managed, tending toward excessive management. 
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Proposition 2- When a risk has a successful outcome history in normal business 
conditions the risk will be well managed, tending toward excessive management. 
Proposition 3- When a risk is managed using effective organisational controls in 
normal business operation the organisation the risk will be well managed, tending 
toward excessive management. 
Proposition 4- When a risk is not addressed by industry-specific regulation, the risk 
will not be well managed, tending toward negligent management. 
Proposition 5- When a risk does not have a successful outcome history in normal 
business conditions the risk will not be well managed, tending toward negligent 
management. 
Proposition 6- When a risk is not managed using effective organisational controls in 
normal business operation the organisation the risk will not be well managed, tending 
toward negligent management. 
An interesting find from this research is that the risk theories relating to temporality do 
not seem to be applicable. In the following chapter I will test the first three 
propositions, and also the apparent effectiveness of the future orientation risk 
determinant to see how well they apply in the situation of the other risk identified in 
Project 1. Since propositions 4,5 and 6 are opposites of 1,2 and 3 these will, in effect, 
be tested when propositions 1,2 and 3 are tested. 
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IMPORT: PROJECT 3 
This chapter presents the third project. Project 3 searches for evidence to support the 
six propositions presented in Project 2 using the qualitative data gathered in Project 1. 
The chapter is divided into a number of sections. The first is the theoretical position 
from which the project is conducted. The second section is the method, which 
describes how the project was constructed. The third section presents the results, and 
the fourth section briefly discusses the results. 
I Theoretical position 
Project 2 presents a set of six propositions. These propositions relate to the role of 
industry-specific regulation, outcome history and effective management controls as risk 
determinants of the behaviour of the target organisation, while executing the 
acquisition under study. The propositions suggest conditions which will result in 
excessive (disproportionately large compared to the risk) or negligent 
(disproportionately small compared to the significance of the risk) management of the 
risks faced. The propositions are: 
Proposition 1- When a risk is addressed by industry-specific regulation, the 
organisation will tend towards excessive risk management behaviour. 
Proposition 2- Mellen a risk has a successful outcome history under normal business 
conditions, the organisation will tend towards excessive risk management behaviour. 
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Proposition 3- When a risk is managed using effective organisational controls in 
normal business operation, the organisation will tend towards excessive risk 
management behaviour. 
Proposition 4- Wien a risk is not addressed by industry-specific regulation, the 
organisation will tend towards negligent risk management behaviour. 
Proposition 5- When a risk does not have a successful outcome history under 
normal business conditions, the organisation will tend towards negligent risk 
management behaviour. 
Proposition 6- When a risk is not normally managed using effective organisational 
controls in normal business operation, the organisation will tend towards negligent risk 
management behaviour. 
The first project identified the risks which the organisation faced during the 
acquisition, and also the degree of significance and mitigation that related to those 
risks. If the propositions are supported, one would expect to find that a population of 
risks that a given proposition relates to would have a statistically significant difference 
from a population of risks that the proposition does not relate to, in terms of the 
degree of excessiveness or negligence exhibited. Testing this for each proposition is 
the goal of Project 3. 
'This type of testing is very common in quantitative research. Black (1999a: 402) 
describes it as "one of the most basic situations in research". The object as described 
above is to compare two sets of data at the same time and test to see if their average 
scores (risk behaviour) are significantly different. The required statistical test is the /- 
test (Black, 1999). The null hypothesis is that the two sets are from the same 
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population, and will therefore have similar means. Specifically, the t-test examines 
whether or not the difference between the means of the two samples drawn from 
different populations is sufficiently large to be statistically significant. 
The application of the t-test will therefore need to check for these conditions and the 
test adjusted accordingly. This testing and appropriate adjustment need to be 
considered for the application of this approach. 
2 Method 
This section describes the method applied in Project 3. This section describes the 
steps taken in the research to use the t-test. 
Each test assumes that two sets of data are being examined; the set to which the risk 
determinant relating to the proposition applies, and that which it does not. 
To determine this it is desirable to use a panel of people who understand the risks. As 
discussed in Project 1, there are approximately seventy to eighty people within the 
target organisation who would have a sufficient breadth of knowledge to be able to 
contribute. Of these 15 (20%) of the total population were sampled. During Project 3 
I was no longer an employee of the target organisation, however, five members of the 
original panel agreed to take part in a small survey to ascertain which propositions 
related to the relevant risks. Four of the participants actually completed and returned a 
questionnaire. 
The purpose of the questionnaire is to decide which risk determinants apply to which 
risks. For each risk the panel were asked to answer three questions: 
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" Does industry-specific regulation exist which addresses this risk? 
" Does the target bank have a successful outcome history in managing this risk? 
" Can this risk be managed using normal management controls? 
Each question required either a "Yes" or a "No" response. 
Industry-specific regulation refers to regulatory obligations that apply specifically to 
firms in this industry. For the financial sector in the United Kingdom these are 
enforced by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which is the statutory regulatory 
authority. These are different from general regulation such as health and safety and 
merger and acquisition legislation, which applies to all industry sectors in the UK. 
Outcome history refers to the record of dealing with a given risk or similar risks. For 
example, the firm has a successful outcome history in making sure that traders know 
their positions, which is something that needs to be done on a daily basis. On the 
other hand, the firm does not appear to have such a successful outcome history in 
managing the risks relating to people management. 
Risks which are, or can be, managed using normal management controls are those 
where the organisation does not require any special controls in addition to those 
already in place. 
Normally such a questionnaire would be developed and piloted. Piloting a 
questionnaire was not appropriate in this case because so few respondents were 
available. The questionnaire was made as simple as possible (see Appendix N), and 
tested. I was available to support the respondents with any queries which might arise, 
either in person or over the telephone. 
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In practice, each participant had to examine each risk and determine whether any of 
the three criteria applied to that risk. The first criteria assesses whether there is any 
industry- specific legislation that relates to the manner in which the risk is managed. In 
order to answer "Yes" the management of the risk would need to be addressed by 
legislation that is specific to financial institutions. 
Risk number 1 "Staff are not aware of the progress of the merger" is not addressed by 
any legislation. There is no legislation relating to how much information staff are 
entitled to about the progress of the merger. As a result the respondents would be 
expected to select "No". Risk 18 "The number of positions on the books make it 
difficult to complete the change of control in the desired time-frame" is more difficult. 
At first sight the risk is about the volume of transactions that need to be processed. 
However, FSA regulatory reporting requirements dictate that this activity be completed 
in the period of the CoC, and in addition, the way in which it is managed is also subject 
to FSA regulations to ensure capital adequacy. Because of this, the respondents would 
be expected to answer "Yes" for this risk being subject to industry-specific regulations. 
Of the three criteria being applied, outcome history proved to be the most difficult for 
the respondents. It accounted for most of the differences in rating and required the 
most time to explain to the respondents. Specifically, the respondents were asked to 
identify risks where there was a history of successful outcomes. Many of the risks 
occur in the everyday operation of the organisation. If a risk is one such risk, and if the 
firm's experience of managing that risk has generally been successful, then the 
respondent should reply "Yes"; if the risk has not been successfully managed, then the 
answer is "No". Where the risk is one that is unique to the acquisition process, then it 
is quite different. One might expect the answer to be "No" for these risks. However, 
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many of the respondents have had experience of more than one acquisition, which 
may influence their answer, and they may also translate the risk to the everyday running 
of the organisation. One example is risk number 20 "The need to transact the merger 
(acquisition), often under tight deadlines, may result in the management focusing more 
on the "business" of the merger than on the "softer" human resources side. " This risk 
is clearly specific to the merger, but it is possible that a respondent who may not have 
experienced a direct outcome history may still wish to take a more general view of how 
the target organisation prioritises "business" issues in relation to "human" issues, 
whether or not they relate to the acquisition. 
Risk number 46 "Traders are not aware of their positions immediately after the Change 
of Control" is a risk where there is day-to-day experience of managing this risk, even 
though it is clearly specific to the merger. It is also a risk that is well managed in the 
day-to-day environment, so respondents would be expected to respond "Yes" to this 
criterion. 
Risk number 46 is a risk where the basic controls to manage it exist in the normal 
"everyday" set of management controls. Because of this, it should be rated as a risk 
which can be managed using existing management controls. On the other hand, risk 
45 "Event tracking, the ability to record events in the order they happen not in place. 
This may impact the ability to analyse and understand the sequence of events when a 
problem arises" is a risk that may not be faced in the day-to-day operation of the bank, 
and certainly not by the level of individuals who are generally sufficiently senior not to 
be normally involved in day-to-day transactions of the business. Because of this, the 
respondents should respond "No" for management control of this risk. 
This process can be seen in the following illustration: 
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The data collected illustrated a high level of consistency in the answers provided. In all 
but seven risks (14%), all of the respondents responded with identical answers. Of 
these, in six instances a single respondent differed from the group. Where this was the 
case the majority opinion was selected for the classification. In this situation, the 
respondent who was in the minority was contacted to explain the reason for their 
opinion. The reason for the difference was ambiguity relating to the meaning of 
outcome history, and how that might be interpreted in relation to certain risks. 
In one risk the responses were equally divided. This risk (risk number 16), "Inadequate 
mix of experienced and energetic staff in the control centre", two respondents felt that 
it could be handled using managerial controls and two did not. The reason for the 
difference of opinion was that they felt that the target bank did not have any 
mechanism to monitor or control the level of staff experience within the control team. 
Two felt that while there was no mechanism they believed that the bank could manage 
it using ordinary controls, if it so desired. Prior to the questionnaire being sent out I 
had completed one as a pilot. In order to progress the project, the classification I 
applied was used as a "casting vote", and I decided that there was not a mechanism in 
place. 
Four of the risks were used in the cases studied in Project 2. Using these would run 
the risk of tainting the results. As it is not appropriate to use these data they were 
removed from the population of risks to be used in Project 3. 
The excessive or negligence score is calculated for each risk. In project 1 the 
significance score and mitigating scores were calculated for each risk and mapped onto 
a graph from 0% - 100%. If the ratio of significance to mitigation is 1: 1 then the 
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scores would be placed along the diagonal from 0 significance, 0 mitigation to 1 
significance and 1 mitigation. This is illustrated below as the line from P1 to P2. 
P3 
O 
c: 
P4 
P1 
Significance 
Figure 21- Calculating excessive/negligent scores 
P2 
Each risk is then mapped onto the unit square, P3 & P4 in this example. To calculate 
the score the distance from any given point, say P3, to the line P1, P2 the following 
calculations are made. This is done by starting with the equation of the line though P1 
and P2. This equation is P= P1 + u(P2 - P1). P3 is closest to the line at the tangent 
that passes through P3 which is the dot product of the tangent and the line is 0, i. e. 
(P3 - P) " (P2 - P1) = 0. Substituting the equation of the line and then solving for u 
gives point of intersection as x= xl + u(x2 - xl) and y= yl + zi(y2 - yl) . The 
distance from this point to P3 to the line is then the distance between P3 and the point 
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(x, y) which can be calculated easily using trigonometry. Negligent scores are signed as 
negative numbers. This calculation is made for each risk. 
The following table illustrates the population size, average and standard deviation for 
the excessiveness/negligence scores. This is for various populations. That is the total 
population, the population used in this project, and the population that is relevant to 
the six propositions. 
Project 1 population is the total set of risks from the Delphi section of Project 1. 
There are 54 risks and the average excessive/negligent score is 1.55 (overall a slightly 
excessive tendency when averaged across the population). 
Project 3 population is the population in Project 1 less the four risks used to derive the 
proposition in Project 2. Hence there are 50 risks. The average score for 
excessiveness/negligence is still slightly excessive. 
The populations used for proposition 1 to 6 apply are populations of risks drawn from 
the Project 3 population where the criteria of the corresponding population applies. 
e. g. If a risk has a successful outcome history, then that risk is part of the population 
where proposition 1 applies and so forth. 
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Number of risks Average excessive 
/ negligent score 
Standard deviation of 
score 
Project 1 population 54 1.55 26.65 
Project 3 population 50 1.57 24.44 
Risks to which proposition 1 applies 7 6.58 23.84 
Risks to which proposition 2 applies 27 8.32 20.20 
Risks to which proposition 3 applies 17 12.32 26.83 
Risks to which proposition 4 applies 
(opposite to proposition 1) 
43 0.78 24.72 
Risks to which proposition 5 applies 
(opposite to proposition 2) 
23 -6.37 26.95 
Risks to which proposition 6 applies 
(opposite to proposition 3) 
33 -3.97 21.49 
Table 24 - Statistical properties of populations used in Project 3 
Each of the six propositions was tested using the same technique. For each 
proposition the population of risks (50 risks) was divided into two sets. One is the set 
of risks to which the proposition applies (ßi1), and the other is the set of risks to which 
it does not apply (X2). 
Normal distributions are appropriate where there is a large sample size (n z 30) or 
where the sample size is small (n < 30) and the population is known and 5 is known. 
In this project the general population is divided into sets where the propositions apply 
(eil) and do not apply (X2). This is done by comparing the mean of the two 
populations. In this project the sample size is small, in one case 7) and the population 
is normally distributed but 8 is not known. In these circumstances the use of the t 
distribution is appropriate (Kazmier, 1995: 139). 
8 The four risks used in Project 2 are removed 
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As stated earlier, the populations are independent of each other, which eliminates the 
need to test for that. 
For each sample in each proposition, the number of samples is counted and the 
average and standard deviation calculated. The F test is conducted for each. Based on 
the results of the F test it is possible to determine whether the data is homoscedastic or 
heteroscedastic; that is, whether they have similar or different volatility in their values. 
The F test is conducted using by following the five steps outlined in Cassell (1969: 106). 
This informs the heteroscedastic nature of the two samples. 
Knowledge of the heteroscedastic nature of the two samples dictates how the t test is 
conducted. This data is needed for the population mean test (t test), which makes it 
possible to test the validity of the propositions to various degrees of statistical 
confidence. This is achieved by determining whether the means of the population 
pairs are similar (Ho: means are similar) or different (different means). The t tests were 
conducted by following the steps as outlined in Cassell (1969: 95). 
2.1 Concerns with the application of this method 
The main concern with this method is the small population size; 50. The t distribution 
addresses this. The tables used for calculation tdf do not show values of all T values. 
Fortunately n>30, so it is possible to use az distribution instead (Kazmier, 1995). The 
calculations were also made using the FIE ST and TEST functions in Microsoft 
Excel. 
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A further concern can be the possibility of a Type II error, when one is performing 
multiple tests from the same data. In this project the test is performed three times, 
each time with a high confidence level (P<0.025). This means that it is likely that 0.075 
instances will be incorrect. This value is so low that it is not a concern for this project. 
3 Results 
This section presents the results of the calculations performed in this project. The f 
test yielded the following results: 
Proposition pair t df p-one 
tailed 
Proposition 1 and 4 -0.5606 48 0.2888 
Proposition 2 and 5 +2.2013 0.0162 
Proposition 3 and 6 -2.3321 0.0119 
Table 25 - Results of F and t-tests 
The t test found evidence to support four of the six proposition witli a high (>0.025) 
degree of confidence. 
4 Discussion 
This section presents a discussion of the project findings and results. 
4.1 Industry regulation 
Proposition I and Proposition 4 address the role of industry-specific regulation in 
determining risk behaviour. Proposition 1 suggests that risks which are subject to 
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industry-specific regulations will be managed so well that they will tend toward being 
excessively managed. This proposition was not supported by the tests. Proposition 4 
suggests that the absence of industry-specific regulation will result in risks being 
inadequately managed, so tending toward negligent management. This too was not 
supported. 
The results are surprising considering the evidence found in Project 2. The 
calculations using the Excel TT-ST and FTEST functions revealed that the statistical 
significance was 23%. Also, as discussed earlier, the need to perform an F test, because 
the data was homoscedastic, would result in it being harder to achieve statistical 
significance. Considering these factors, while the research cannot support the 
propositions and the role of industry-specific regulation, it does not disprove it either, 
and there is sufficient evidence to warrant further research. 
4.2 Outcome history 
Propositions 2 and 5 relate to the organisation's outcome history in terms of the type 
of risk. Proposition 2 suggests that where there is a successful outcome history, the 
risk is likely to be well managed, tending towards excessive management. Proposition 
5 suggests that where there is not a successful outcome history, the organisation will 
not manage risk well; in fact it will tend towards negligent management. Both these 
propositions were supported to a high level of confidence (> 0.025). This suggests 
that outcome history will impact on risk behaviour. 
This is clearly important from a number of perspectives. It indicates how well an 
organisation will operate when faced with new risks that are in some way similar to 
previous risks that it has faced. This would indicate support for the existing research 
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relating to outcome theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; March and Shapira Z., 
1987; March, 1988; Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
4.3 Normal management control 
Propositions 3 and 6 relate to the organisation's management of risks which can be 
handled using regular management controls. Proposition 3 suggests that where the 
risks can be managed with regular controls they are likely to be well managed, tending 
towards excessive management. Proposition 6 suggests that where normal controls are 
not in place the organisation will not manage the risk well. The management of this 
risk will be poor, tending towards negligent management. Both of these propositions 
were supported to a high level of confidence (> 0.025). 
The findings support earlier work by March and Shapira (1987) and Tversky and 
Kehneman (1973) on problem domain familiarity. The higher the degree of familiarity, 
the greater the tendency toward better, and often excessive, management. This would 
be the first time such theories have been tested in unfamiliar problem domains. 
This also raises questions about the role of sense-making. \Veick (1988) shows that 
sense- making in an organisation during a crisis can often be in the context of the 
normal environment, which can in extreme circumstances lead to people making 
incorrect decisions and taking detrimental actions as the members of the organisation 
are either unable to develop creative solutions or are unable to follow unorthodox 
solutions (\Veick, 1993). 
These findings therefore show that outcome history and normal operational controls 
play a particularly important role in determining risk behaviour in the unfamiliar 
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problem domain. The challenge for organisations is either to take steps to make the 
organisation more creative (\Veick, 1993) or to put more robust controls in place which 
can deal with the unexpected, or failing that, keep the organisation functioning well 
enough to give it time to come up with the appropriate risk management behaviour. 
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PART C: Appendices and Back 
Matter 
Page 209 
C) 
N 
bA 
ca 
.ý 
0 "y 
V 
h 
V 
t34 
4e 
h 
ýV 
v 
Ll 
k 
ö 
Cý N 
iý 
ä 
N 
0 
N 
I 
0 
w 
I,. -- 
N 
V 
cC 
C) U 
.Q 
aG 
N 
a 
V 
Qý 
Y+'1 
R: 
L 
h 
1ý 
e -0 °ö 
r_ 8 
C 
Ö ü 
" :: X 
¢ 
t- 0 
~Ö 
aý ° W ey 
Ea 
E r- 0w"b 
3,8 
a 
.ýV 
y Vy 
N 
t0« >ä 
TÖÖ 
.p ýG 
'b ci., " 
Ce 
LL 
'D N W y ý 
.m 
ä 
g 
N 
C 
> oAO 
L. 
'1" O ° a'J y. 
r ý ý 
° 
äý 
ýy. 
E> 
' 
ý. 1ýi 
O 
ýy F 
MV 
ß'y+ 
xJ 
.. + O7 M + 
.ö 15 -p- 'ö 11 N 
. gis; ýýQ 
Ü 
g. ög ý, ö 
E c 3 ä 
8 
9 
. _j W 
C 
7 .2 
G C 
0 
3 3°ß a 
A CA b y 
U 
3 3 ý'c °'ý z 
ö b b E ö 
a r, ) E 53 
Z3 
ý A .8 
u "v 
N 
-4 N 
u 61o 
2 
0 
U 
0 
on c 
E 
a 
A 
0 
ßr 
V 
.G 
VF 
4r 
N 
N 
w 
E 
.8 0 
0 
V 
C 
V 
Ip 
a 
j 1 
"Va äý ö ö 
P+Vlr1 ºCrN 
m7 
v 
cw 
jo 
Cl. 
U 
t0 
E 
Lr 
to 
cts U 
U 
G 
0 
M 
bA 
P-4 
I 
i 
", r 
I 
^W_ C 
Z, 
.c 
I a c 
n 
I 
I 
i. 
I 
r uý 
Ii 
C2 
I 
'ý 
d .. 
P; 
e ti 
8 
r 
M 
ti 
O 
ti i 
9 
h 
a 
M 
ti 
N 
bA 
cs P-4 
J 1 
17 
Ti 
V8 
0 V 
I 
I 
e 
+e 
.ý 
e V 
sý 
.ý 
a 
E 
g 
0 
h 
ti Ö 
N 
ä 
S 
N 
M 
ti 
in 
N 
60 
CI 
Jý .Q 
r ö 
m 
a 
g 
4 
I 
C 
0: cc 0 
4 
e V 
9 
8 
A 
m 
s 
I 
I 
gý 
.ý 
a 
.. 
I 
8 
I 
tS 
ö 
G 
I 
$a 
c 
äý 
If 
I- 
0 
A 
c3 's 
1 
M 
n 
u 
C 
N 
M 
ti 
hA 
c4 r-4 
ii___ 
r ,ý 
I 
Cp 
.3 
a 
. _y 
5i 
v 
ýý 
S 
s 
8 
s 
s 
I 
I 
a 
.ý 
0 
1w 
F 
I 
e V 
171 
4 
.ý 
w 
r 
a 
I I 
I 
8 
n 
M 
Ö 
b 
C° 
M 
ti 
N 
N 
bA 
P-1 
ýý. ýIý ý ýý 
ýý 
ö 
f 
C 
.Q 19. 
. 12 w 
F 
a 
x ýý 
QaQ 
QQ 
Q ýQ 
ýý I w 
3 
u 
I 
3 
I- 
1Y 
51 
. yý 
h 
n 
Ö 
h 
Y 
ýý 
8 N 
ý'1 
ti 
00 
I 
P4 
ö 
eý 
I 
"1 
.3 
'ý ý 
m 
ýý 
I 
a 
I 
1 
w 
c 
I. 
I Y I 
'8 
a 
01 1 
b 
2. 
.ý 
e V 
I 
I 
s 
13 
U 
a 
N 
i 
1 
U 
N 
ti 
Ö 
b 
Y 
wt 
8 h 
M 
ti 
c, 
N 
bA 
cs 
ý-+' 
rn 
qör 
3 
.1 n 
ro 
9 
ä 
ýý 
E 
I 
1 
F 
U' 
s 
r 
I 
ö c 
I 
I. 
ýI 
41 41 .2 
y 
t °c 
" 
ä 
a 
.i 
I I 
b 
ti 
m 
+i 
n 
II 
11 
r 
a " 
8 
U 
h 
Ö 
n 
Y 
b 
a 
h 
1- H 
I 
.ý 
m 
9 
n 
W. x 
Ai 
g 
s 
s 
a 
I 
I 
it 
r 
s 1 
. 12 
s 
40 
e .. 9 
19 
$ 
ö 
ä 
s 
b 
e 
ß 
S 
C 
q> 
1 
t 
e 
I 
sg 
8 
I 
E 
" 
I 
8 
0 
X 
b 
w 
Pl 
11 
I 
8 
s 
h 
n 
Ö 
Sc 
4 
8 
h 
M 
C) N 
N 
u to 
1-4 
N 
N 
U to 
ýý 
r 
.ý 
ö 
I 
a 
ro 
9 
n 
x 0: 
n eI 
I 
Wm 
L 
R 
0 
i 
A, Hi 
vi 
1 
a 
f7 f 
n 
I 
S 
sIý 
h 
ti 
Ö 
O. 
V 
d 
4 
S h 
Z 
ti 
N 
N 
N 
u to 
ýY 
ni 
I 
I 
111 
z 
'ý 
e 
.. 
x 
s 
m 
ö 
ä 
E 
8 .5 
r 
r 
I 
a M 
r-ý1 
1 
i h. 
.1 
. 10 
P 8 
s2 
m 
ö 
w 
Z 
is 
3 
_$$ 
äý 52 
h 
Ö 
O 
1 
ä 
S h 
M 
ti 
tn N 
N 
tv0 
cý 
w 
ö 
I 
S 
8 
A 
E 
ß ý 
b 
ä 
x° 
.9 
1 Z' _ Q 
a It 6 £ 
N 
ýi 
.ý 
C 
V 
P4 
.ý 
a 
I 
A 
. t1 
p 
ti 
M 
Ö 
1 
ýý 
h 
"'f 
ti 
N 
N 
aý 
A 
ýý .. 
i 
s 
i I 
i 
I ýý s 
8 
8 
.19 C26 9 
9 
:n 
I 
Z, 
0 
9 
w 
ä 
II 
m 
El 1: 1 
aa 
'v 
a 
I 
s 
ä 
ý91 
L 11 
-1 
M 
ti 
Ö 
h 
1 
v 4 
1p 
O 
h 
M 
ý1 
ýn 
N 
N 
bA 
ýý :ý 
ýý 
.ý 
ti H 
I 
A 
m 9 
cr 
ß 
a 
B 
I 
a 
i 
s F 
AI 
I 
0 
.ý 
n M 
V 9 C ýp 
yR 
T. 
ý 
6C,. 
HI 
1 
s 
ýC 
H 
BF 
3 
ö 
i 
E 
IA 
d 
Ä 
T 
A 
E 
I 
15 
91 
i 
n 
h 
Ö 
ý'f 
ä 
S M 
M 
ti 
110 N 
N 
v 
1 
Ö 
I 
Ii 
tx c 
M 
b 
ti 
® 
Iii 
I 
i 
Em 
Ir 
tl 
iý 
a- 
a 
2 
ýe 
.ý 
e .. 
h 
Ö 
1 
IF 
S 
Z 
r- C14 
N 
bA 
cc 
ýý 
.ý 
ý' ,4b 
F 
a 
m 
Y9 
N_ 
Y 
gy 
I 
I 
t 
3 
b 
F 
a 
I L 
5 
e 
ýo 
V% 
ö 
h 
v 
4ý 
Appendix B- Correlation equations used 
Pearson's product-moment coefficient 
»(zXY)-(zXY) 
n-rZXlz I1ýYz _(y)2 
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Appendix C- Calculations used to calculate statistical 
sigttifican ce 
The t value for the degrees of freedom is calculated from the size of the populations - 2, 
thus: 
tdf ='nl+n2-2 
The standard error is: 
6Z 
J111 - I)S1 + (i12 -1 52 
/11+112-2 
The standard error of the differences is therefore: 
A 62 62 
6x1-x2 =-+ 
111 112 
Thus to test the hypothesis we need to see if it is the range for that interval Y: 
Y=(X1 
-X2) ttdfd 1=x2 
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Appendix D- Project 3 calculation results 
Propositions 1 and 4 
Values X. Xb 
n 43 7 
sum 0.3340000000000001 0.44799999999999995 
mean 0.0078 0.064 
sumsq 2.5692 0.3698 
SS 2.5666 0.3412 
variance 0.0611 0.0569 
st. dev. 0.2472 0.2385 
MeanA - Mean11 t df 
-0.0562 -0.5606 48 
P one-tailed 0.2888485 
Propositions 2 and 5 
Values X. Xh 
n 27 23 
sum 2.248 -1.4660000000000002 
mean 0.0833 -0.0637 
sums 1.2472 1.6918 
SS 1.06 1.5983 
variance 0.0408 0.0727 
st. dev. 0.2019 0.2695 
MeanA - Mean, t df 
0.147 +2.2013 48 
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P one-tailed 0.0162765 
Propositions 3 and 6 
Values X. Xh 
n 33 17 
sum -1.3120000000000002 2.094 
mean -0.0398 0.1232 
sums 1.5299 1.4091 
SS 1.4777 1.1512 
variance 0.0462 0.0719 
st. dev. 0.2149 0.2682 
MeanA - Mean t df 
-0.1629 -2.3321 48 
P one-tailed 0.0119695 
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Appendix E- SPSS results 
4.3.1 Correlations -2 Tailed Test 
SIG MIT 
SIG Pearson Correlation 1.000 -. 411(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 002 
N 55 55 
MIT Pearson Correlation -. 411(**) 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 002 
N 55 55 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
4.3.2 Nonparametric Correlations -2 Tailed Test 
SIG MIT 
SIG Pearson Correlation 1.000 -. 411(**) 
Sig. (1-tailed) . 001 
N 55 55 
MIT Pearson Correlation 411(**) 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) . 001 
N 55 55 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
4.3.3 Nonparametric Correlations -1 Tailed Test 
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Appendix F- Wilcoxon test results 
Probability 
Risk Number Delphi 1 Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
X1 X2 (d=X1-X2) Id Rank Id l + - 
1 4.33 4.43 -0.0952 0.0952 17 17 
2 3.89 4.14 -0.2540 0.2540 36 36 
3 4.33 4.36 -0.0238 0.0238 3 3 
4 3.75 4.00 -0.2500 0.2500 34 34 
5 2.88 3.29 -0.4107 0.4107 47 47 
6 3.89 3.86 0.0317 0.0317 5 5 
7 4.86 4.83 0.0238 0.0238 3 3 
8 4.25 4.17 0.0833 0.0833 13 13 
9 3.57 3.67 -0.0952 0.0952 15 
15 
10 3.43 3.29 0.1429 0.1429 22 22 
11 3.75 3.29 0.4643 0.4643 51 51 
12 3.38 3.50 -0.1250 0.1250 19 19 
13 3.71 3.50 0.2143 0.2143 31 31 
14 3.43 3.33 0.0952 0.0952 15 15 
15 3.00 3.17 -0.1667 0.1667 29 
29 
16 3.25 3.86 -0.6071 0.6071 54 
54 
17 5.00 5.21 -0.2143 0.2143 31 
31 
18 3.14 3.43 -0.2857 0.2857 38 
38 
19 4.71 5.00 -0.2857 0.2857 38 
38 
20 4.89 4.86 0.0317 0.0317 6 6 
21 4.25 4.00 0.2500 0.2500 34 34 
22 4.67 4.71 -0.0476 0.0476 9 9 
23 4.44 4.86 -0.4127 0.4127 48 48 
24 4.75 4.71 0.0357 0.0357 8 8 
25 4.13 4.29 -0.1607 0.1607 28 28 
26 4.75 5.17 -0.4167 0.4167 50 
50 
27 3.50 4.00 -0.5000 0.5000 52 52 
28 3.67 3.86 -0.1905 0.1905 30 
30 
29 4.00 3.86 0.1429 0.1429 22 22 
30 4.00 3.86 0.1429 0.1429 22 22 
31 3.00 3.14 -0.1429 0.1429 22 22 
32 3.86 4.17 -0.3095 0.3095 41 41 
33 4.67 5.00 -0.3333 0.3333 42 42 
34 4.44 4.57 -0.1270 0.1270 21 
21 
35 3.63 3.57 0.0536 0.0536 11 11 
36 3.78 3.71 0.0635 0.0635 12 12 
37 3.44 3.43 0.0159 0.0159 1 1 
38 3.67 4.00 -0.3333 0.3333 43 43 
39 4.88 4.29 0.5893 0.5893 53 53 
40 4.63 4.50 0.1250 0.1250 19 19 
41 3.89 4.29 -0.3968 0.3968 46 46 
42 3.33 3.57 -0.2381 0.2381 33 
33 
43 4.22 4.07 0.1508 0.1508 27 27 
44 3.50 3.42 0.0833 0.0833 14 14 
45 2.56 2.83 -0.2778 0.2778 37 
37 
46 2.29 2.57 -0.2857 0.2857 40 
40 
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Probability 
Risk Number Delphi 1 Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
Xl X2 (d=X1-X2) Id l Rank Id l + - 
47 2.57 2.93 -0.3571 0.3571 45 45 
48 3.56 3.57 -0.0159 0.0159 1 1 
49 3.67 3.71 -0.0476 0.0476 10 10 
50 3.44 3.86 -0.4127 0.4127 49 49 
51 3.33 3.00 0.3333 0.3333 43 43 
52 3.25 3.25 0.0000 
53 4.11 4.14 -0.0317 0.0317 6 6 
54 2.43 2.57 -0.1429 0.1429 26 26 
55 2.83 2.71 0.1190 0.1190 18 18 
54.00 430 1040 
Critical value 
ofT 
Accept? 
P=0.050 546 Yes T+ 430 
P=0.025 510 Yes 
P=0.010 470 Yes 
P=0.005 441 Yes 
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Impact 
Risk Number Delphi 1 Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
Xl X2 (d=X1-X2) Idl Rank Id l + - 
1 289 3.00 -0.1111 0.1111 13 13 
2 4.22 4.14 0.0794 0.0794 7 7 
3 3.33 3.64 -0.3095 0.3095 36 36 
4 3.75 4.14 -0.3929 0.3929 43 43 
5 3.13 3.00 0.1250 0.1250 14 14 
6 2.78 2.71 0.0635 0.0635 4 4 
7 3.14 283 0.3095 0.3095 36 36 
8 3.38 3.33 0.0417 0.0417 1 1 
9 286 3.00 -0.1429 0.1429 17 
17 
10 3.29 3.36 -0.0714 0.0714 5 
5 
11 4.13 3.71 0.4107 0.4107 44 44 
12 2.75 267 0.0833 0.0833 9 9 
13 1.86 2.17 -0.3095 0.3095 36 
36 
14 200 200 0.0000 
15 2.14 2.25 -0.1071 0.1071 12 12 
16 2.13 2.29 -0.1607 0.1607 25 25 
17 3.14 3.93 -0.7857 0.7857 49 
49 
18 4.14 3.86 0.2857 0.2857 33 33 
19 257 3.17 -0.5952 0.5952 48 
48 
20 3.56 3.71 -0.1587 0.1587 22 
22 
21 2.38 2.67 -0.2917 0.2917 34 
34 
22 3.22 3.43 -0.2063 0.2063 28 
28 
23 267 3.00 -0.3333 0.3333 39 
39 
24 4.13 3.71 0.4107 0.4107 44 44 
25 4.00 4.00 0.0000 
26 3.13 3.50 -0.3750 0.3750 42 42 
27 3.50 3.36 0.1429 0.1429 17 17 
28 3.83 4.00 -0.1667 0.1667 26 
26 
29 288 293 -0.0536 0.0536 3 
3 
30 3.43 3.29 0.1429 0.1429 17 17 
31 243 2.50 -0.0714 0.0714 5 5 
32 3.86 3.58 0.2738 0.2738 32 32 
33 3.33 3.43 -0.0952 0.0952 10 10 
34 3.78 3.57 0.2063 0.2063 28 28 
35 4.38 4.14 0.2321 0.2321 30 30 
36 3.67 4.00 -0.3333 0.3333 39 
39 
37 3.44 3.29 0.1587 0.1587 22 22 
38 2.89 3.14 -0.2540 0.2540 31 
31 
39 3.00 3.00 0.0000 
40 3.00 3.17 -0.1667 0.1667 26 
26 
41 2.78 293 -0.1508 0.1508 20 
20 
42 2.78 2.93 -0.1508 0.1508 20 
20 
43 3.56 4.00 -0.4444 0.4444 47 47 
44 3.13 3.00 0.1250 0.1250 14 14 
45 3.00 3.33 -0.3333 0.3333 39 
46 5.00 4.57 0.4286 0.4286 46 46 
47 4.14 4.29 -0.1429 0.1429 16 
16 
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Impact 
Risk Number Delphi 1 Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
Xi X2 (d=X1-X2) Idl Rank Idi + - 
48 4.33 4.43 -0.0952 0.0952 11 11 
49 4.22 4.14 0.0794 0.0794 7 7 
50 3.56 3.71 -0.1587 0.1587 22 22 
51 3.00 3.00 0.0000 
52 3.13 3.42 -0.2917 0.2917 34 34 
53 3.67 3.71 -0.0476 0.0476 2 2 
54 4.50 4.50 0.0000 
55 4.50 4.50 0.0000 
7= 49.00 405 800 
Critical value 
ofT 
Accept? 
P=0.050 446 Yes T+ 405 
P=0.025 415 Yes 
P=0.010 380 No 
P=0.005 356 No 
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Mitigation 
Risk 
Number 
Delphi I Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
X1 X2 (d=X1-X2) Idl Rank IdI + 
1 289 3.14 -0.2540 0.2540 25 25 
2 4.00 3.71 0.2857 0.2857 26 26 
3 3.33 3.00 0.3333 0.3333 34 34 
4 4.00 3.71 0.2857 0.2857 26 26 
5 3.25 3.43 -0.1786 0.1786 19 19 
6 289 3.00 -0.1111 0.1111 9 9 
7 3.43 292 0.5119 0.5119 42 42 
8 3.13 3.00 0.1250 0.1250 10 10 
9 3.14 2.92 0.2262 0.2262 22 22 
10 4.43 3.86 0.5714 0.5714 43 43 
11 4.13 3.71 0.4107 0.4107 40 40 
12 3.75 3.50 0.2500 0.2500 23 23 
13 4.29 3.67 0.6190 0.6190 46 46 
14 4.71 3.75 0.9643 0.9643 51 51 
15 3.57 3.17 0.4048 0.4048 39 39 
16 3.88 3.50 0.3750 0.3750 36 36 
17 2.43 1.71 0.7143 0.7143 49 49 
18 4.57 4.43 0.1429 0.1429 11 11 
19 243 1.83 0.5952 0.5952 45 45 
20 3.11 279 0.3254 0.3254 33 33 
21 2.63 1.92 0.7083 0.7083 48 48 
22 2.89 2.71 0.1746 0.1746 17 17 
23 2.22 229 -0.0635 0.0635 7 
7 
24 3.13 3.07 0.0536 0.0536 4 4 
25 338 3.07 0.3036 0.3036 31 31 
26 2.50 2.17 0.3333 0.3333 34 34 
27 3.83 3.14 0.6905 0.6905 47 47 
28 3.80 3.21 0.5857 0.5857 44 44 
29 3.00 3.00 0.0000 
30 4.29 3.79 0.5000 0.5000 41 41 
31 4.00 3.71 0.2857 0.2857 26 26 
32 3.86 3.92 -0.0595 0.0595 6 
6 
33 3.00 2.86 0.1429 0.1429 12 12 
34 3.00 286 0.1429 0.1429 12 12 
35 3.71 3.57 0.1429 0.1429 12 12 
36 4.00 3.71 0.2857 0.2857 26 26 
37 3.67 3.29 03810 0.3810 37 37 
38 3.78 4.00 -0.2222 0.2222 21 
21 
39 3.00 3.14 -0.1429 0.1429 12 
12 
40 3.50 3.25 0.2500 0.2500 23 23 
41 3.89 3.57 03175 0.3175 32 32 
42 4.22 3.43 0.7937 0.7937 50 50 
43 3.89 3.71 0.1746 0.1746 17 17 
44 4.38 4.08 0.2917 0.2917 30 30 
45 4.56 4.17 0.3889 0.3889 38 38 
46 4.43 4.29 0.1429 0.1429 16 16 
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Mitigation 
Risk 
Number 
Delphi 1 Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
X1 X2 (d=X1-X2) Idl Rank Idl + - 
47 4.57 4.50 0.0714 0.0714 8 8 
48 4.44 4.43 0.0159 0.0159 2 2 
49 3.89 3.86 0.0317 0.0317 3 3 
50 4.00 4.21 -0.2143 0.2143 20 20 
51 4.22 4.21 0.0079 0.0079 1 1 
52 4.00 4.00 0.0000 
53 3.56 3.50 0.0556 0.0556 5 5 
54 5.14 5.1429 5.1429 53 53 
55 4.57 4.5714 4.5714 52 52 
53.00 1297 119 
Critical value 
ofT 
Accept? 
P=0.050 526 Yes T+ 119 
P=0.025 491 Yes 
P=0.010 452 Yes 
P=0.005 424 Yes 
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Significance 
Risk 
Number 
Delphi I Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
(d=X1-X2) Ids Rank IdI + - 
1 12.52 13.29 -0.7672 0.7672 24 24 
2 16.42 17.16 -0.7435 0.7435 23 23 
3 14.44 15.87 -1.4280 1.4280 37 
37 
4 14.06 16.57 -25089 2.5089 48 
48 
5 8.98 9.86 -0.8728 0.8728 26 26 
6 10.80 10.47 0.3331 0.3331 10 10 
7 15.27 13.69 1.5709 1.5709 38 38 
8 14.34 13.89 0.4549 0.4549 13 13 
9 10.20 11.00 -0.7959 0.7959 25 
25 
10 11.27 11.03 0.2347 0.2347 7 7 
11 15.47 12.20 3.2647 3.2647 51 51 
12 9.28 9.33 -0.0521 0.0521 1 
1 
13 6.90 7.58 -0.6854 0.6854 20 
20 
14 6.86 6.67 0.1905 0.1905 4 4 
15 6.43 7.13 -0.6964 0.6964 22 
22 
16 6.91 8.82 -1.9101 1.9101 44 
44 
17 15.71 20.48 -4.7704 4.7704 53 
53 
18 13.02 13.22 -0.2041 0.2041 5 
5 
19 12.12 15.83 -3.7109 3.7109 52 
52 
20 17.38 18.04 -0.6581 0.6581 19 
19 
21 10.09 10.67 -0.5729 0.5729 16 
16 
22 15.04 16.16 -1.1262 1.1262 32 
32 
23 11.85 14.57 -2.7196 2.7196 49 
49 
24 19.59 17.51 2.0835 2.0835 47 47 
25 16.50 17.14 -0.6429 0.6429 18 18 
26 14.84 18.08 -3.2396 3.2396 50 
50 
27 12.25 13.43 -1.1786 1.1786 33 
33 
28 14.06 15.43 -1.3730 1.3730 36 
36 
29 11.50 11.30 0.2041 0.2041 6 6 
30 13.71 12.67 1.0408 1.0408 30 30 
31 7.29 7.86 -0.5714 0.5714 15 15 
32 14.88 14.93 -0.0530 0.0530 2 
2 
33 15.56 17.14 -1.5873 1.5873 39 
39 
34 16.79 16.33 0.4636 0.4636 14 14 
35 15.86 14.80 1.0635 1.0635 31 31 
36 13.85 14.86 -1.0053 1.0053 29 
29 
37 11.86 11.27 0.5989 0.5989 17 17 
38 10.59 12.57 -1.9788 1.9788 45 
45 
39 14.63 12.86 1.7679 1.7679 41 41 
40 13.88 14.25 -0.3750 0.3750 11 11 
41 10.80 12.55 -1.7486 1.7486 40 40 
42 9.26 10.46 -1.1999 1.1999 34 34 
43 15.01 16.29 -1.2734 1.2734 35 35 
44 10.94 10.25 0.6875 0.6875 21 21 
45 7.67 9.44 -1.7778 1.7778 42 42 
46 11.43 11.76 -0.3265 0.3265 9 
9 
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Significance 
Risk 
Number 
Delphi 1 Delphi 2 Difference Signed Rank 
(d=X1-X2) Idl Rank Idl + - 
47 10.65 1255 -1.8980 1.8980 43 43 
48 15.41 15.82 -0.4089 0.4089 12 
12 
49 15.48 15.39 0.0937 0.0937 3 3 
50 12.25 14.33 -20796 20796 46 
46 
51 10.00 9.00 1.0000 1.0000 28 28 
52 10.16 11.10 -0.9479 0.9479 27 
27 
53 15.07 15.39 -0.3137 0.3137 8 
8 
54 11.57 11.5714 11.5714 54 54 
55 12.21 122143 122143 55 55 
n= 55.00 470 1070 
Critical value 
ofT 
Accept? 
P=0.050 566 Yes T+ 470 
P=0.025 529 Yes 
P=0.010 488 Yes 
P=0.005 458 No 
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Appendix G- Critical values for T in the U7ilcoxon test 
n=53 n=54 n=55 
P=0.100 526 546 566 
P=0.050 491 510 529 
P=0.025 452 470 488 
P=0.010 424 441 458 
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Appendix H- List of risks identified from the Delphi 
process 
1. Staff not aware of progress of merger 
2. Inter-organisational connectivity not achieved 
3. General Organisational Cultures do not match 
4. Business areas do not report progress in a timely 
5. Control centre staff are not the correct personality types for the role 
6. Control centre staff do not fully understand what they are reporting 
7. Investment bank's operations are so large and complex that it is not 
possible for single individuals to fully 
8. Seniority of rank may take precedence over knowledge in the operation of 
the control centre 
9. Control centre managers are not good people managers 
10. Control centre tools not robust 
11. Control staff not aware of contingency measures 
12. Control centre staff do not 'know' their counterparts in other locations 
13. Control centre environment not comfortable 
14. Food and drinks available to the control centre staff not sufficient 
15. Amenity and hygiene facilities not suitable for control centre working 
16. Inadequate mix of experienced and energetic staff in the control centre. 
17. Need to rationalise software may mean that 'good' software is disposed of. 
18. The number of positions on the books make it difficult to complete the 
change of control in the desired 
19. Post merger staff not'introduced' to new organisation 
20. Management may focus on the 'business' of the merger and not the human 
resources side of it 
21. 'Overnight' re-branding of corporate systems may result in a shock or 
possible resentment by staff 
22. Staff not aware of their position in the new combined organisation 
23. Personal contacts network no longer valid, or significantly reduced 
24. Critical staff dependency 
25. Organisation is slow to mobilise itself for the merger 
26. Talented resource not fully utilised 
27. Valuation of the merger incorrect 
28. Merger execution 'due diligence' not completed in a timely manner 
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29. Escalation process too sensitive 
30. Control centre not practiced 
31. Control centre overly practiced 
32. Business lines not utilizing central PMO resources 
33. Co-ordination meetings too large 
34. Staff become'burned out' 
35. Financial and risk control may not be as accurate as possible 
36. Knowledge diluted by a single point of control 
37. Formal escalation through control structures may result in a slowing of the 
decision making process 
38. Everyone involved in the change of control not aware of the plan 
39. Change of Control reporting requirements not defined at start of CoC 
period 
40. Formal reporting lines bypassed 
41. Progress not reported "down" the organisation 
42. The recipients of information are not clearly defined 
43. System dependencies not clearly defined 
44. Control centre staff not well trained 
45. No event tracking in place 
46. Trading desks not aware of their positions after Change of Control 
47. Settlement function not clear as to what positions need to be settled or 
when 
48. Communications with external parties not coordinated 
49. Non-trading areas not fully engaged 
50. Organisation not confident that merger will actually 
51. Control centres not set-up correctly 
52. Merger information packs not distributed in time 
53. Change of Control plans not completed in a timely 
54. Trading desks not aware of their positions at the start of Change of 
Control; and 
55. Trading desks not aware of their positions during. 
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Appendix I- Hazard rankings 
Risk 
Number' 
Significance 
variation 
>ISD 
Mitigation 
variation 
>1SD 
Significances 
Ranking 
Mitigation 
Ranking 
Negligent 
Ranking 
Excessive 
Ranking 
1 Yes 33 46 22 
2 Yes 19 18 25 
3 Yes Yes 13 44 11 
4 Yes 23 25 26 
5 Yes 47 30 17 
6 41 41 30 
7 Yes Yes 22 36 18 
8 Yes Yes 15 40 12 
9 Yes 39 43 29 
10 Yes Yes 35 10 14 
11 Yes 25 23 32 
12 Yes 50 26 12 
13 Yes 52 18 4 
14 Yes 55 9 1 
15 53 34 13 
16 51 27 10 
17 Yes Yes 3 54 1 
18 Yes 29 12 19 
I'op must excessive in RI -I), ten most negligent in BLUE and ten most balanced in (, IZ 1 '. 1' 
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Risk 
Number' 
Significance 
variation 
> ISD 
Mitigation 
variation 
> 1SD 
Significances 
Ranking 
Mitigation 
Ranking 
Negligent 
Ranking 
Excessive 
Ranking 
19 Yes 24 54 5 
20 Yes Yes 1 49 2 
21 Yes 46 53 19 
22 Yes 17 50 7 
23 26 51 9 
24 Yes 2 38 4 
25 4 38 8 
26 Yes 7 52 3 
27 32 35 28 
28 Yes 11 36 13 
29 Yes 40 46 24 
30 Yes 28 11 20 
31 Yes 54 12 3 
32 Yes 10 16 23 
33 Yes Yes 6 44 10 
34 Yes 5 46 6 
35 Yes 12 31 15 
36 Yes 21 18 31 
37 Yes 34 29 21 
38 31 15 18 
39 Yes Yes 27 41 17 
40 Yes Yes 18 33 14 
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Risk 
Number' 
Significance 
variation 
> 1SD 
Mitigation 
variation 
> 1SD 
Significances 
Ranking 
Mitigation 
Ranking 
Negligent 
Ranking 
Excessive 
Ranking 
41 Yes 30 28 23 
42 Yes Yes 44 24 16 
43 Yes 9 21 21 
44 43 6 9 
45 49 7 5 
46 Yes 37 5 11 
47 Yes 38 4 8 
48 Yes 14 3 22 
49 Yes Yes 8 21 20 
50 Yes Yes 19 17 27 
51 Yes 48 8 6 
52 Yes 36 12 15 
53 Yes 16 31 16 
54 45 1 2 
55 Yes 42 2 7 
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Appendix J- Sitkin and Pablo's risk propositions 
1. The risk propensity of decision makers will be consistent with their preference 
concerning risk. 
2. Over time, decision makers will exhibit inertia in their risk propensity. 
3. a Decision maker's propensity to take risks will be contingent upon the degree of 
outcome of success associated with their past propensity to take risks. 
3. b The variability of decision makers' risk propensity will decrease with increases in the 
scale of prior failure outcomes, but will be unaffected by the schedule of prior failure 
outcomes. 
4. Decision makers who have a risk-seeking propensity will perceive risks to be lower 
than decision makers who have a risk-averse propensity. 
5. a Positively framed situations will be perceived as involving higher risk than is 
normatively appropriate, whereas negatively framed situations will be perceived as 
involving a level of risk that is lower than normatively appropriate. 
5. b Negatively framed situations will be perceived as involving higher risk than is 
normatively appropriate, whereas positively framed situations will be perceived as 
involving a level of risk that is below a normatively acceptable limit. 
G. The more homogeneous the top-management team, the more its individual members 
will exhibit risk perceptions that are similar and extreme; they also will exhibit 
confidence in the accuracy of those perceptions. 
7. Decision maker's perceptions of risk will be consistent with the risk-related role 
models provided by their leaders. 
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8. a Decision makers with moderate levels of domain familiarity will have more accurate 
estimates of risk and more moderate levels of confidence in the accuracy of those 
estimates than will decision makers with high or low levels of domain familiarity. 
8. b Decision makers with moderate or high levels of domain familiarity will have more 
stable perceptions of risk than will decision makers with low levels of domain 
familiarity. 
9. a The greater the emphasis on process controls in organisations, the lower the level of 
risk perceived be decisions makers. 
9. b The greater the emphasis on outcome controls in organisations, the higher the level 
of risk perceived by decision makers. 
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Appendix K- Vlek and Keren 's risk definitions 
1. Probability of undesired consequences. 
2. Seriousness of (maximum) possible undesired consequences. 
3. Multi-attribute weighted sum of components of possible undesired consequences. 
4. Probability x seriousness of undesired consequences (`expected loss'). 
5. Probability weighted sum of all possible undesired consequences (average 
`expected loss'). 
6. Fitted function through graph of points relating probability to extent of undesired 
consequences. 
7. Semi variance of possible undesired consequences about their average. 
8. Variance of all possible consequences about mean expected consequences. 
9. Weighted combination of various parameters of the probability distribution of all 
possible consequences. 
10. Weight of possible undesired consequences (`loss') relative to comparable possible 
desired consequence (`gain'). 
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Appendix L- Volatility of results: Average probability, 
impact and mitigation scores for all risks 
Average I Probability I Impact I Mitigation 
PoiYNuMbV NaledsY ProWWY Ynpstl 
Howwel 
. need) A.. g. 
landend 
Dedtllon Ren " Avere " 
Slenderd 
D. Mton Rene Avere " 
Slendrtd 
D A. tlon Ren 
1 4.45 2.73 2.91 4.45 1.13 4.00 2.73 0.65 2.00 2.91 1.04 4.00 
2 3.82 4.00 4.00 3.82 1.25 4.00 4.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 0.77 2.00 
3 4.41 3.59 3.00 4.41 1.39 4.00 3.59 1.02 3.00 3.00 1.10 4.00 
4 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 1.44 5.00 3.45 1.51 5.00 3.45 1.21 4.00 
5 2.82 2.91 3.27 2.82 1.08 4.00 2.91 1.22 5.00 3.27 1.35 5.00 
6 3.82 2.91 3.09 3.82 0.87 3.00 2.91 0.83 3.00 3.09 0.70 2.00 
7 3.82 2.55 2.68 3.82 2.04 6.00 2.55 1.51 5.00 2.68 1.65 5.00 
8 4.09 3.18 2.82 4.09 1.58 6.00 3.18 1.40 5.00 2.82 1.54 5.00 
9 3.09 2.45 2.50 3.09 1.64 5.00 2.45 1.29 4.00 2.50 1.60 5.00 
10 3.09 3.14 3.82 3.09 1.30 5.00 3.14 1.38 5.00 3.82 1.54 5.00 
11 3.27 3.55 3.55 3.27 1.74 6.00 3.55 1.57 6.00 3.55 1.37 5.00 
12 2.91 2.55 3.55 2.91 1.38 5.00 2.55 1.13 4.00 3.55 1.44 5.00 
13 3.09 1.73 3.27 3.09 1.76 5.00 1.73 0.90 3.00 3.27 1.79 5.00 
14 2.91 1.64 3.50 2.91 1.81 5.00 1.64 1.03 3.00 3.50 2.06 6.00 
15 2.73 1.86 2.73 2.73 1.74 6.00 1.86 1.05 3.00 2.73 1.49 4.00 
16 3.45 2.00 3.41 3.45 1.37 5.00 2.00 0.77 3.00 3.41 1.28 5.00 
17 4.14 2.95 1.73 4.14 2.10 6.00 2.95 1.77 5.00 1.73 1.19 4.00 
18 3.09 3.45 3.73 3.09 1.22 4.00 3.45 1.44 5.00 3.73 1.62 6.00 
19 4.00 2.36 1.73 4.00 2.05 6.00 2.36 1.36 4.00 1.73 1.19 4.00 
20 5.00 3.73 2.68 5.00 0.63 2.00 3.73 1.01 3.00 2.68 1.06 3.00 
21 3.82 2.18 2.14 3.82 1.47 5.00 2.18 0.98 4.00 2.14 1.05 4.00 
22 4.64 3.36 2.64 4.64 0.81 3.00 3.36 0.81 2.00 2.64 1.03 3.00 
23 4.82 2.91 2.36 4.82 0.75 3.00 2.91 0.54 2.00 2.36 0.81 3.00 
24 4.82 3.82 3.14 4.82 0.98 3.00 3.82 0.75 2.00 3.14 0.71 2.00 
25 4.27 4.00 3.14 4.27 0.65 2.00 4.00 0.63 2.00 3.14 0.71 3.00 
26 4.64 2.91 2.09 4.64 1.63 6.00 2.91 1.14 4.00 2.09 1.04 4.00 
27 3.36 3.05 3.00 3.36 1.29 5.00 3.05 1.19 5.00 3.00 1.10 4.00 
28 3.18 3.36 2.68 3.18 1.66 5.00 3.36 1.80 6.00 2.68 1.38 4.00 
29 3.91 2.86 2.91 3.91 0.54 2.00 2.86 0.64 2.00 2.91 0.83 3.00 
30 3.45 3.18 3.77 3.45 1.29 5.00 3.18 1.60 5.00 3.77 1.47 6.00 
31 2.82 2.14 3.73 2.82 1.17 4.00 2.14 1.10 3.50 3.73 1.49 6.00 
32 3.55 3.05 3.32 3.55 1.86 6.00 3.05 1.80 6.00 3.32 1.68 5.00 
33 5.00 3.27 3.00 5.00 0.63 2.00 3.27 0.90 3.00 3.00 0.89 3.00 
34 4.55 3.73 2.91 4.55 0.69 2,00 3.73 0.90 3.00 2.91 1.04 4.00 
35 3.45 3.82 3.18 3.45 1.44 6.00 3.82 1.54 6.00 3.18 1.25 4.00 
36 3.64 4.00 4.00 3.64 1.21 4,00 4.00 1.26 4.00 4.00 0.63 2.00 
37 3.36 3.55 3.64 3.36 0.81 3.00 3.55 1.13 4.00 3.64 0.81 2.00 
38 3.82 3.27 4.09 3.82 0.98 3.00 3.27 1.10 4.00 4.09 0.70 2.00 
39 4.64 3.00 3.09 4.64 0.92 3.00 3.00 0.89 3.00 3.09 1.14 4.00 
40 4.27 3.00 3.05 4.27 1.68 6.00 3.00 1.48 6.00 3.05 1.49 5.00 
41 4.27 2.95 3.73 4.27 1.35 5,00 2.95 0.85 3.00 3.73 1.10 4.00 
42 3.55 2.95 3.82 3.55 0.82 3.00 2.95 0.96 3.00 3.82 0.87 2.00 
43 4.14 3.91 3.91 4.14 1.23 4.00 3.91 1.04 4.00 3.91 0.70 2.00 
44 3.14 2.91 4.05 3.14 1.31 5.00 2.91 1.38 5.00 4.05 1.42 5.00 
45 2.82 3.27 4.36 2.82 1.33 5.00 3.27 0.90 3.00 4.36 0.67 2.00 
46 2.27 4.18 4.09 2.27 1.10 4.00 4.18 1.72 6.00 4.09 1.51 5.00 
47 2.59 3.64 4.14 2.59 1.07 4.00 3.64 1.75 6.00 4.14 1.45 5.00 
48 3.55 4.45 4.64 3.55 1.63 5.00 4.45 0.93 3.00 4.64 0.67 2.00 
49 3.82 4.27 3.91 3.82 0.87 3.00 4.27 0.79 3.00 3.91 1.04 4.00 
50 3.82 4.00 4.05 3.82 1.60 5.00 4.00 1.18 4.00 4.05 0.96 3.00 
51 3.09 3.09 4.32 3.09 1.14 3.00 3.09 1.14 4.00 4.32 0.90 3.00 
52 3.05 3.14 3.73 3.05 1.27 5.00 3.14 1.31 5.00 3.73 1.49 5.00 
53 4.09 3.82 3.50 4.09 0.94 3.00 3.82 0.87 3.00 3.50 0.50 1.00 
54 2.27 3.77 4.64 2.27 1.01 4.00 3.77 1.57 6.00 4.64 1.57 6.00 
55 2.36 3.86 4.27 2.36 1.29 5.00 3.86 1.61 6.00 4.27 1.56 5.00 
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Appendix M- Project 3 secondary calculations 
Test 
number 
Risk characteristic 
7 Risk is subject to industry specific 
regulation* 
10 Risk can be managed using formal controls 
(Yes) ** 
12 Risk can be managed using formal controls 
(No) *** 
13 Problem domain is familiar*** 
14 Risk is managed by those impacted** 
15 Risk impacts CoC (Exclusively) *** 
17 Risk is classified as "Technology" 
19 Risk is classified as "Culture"*** 
20 Risk is classified as "Physical"*** 
21 Risk impacts pre-CoC*** 
22 Risk impacts at CoCt 
23 Risk impacts post-CoC*** 
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Appendix N- Project 3 questionnaire 
Questionnaire instructions 
Dear XXXXXXXX 
Thanks again for agreeing to take part in this follow-up exercise. 
As you recall we identified a number of hazards which could impact 
BT/DB merger. You also helped me identify the probability, impact 
and quality of mitigation in place for each of hazard. 
The research indicates that certain factors may have been 
particularly important in influencing the way certain risks were 
managed. I wish to see if that is true. As discussed in our phone 
call I would appreciate it if you could look once more at each of 
these risks and answer let me know if each of the three factors 
apply. Please use the drop down box for each to enter "Yes", if it 
did apply, "No" if it did not and "? " if you feel you can't answer 
(Please try not to use this option! ). 
The three factors are: 
" Industry Specific Regulation Exists which addresses this hazard 
- This is regulation specific to banking/financial services (FSA/SEC 
or FED regulations) 
" Successful outcome history - of dealing with this hazard 
" Can be managed using normal management controls - The types of 
everyday controls in place can be used to manage this hazard 
Please return your questionnaires to me as soon as you can via e-mail 
to XXXXXXXXX@XX. XXX or via fax XXXX XXXX 
Again, many thanks, 
Michael. 
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Qe E 
z 
1 Staff not aware of progress of 
merger. 
2 Inter-organisational connectivity not 
achieved. 
3 General Organisational Cultures do 
not match. 
4 Business areas do not report 
progress in a timely manner. 
5 Control centre staff are not the 
correct personality types for the role, 
6 Control centre staff do not fully 
understand what they are reporting. 
7 Investment banks operations are so 
large and complex that it Is not 
possible for single individuals to 
fully understand It. 
8 Seniority of rank may take 
precedence over knowledge In the 
operation of the control centre 
9 Control centre managers are not 
good people managers 
10 Control centre tools not robust. 
11 Control staff not aware of 
contingency measures. 
12 Control centre staff do not'knovd 
their counterparts In other locations 
13 Control centre environment not 
comfortable 
14 Food and drinks available to the 
control centre staff not sufficient. 
15 Amenity and hygiene facilities not 
suitable for control centre working 
16 Inadequate mix of experienced and 
energetic staff in the control centre. 
18 The number of positions on the 
books make It difficult to complete 
the change of control in the desired 
time-frame. 
19 Post merger staff not' introduced' to 
new organisation 
21 'Overnight' re-branding of corporate 
systems may result In a shock or 
possible resentment by staff 
22 Staff not aware of their position in 
the new combined organisation. 
Page 253 
YY ý'w k ýY" 
7" 
,,:.;; .. 2 ., 
23 Personal contacts network no 
valid, or significantly reduced. 
24 Critical staff dependency. 
25 Organisations slow to mobilise itself 
for the merger. 
26 Talented resource not fully utilised. 
27 Valuation of the merger incorrect. 
28 Merger execution 'due diligence' not 
completed in a timely manner. 
29 Escalation process too sensitive. 
30 Control centre not practiced. 
32 Business lines not utilizing central 
PMO resources. 
33 Co-ordination meetings too large. 
34 Staff become 'burned out. 
35 Financial & risk control may not be 
as accurate as required 
36 Knowledge diluted by a single point 
of control 
37 Formal escalation through control 
structures may result in a slowing of 
the decision making process. 
38 Everyone involved in the change of 
control not aware of the plan 
39 Change of Control reporting 
requirements not defined at start of 
CoC period. 
40 Formal reporting lines bypassed 
41 Progress not reported "down" the 
organisation. 
42 The recipients of information are not 
clearly defined 
43 System dependencies not clearly 
defined 
44 Control centre staff not well trained. 
45 No event tracking in place. 
46 Trading desks not aware of their 
positions after Change of Control. 
47 Settlement function not clear as to 
what positions need to be settled or 
when. 
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48 Communications with external 
parties not coordinated. 
49 Non-trading areas not fully engaged. 
50 Organisation not confident that 
merger will actually happen. 
51 Control centres not set-up correctly. 
52 Merger information packs not 
distributed in time. 
53 Change of Control plans not 
completed in a timely manner. 
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